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Economic systems are distributed in the sense that economic agents make
decisions without any central control. Prices, quantities, wealth, and market
structure emerge from the interaction of agents acting in their own self interest.
The concepts and language of systems science are used to define economic
systems in a manner that captures and articulates the distributed nature of
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2economic systems. Further, the systems definition permits multiple views of the
economic system, and in addition, allows the agents to "step outside" the system
in order to study it.
Economic systems are defined in such a way that it is feasible to construct
artificial economic systems, and in particular, ones that are composed of self-
interested agents that operate according to principles that are prescribed by the
researcher. An artificial economic system was actually constructed and tested in
a computer environment. The model was verified with reference to several
theoretical models such as static and adaptive expectations. The system
constructed allows up to 1000 agents to interact without any central control.
A computer "blackboard system" is used as the architecture for providing
common information to the agents in the artificial economic system. The
blackboard design successfully allows complex agents to compete and trade in
an artificial economic system created by the researcher. Prices, quantities,
wealth, and market structure emerge naturally in the artificial economy that
depend on the characteristics and prescribed strategies of the agents in the
system. After a transition period, the trading frequently produces price and
quantity time series that have the characteristics of a random walk, a condition
that is well known in real world markets.
Three classes of producer agents were used in these artificial economic systems:
optimiZing agents that incorporate neural networks, satisficing agents that
incorporate very simple rule-based approaches, and Stackelberg agents that have
knowledge about the consumers in the system, but do not have knowledge
about their competitor's strategies or intentions. Neural networks are used to
3model the behavior and strategies of economic agents that can be said to learn,
i.e., those agents that develop general principles for adapting to changing market
conditions that transfer across markets. The focus of this research was on the
producers in the system. The consumption side of the economic system was
represented by a set of simple consumers.
An important result emerging from this research is that at least one agent out of
four in these experiments with accurate knowledge about market demand
increases the wealth of the system as a whole. Markets containing a single
Stackelberg or neural agent produced far more wealth than markets composed
only of satisficing agents. However, the agents with knowledge do not
necessarily capture the highest share of the wealth.
The success of individual agents depends on the agent's trading strategy, as
expected, and in addition depends on the combination of agents in the system.
Certain strategies appeared to be flexible while others were brittle, and were
easily foiled by changing the agents in the market, or by changing the market
conditions.
Earlier studies attempted to use neural networks to simulate an entire economic
system, but were rejected because the organizing principles of the two systems
are not analogous. Additionally, neural networks were successfully tested for
solving various economics problems that were not related to the simulation of
economic systems. Neural networks were found to effectively solve problems
with missing and redundant data that are not directly solvable with well known
methods such as least squares.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO DISTRIBUTED ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Economic systems are distributed in the sense that every agent in the system acts
independently. Unfortunately, the traditional method of studying economic
systems assumes that the agents are identical, and that they can be aggregated
into representative groups. Thus, an economic system is usually modeled by
making simplifying assumptions that yield an abstraction of an economic
system that is not distributed. The model is fundamentally different from the
real system at a macro level.
Economic systems comprise agents such as individuals, households, firms, etc.
that act independently according to their own private motivation and individual
ability. The traditional approach to modeling these systems assumes that all
economic agents are rational and optimize some specific objective, such as
maximizing profit. The model is fundamentally different from the system at a
micro level.
Allocation of scarce resources through trade and competition among agents
under time constraints are the primary organizing forces in economic systems.
Prices, quantities and wealth emerge naturally in economic systems as a
consequence of these primary organizing forces. Unfortunately, the traditional
approach assumes that at least one of these key emergent variables is fixed, and
ignores the primary economic forces of scarcity, trade and time. The traditional
model is fundamentally different from the system in the manner of organization.
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2I contend that any system that includes distributed agents that act independently
and are organized by scarcity and trade is an economic system. Prices,
quantities and wealth will emerge as properties of such a system, and these
properties depend on the interaction of the particular agents in the system. I
develop a conceptual model of economic systems that is consistent with the
vocabulary and concepts of Systems Science, and then construct nnd test an
artificial economic system based on these ideas. Additionally, neural networks
are developed and tested for simulating agents in these artificial economic
systems, and for analysis of economic data.
Economic systems are defined in Chapter II, using a model based on two views
of a system. The first view sees the system as a unit that contains subunits and
has observable attributes relative to its environment. The second view focuses
on the subunits of the system, and these are organized in a manner that
manifests the observed attributes of the system. The organizing principle of
economics is identified as distributing scarce resources by trading.
The observable attributes of any economic system emerge from the interaction of
agents in the system as they respond to changes in their environment. In an
unrestricted economy, agents make decisions based on their own private
knowledge, beliefs and strategies, but without any central control. The decision
making in such a system is defined as being distributed.
The primary goal of this research is to develop distributed models of economic
systems that mimic selected attributes of genuine economic systems. This area of
research is novel because distributed models have not yet been widely used for
studying economic systems, even though the economy is an example of a
3distributed computer. In order to develop distributed models of economic
systems it is necessary to better understand the concept of a system, and
specifically the concept of an economic system. These concepts are developed
in Chapter II.
Models of economic systems are discussed in Chapter III, including well known
classical models, and the fundamentals of the distributed approach for modeling
economic systems is reviewed. Of special importance to this discussion is the
role of expectations, and the different paths individual economic agents could
take to forming expectations. From my perspective, models of true economic
systems must be flexible enough to include agents with different belief systems,
goals, abilities and problem solving strategies. The ability to adapt, learn and
gather knowledge are identified as important survival skills for economic
agents. In particular, 3 classes of agents are discussed that are consistent with
existing economic literature, and consistent with the concepts of agents in
distributed economic systems: optimizing agents, satisficing agents and
Stackelberg agents.
I assert that economic systems can be understood as a type of parallel distributed
computer. That is, an economy is a computer made up of a large number of
computing elements all operating at the same time, with little (if any) central
control. A free market economy comprises a massive number of activities that
proceed simultaneously (massively parallel), and has little or no central control.
However, as mentioned by Simon [1981, 1982], both hierarchical and distributed
aspects are present in any economy.
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4Assuming that each individual in an economic system acts according to utility
maximization, then the economy does indeed act as a distributed computer,
since there is no central processing unit that computes the prices or the quantities
of goods in the economy at the macro level. However, some centralized control
is apparent in business firms, governments and markets. On closer inspection,
this central control can be seen as a feature that emerges in certain types of
economic systems. The idea that an economy acts as a distributed computer is
not entirely new. Herbert Simon appears to be the first writer to mention this
interpretation of economic systems. However, the view he presents was strongly
influenced by earlier writings, going back as far as Adam Smith, that emphasize
the distributed nature of economic systems. The alternative to distributed
economic systems are systems that exhibit central control or hierarchy. A
common type of hierarchic economic system is a firm in which decisions are
made at the executive level. Obviously, both hierarchic and distributed
economic systems are observed in the world, and it appears that most economic
systems embody some combination of control. A convincing model of an
economic system would also allow differentiation of agents in the system, and
include agents with varying complexity. A significant development of this
research is a better understanding of the dual hierarchic / distributed nature of
economic systems, from a computational perspective.
The typical researcher deals with imperfect information about the agents and
cannot predict in advance what properties will emerge from the interaction of
the agents. However, according to the systems paradigm, even if the researcher
had perfect information about the agents, there are some properties that emerge
Jfrom the interaction of the agents that cannot be predicted solely from the
known attributes of the agents.
The traditional approach to answering questions in economics relies on
aggregation to reduce problem complexity. Unfortunately, a collateral result of
aggregating data into groups that operate in a supposedly identical manner is to
mask the variability that is inherent in individuals, and to reduce the observed
diversity of the world. An important result of the present research is the
demonstration that individual roles are indeed important for building realistic
models of economic systems. In particular, it is demonstrated that a single agent
with knowledge about the system can dramatically impact the status of all
agents in the market.
It has long been recognized that economic processes are adaptive rather than
static (see [Murphy, 1965] for an example). Other authors have suggested a
rational expectations hypothesis to explain the behavior of economic agents
[Muth, 1961]. Simulation of economic systems have typically included adaptive
or rational processes but did not model the economy as a collection of
independent and distributed agents with free agency (see [Naylor, 1971]). An
early paper by AoId suggested modelling the interaction of economic agents as a
stochastic estimator, which is very similar to a neural network approach [Aoki,
1979]. However, Aoki still modelled industries as collections of identical agents.
Fourgeaud, Gourieroux and Pradel [1986], investigated learning and rational
expectations models with agents that learned by using linear regression. Bray
and Savin [1986] follow a similar approach using a cobweb model and endowed
agents with a linear regression learning routine. The agents learned to converge
--''"----- --- ._..--_._'--" ... _.. _..- .
6to the theoretically expected equilibrium in a short time. In all those cases, all
the agents were identical and had a simple problem to solve.
A related area, the field of experimental economics, has slowly emerged as a
significant area of economic research (see [Smith, 1982], [Plott, 1982] for survey
articles). The approach of experimental economics is to create micro markets
with human and sometimes computer participants. One recent example of this
approach was the Santa Fe Institute double auction market for computer agents
[1990] in which I participated. This market was a distributed computational
system based on economic agents that were designed to compete in a double
auction. In a double auction market, a single unit is offered for sale, the sellers
make offers to sell the unit, while the consumers make bids to buy the unit. The
seller with the lowest offer and the consumer with the highest bid are free to
trade with each other. The competitive system is similar to the system
developed here except that the Santa Fe system is far more constrained because
of the double auction framework. Additionally, the Santa Fe system contains a
"monitor" that examines all bids and offers tendered by the agents, eliminating
those that do not conform to the institution of the double auction. In the double
auction framework, the agents and market are designed with a strong tendency
toward equilibrium. In contrast, the market systems designed in my research
are unconstrained by the double auction institution, and have no controlling
monitor to eliminate behavior that is illogical from the researcher's perspective.
In addition, the focus of my research is directed toward longer term learning,
rather than the short term approach to equilibrium in a constrained market. As a
result, pathological economic conditions such as underproduction and
7speculative bubbles are possible in my distributed economic markets, but do not
develop in the Santa Fe Institute double auction type models.
As mentioned above, adaptive behavior has long been of interest to economists,
and more recently, learning and artificial intelligence are entering the economics
literature. For instance, Arthur suggests a bounded rational approach for
designing artificial economic agents [Arthur, 1991]. Holland and Miller suggest
the use of genetic algorithms for developing artificial adaptive agents to study
economic phenomena [Holland and Miller, 1991]. Kiyotaki and Wright show
that a good representing money emerges naturally in artificial markets where
specialized agents meet randomly to trade goods [Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989].
Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent expand on the work of Kiyotaki and Wright
by introducing more complex classifier agents for trading.
A research area that is in some ways similar to my approach to distributed
economic systems is artificial life [Langton, 1991], [Levy, 1992]. The intent of
researchers in the artificial life field is to study the emergent process that is
called life. Automata interact and evolve in artificial ecosystems and display
many of the qualities of life, and in particular, prosper or perish according to
their fitness in their environment. While agents in economic systems share many
of these qualities, such as independence, success according to fitness, and
adaptability, the economic process is organized around scarcity and trade. This
appears to me to be a distinctly different organizing principle from the life
process, which typically includes scarcity, but not trade. While some well
known authors such as Boulding [1981], have pointed out the isomorphisms
between economics and ecology, I believe that the economic process is
--- ._--_._-_ .•._--- - .- ._--
8fundamentally different from the life process because of the economic
organizing principle.
There is a second-order emergence in economic systems that depends on the
prior (lower-order) emergence of an infrastructure complex enough to support
the reasoning required for trade. In this research, I provide the lower order
infrastructure in the form of computer programs that can reason about trade. I
do not make the strong claim that these agents are alive, but I do claim that their
interaction is the interaction of an economic system. In any case, it appears that
the time series emerging from the processes of artificial life and artificial markets
are similar and can be analyzed by similar methods.
The techniques of artificial intelligence become important in understanding how
agents may develop knowledge, understanding and adaptability. Stackelberg
agents are representative of agents with limited knowledge but without the
ability to adapt and to learn. Satisficing agents are representative of the rule-
based artificial intelligence strategies. Optimizing agents are representative of
some computational neural network strategies.
Two types of distributed computer systems are considered in this research for
use as models of distributed economic systems: neural networks and blackboard
systems. Neural networks take their inspiration from the biological brain, where
the neuron is the fundamental processing unit. Millions of neurons exist within
the brain and operate together in a manner that manifests the attributes of the
brain. These neurons operate in a way that is called massively parallel, where
each neuron receives signals from, and sends signals to many other neurons, all
at the same time. Each neuron is loosely connected to thousands of other
9neurons, but not all paths between neurons are of equal strength. Artificial
neural networks (ANNs), or connectionist nets, are conceptually based on this
aspect of brain structure.
In the neural element typically used for ANNs, the processing element has a
simple nonlinear response function and may be connected in parallel to many
other neural elements. The networks are said to learn in the sense that they
modify their responses according to the stimuli they are exposed to. As is well
known, the human brain naturally and easily solves problems that are quite
difficult to solve with conventional computers. Such problems include pattern
recognition, summarization of written material, and intuitive response and
generalization.
Since the neural network is a distributed computer, I entertained the idea of
modeling economic systems as a neural network. (This is not a model from the
economics or neural network literature). However, instead of using a neuron as
the basic processing (decision making) element in the network, an economic
system would be conceptualized as a massively parallel network of human
beings who are making economic decisions. The nodes of an economic system
could represent individuals, each receiving and sending many signals to other
units. The units may specialize so that not all units receive and send identical
signals.
I rejected my neural model of economic systems because neural networks do not
allow for the basic operating principles on which an economic system is
organized. In particular, the neural network approach to distributed computing
does not allow processes resembling trade. Additionally, complex hierarchic
10
structures similar to economic entities are difficult to incorporate in the neural
network schema. Neural networks fail to capture the structural and
organizational nature of distributed economic systems, but are used successfully
to model the behavior of agents that make up the system.
Neural networks are discussed in general in Chapter IV of this dissertation.
Neural networks have many potential applications as computational models in
economics, as well as for modeling the logic and adaptive behavior of economic
agents. The use of neural nets to solve several statistical problems in economics
is discussed in Chapter VIII.
A "blackboard" structure [Englemore and Morgan, 1988] is an alternative model of
distributed computing that is more in keeping with the independence of agents in
economic systems. This model was developed in the field of speech recogni tion,
where many computational processes interact. The blackboard model that is
developed and implemented for modelling distributed economic systems in this
research is described in Chapter V. Briefly, the model is composed of a shared area
of computer memory that is called the blackboard. In this model, economic agents
operate as independent programs which have equal access to all shared da tao The
agents have roles as producers and consumers in the economic market, and are free
to use any strategy to make decisions. An important feature of the blackboard
market is the way time is handled so that both price and quantity can emerge from
interactions in the market.
The blackboard model is an alternative conceptual model of distributed
computing that is consistent with the distributed and independent nature of
economic systems. Blackboard models are discussed and put forth as an
_._-_ .....- .. - ..__ ....•-..-
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example of a distributed economic computing in Chapter V. Using the
blackboard model as the system-level view of an economy, agents are
independent and can interact according to the economic forces of scarcity and
trade. An artificial economic system was constructed from independent
computer programs that use satisficing, optimizing and Stackelberg strategies
for trading scarce resources under time constraints. The optimizing strategy was
implemented in the form of a neural agent that learned and adapted to changing
market conditions.
Chapter VI details the preliminary experiments and verification of the
blackboard market system. The blackboard model was tested and verified with
several well known economics problems. Agents employing static and adaptive
expectations were tested, as well as more complex agents using a Stackelberg
strategy. Two approaches were taken for the market verification, the first used a
cobweb framework to test the market infrastructure and general operation of
inputs and outputs. The second approach used Stackelberg agents with different
numbers of producers and consumers to find an appropriate level of complexity
to work with, and to verify that the theor.etically expected results emerge.
Without exception, these markets came to the theoretically expected equilibrium.
The distributed market experiments are reported in Chapter VII. The emerging
prices, quantities and wealth from experimental markets composed of selected
agents were examined, and the impact of different classes of agents are
determined. In general, the researcher is free to construct markets composed of
any number of agents that follow selected strategies, and are subject to given
constraints.
12
One of the strengths of these markets is that the researcher can directly test the
applicability of different strategies and assumptions about the market. In these
experiments, the focus is on agents that use different assumptions and
knowledge to interact in the market. Specifically, agents use one of three classes
of behavior to make production and price decisions:
1. Satisficing agents use any approach that is good enough to satisfy their
private criteria.
2. Optimizing neural agents learn about the market, and attempt to maximize
profits by adjusting their output and prices to profit from the market conditions.
3. Stackelberg agents have knowledge of the average demand curve, but do not
know the intentions of other producers in the market.
These agents interact with each other, and with consumers, in both
homogeneous and heterogeneous markets (e.g. composed of a single agent or
many agents of different types).
Chapter VIII discusses the analysis of economic data with neural networks.
Several computational economics problems are solved with neural networks,
and compared with more traditional methods when possible. In general, the
successful application of neural methods depends on the problem complexity,
and the availability of data. Neural methods are recommended when problems
are complex and the data is messy. Neural methods are not recommended when
the problem is simple, or when the internal structure of the solu tion and
relationships among the variables must be recovered.
--_•......- _..__ _..
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While others have used neural nets for solving economic problems, no approach
up to this time (known to the author) has been rooted in the idea of systems
theory nor related to the actual activities that take place in economic systems.
The application of neural networks in economics generally are in predicting
bond ratings, bank failures and other classification problems, [Dutta & Shekhar,
1988, 1989], [Surkan & Singleton, 1990], [Odom & Sarda, 1990], trading stock,
currency and commodities, [Kimoto et. al., 1990], [Kamijo and Taniya, 1990],
[Bergson & Wunsch, 1991], [Weigand et.a!. 1991], and other forecasting
applications [Hoptroff and Hall, 1991].
Some of the published neural network research in the economics literature
claims advantages for neural models that appear to be overstated or even
incorrect. For example, Dutta and Shekhar claim advantages for neural
networks over linear regression when applied to predicting bond ratings, but
overlook the basic similarity between these methods. There are two very
different potential uses of neural networks for solving problems in the field of
economics. The first is to apply the connectionist network purely as a
computational device, without giving any meaning to the network structure.
This is the usual approach found in the neural network literature. The second
approach, which I proposed and rejected for modeling economic systems in this
research, is to assign an economic meaning to elements within the network.
Neural nets were successfully used to model the behavior of economic agents,
and to solve several computational problems in economics.
Researchers in neural nets have done a good deal of high quality theoretical
work, and have linked neural nets to stochastic estimators that are sometimes
used to estimate economic phenomenon [Hornick et. al., 1990], [White, 1989]. It
____._•• _ • •• •• • - __ • ••• _. 0 •
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is also noteworthy that none of the reported research is based on a concept of the
economy as a distributed computer. Rather, the work of White and associates
emphasizes the network as a stochastic estimator of an unknown function. The
network structure proposed by White is based, appropriately, on a vision of a
computing, rather than an economic, system.
The conclusions resulting from this research are reported and summarized in
Chapter IX.
CHAPTER II
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO ECONOMICS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation on which the empirical research is
based. In the first section, systems are defined in a way that is consistent with
the ideas and vocabulary of systems science. This section relies heavily on the
definition of a system that was proposed by Lendaris [Lendaris, 1986], and in
subsequent sections, I adapt and build on this definition in the context of
economic decision making. The characteristics of economics that are relevant to
the systems approach are also described in this chapter. Furthermore, the
characteristics of economic phenomena and of systems are brought together to
define economic systems. The second section of this chapter describes how the
definition of economic systems can be used to help understand them as
distributed computers.
Definition of Systems
Recent definitions of systems found in the literature insist that systems are more
than a set of elements, attributes and relations. Modern definitions include
emphasis on the importance of individual perception in the fundamental
definition of a system. Lendaris, for example [Lendaris, 1986], gives the
following two-part definition of a system.
~-- .•... _- .. _..-.._... - ... _..•.
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"A system is:
A. A unit with certain attributes perceived relative to its external environment,
and
B. That unit has the quality that it internally contains subunits and those
subunits operate together to manifest the perceived attributes of the unit."
This definition specifies the requisite features of any system. The definition
consists of two parts that explicitly indicate the simultaneous existence of macro
and micro components in the system. First, a system can be perceived at the level
of a unit within its environment, and second, as a collection of subunits within
the unit. The levels exist simultaneously, yet can be observed separately.
Furthermore, the definition requires that the attributes of the system are
perceived relative to the external environment by an observer, thus specifying
the relationship of the system to its environment, and insisting on the existence
of an observer. The observer's focus (relationship to the system and the
environment) provides the context against which the unit is perceived by the
observer. The environment does not consist of the internal elements of the
system, but rather as the background against which the system is observed.
As mentioned above, the word "perceived" indicates that a human is present to
observe the system. Thus, the human element of perception exists in the
primary definition of a system. Perception is inherently a subjective experience
that relies on the observer. As a consequence of the subjective nature of
perception, no system is perceived with complete objectivity. Alternative
perspectives may provide radically different understandings of the same
"system".
17
The second level of this definition provides for the internal subunits that
compose the system. Again, the reference to perception internalizes the
observer in the definition of the system. The subunits operate together to
manifest the perceived attributes of the unit. The attributes of the system are not
simply the sum of the attributes of the subunits. Instead, the attributes of the
unit emerge from the interaction of the subunits. Decomposition is the usual
method of scientific analysis of physical phenomenon. However, not all systems
are decomposable, and if the subunits are strongly coupled [Simon, 1981],
serious errors are introduced by decomposition without the proper redefinition
of the environment, system and subsystem relationships.
When taken together, this definition requires perception at three adjacent levels:
the environment, the unit and the subunit. Statement A requires perception of
the environment and the unit, while statement Bspecifies perception of the unit
and subunits. The statements overlap by requiring perception at the unit level.
Figure 1 depicts a two dimensional representation of the multiple views feasible
for any system. It is possible for the perspective of the observer to shift up and
down the vertical axis. This shifting corresponds to changing the focus of the
observer, and consequently the unit or system level will become the
environment of the new system. The subunit of the previous level will become
the unit level from the new focus, and the new units must contain subunits to
satisfy the definition of a system from the new focus. Figure 1 shows how the
same object may be interpreted at the environment, system and subsystem
levels, depending on the focus of the observer. At the same time, shifting along
the horizontal axis provides a whole new perspective of the system. The
horizontal axis indicates the perspectives that emerge when the observer adopts
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different roles, while the vertical axis represents the relationship of the
environment to the unit and the subunits.
Focus 1
Focus 2
Focus 3
Environment
System 1 Environment
Subsystem System 2 Environment
Subsystem System 3
Subsystem
PerspectIve 1 Perspective 2 Perspectlve 3
Figure 1. Multiple views of a system. (Adapted from [Lendaris, 1986].)
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Existing Definitions
Nearly every author who writes about economics in a general way devotes a
paragraph or two to the concept of an economic system. However, there is no
widespread agreement among the definitions of different authors, and none of
the definitions contain all the elements required for an adequate definition from
the systems perspective.
Many authors rely on the basic definition attributed to Robbins that economics is
the study of scarcity, and economic systems are thus seen as systems in which
scarcity plays a major role in allocation of resources [Robbins, 1935, p161. Some
authors, on the other hand, define economic systems in terms of the behavior
that is attributed to economic agents. From this approach, economic systems are
analyzed by methods that presuppose optimizing behavior [Intriligator, 1971].
In "Microeconomics as an Experimental Science", [Smith, 1982], Smith defines
microeconomic systems in terms of "an environment and an institution". By
environment he means the economic actors in the system and by institution he
means the control mechanism of the system. While Smith's definition is
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appropriate for his purposes, it does not address the basic nature of a system,
and is distinctly different in character from the concept of a system that prevails
in the systems literature. Some of the early writers in the systems field were
economists, such as Kenneth Boulding and Herbert Simon, who wrote
extensively about economic systems. In Economics as a Science [Boulding, 1970],
for instance, Boulding discusses several perceptual viewpoints of economics.
While his overall outlook is in many ways compatible with modern systems
views, he still does not clearly define economic systems. Boulding does
however, reject the view that economics is founded on the premise of scarcity in
favor of the concept that trade is the central feature of economic systems. It
appears that Boulding was particularly interested in isomorphisms between
ecology and economics [Boulding, 1981], and drew heavily on these
relationships. Economics systems, however, are unique and can be studied as
distributed systems in their own right. While isomorphisms exist between other
competitive or distributed systems such as neural or ecological systems,
economic systems appear to operate on other principles. In particular, economic
systems are made up of self directed decision making units that deal with
allocation of scarce resources by trading among themselves.
The writings of Herbert Simon are somewhat closer to the mark. Simon
specifically points out the dual nature of economic systems as distributed and
hierarchic [Simon, 1979, 1981, 1982]. However, he does not provide a definition
of an economic system which is consistent with both of these views. Indeed,
Simon distinguishes between the distributed nature of a free economy and the
hierarchic nature of the firm. Simon was particularly interested in how decisions
are made, and rejected the optimization hypothesis. Simon proposed that
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humans actually use very simple decision making rules rather than complex
optimization procedures.
A recent collection of articles published as Systems Economics [Fox & Miles,
1987], discusses economics from a systems viewpoint, but does not provide an
overall frame for visualizing economic problems. It is also clear from a
comparison of the works of Boulding, Simon and Fox & Miles that there is not
complete agreement within the systems field about the concept of an economic
system.
Economics is the study of decision making problems that include scarcity as a
fundamental consideration. Problems involving efficiency, alternative uses of
resources, and trade are typical economic problems. Robbins [1935, p161 defined
economics as "the science which studies human behavior as a relationship
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." Simon [1981, p31]
also maintained that the fundamental concern of economics is the allocation of
scarce resources:
"Scarcity is a central fact of life. Because resources - land, money, fuel, time,
attention- are scarce in relation to our uses of them, it is a task of rationality to
allocate them. The discipline of economics has taken the performance of that
task as its focal concern."
Both of these economists draw attention to the fact that economics is a discipline
that studies problems posed by the scarcity of resources and the surplus of
competing applications. Generally, economists do not study the actual process
by which decisions are made, but the outcomes of such processes. It is widely
believed in the discipline that economic agents are rational, and that economic
----'''----_..--' _.-- .-.-.- ..
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decision processes are guided by optimization. That is, economic agents compare
the feasible alternatives, and employ the combination of resources that is
preferred above all others, given the associated constraints and benefits. An
alternative hypothesis is based on the concept of bounded rationality, wherein
the economic agents satisfice rather than optimize. The present research studies
the decision making process, and documents the consequences of different
decision making procedures.
In a somewhat different approach, [Boulding, 1970] Boulding emphasized the
importance of one particular type of activity in the economy: "The economy
consists of that segment of the sociosphere which is organized through exchange,
and especially commodity exchange." In his conception then, exchange is the
quintessence of economic activity, and all other economic actions are rela ted to
exchange. Furthermore, like conversation, exchange is a behavior that is
typically human, while scarcity is a phenomenon that is ubiquitous in the animal
world.
Economic decision processes have been defined in relation to allocation of scarce
resources between alternative uses. The role of decision maker is taken up by
some entity such as a country, market, institution, firm, household, individual,
etc. Economic decision units are sometimes called economic agents in the
present work. The activities that these economic decision units are engaged in
will provide the context in which the decision process is embedded. Some
activities that are frequently mentioned in economics include production,
distribution, trade and consumption.
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Recognizing the importance of exchange is crucial for the developmen t of the
concept of economic systems that follows because economic agents do not
operate independently. (With the possible exception of Robinson Cruso).
Rather, the decisions of one unit may affect the decisions of others. Motives for
conflict and cooperation frequently arise between economic entities. We are
interested not only in the decisions of a single unit, but also in the relationships
of the complex of economic units.
Economic Systems
An economic system exists in some environment or context that is defined by the
observer. The system is perceived by some observer who can distinguish the
system from the environment. There is no reason that the observer cannot play il
role in the economic system. The system has attributes that are not shared by the
environment and is therefore distinguishable from the environment by the
observer.
The attributes of an economic system that can be perceived by the observer are
distinguishable from the attributes of the goods and services that the economic
system deals with. Economic variables such as perceived quality are attributes
of goods and services, rather than attributes of an economic system in which
such goods are traded. The attributes of an economic system are embodied in
the relative prices and quantities of goods produced, and in the way the system
adjusts to changes in the economic environment.
The price of a good emerges from the interaction of buyers and sellers who come
together to trade in an economic market. Exactly how the price emerges is not
known with certainty, but a number of models have been suggested over the
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years. The discussion herein will explore some of the better known options and
discuss the implications of price emergence under various models using a
systems approach. Price is sometimes called the "informational link" because it
summarizes all of the information that is available to participants in the market.
The price emerges from interaction in the market and is used by economic
agents as a basis for economic decision making, which in turn affects the price.
The subunits in an economic system are decision making units. The decision
units may share the same information but not all arrive at exact!y the same
decision. In other words, the decision units are not identical and do not
necessarily weigh all the information in the same manner. As a result, not all
decision units come to precisely the same economic decisions.
As mentioned above, an economic system is composed of decision making units
which are the subunits in the system. Decision making units may be simple or
complex <e.g., made up of many subunits), but in either case each unit must
make decisions based on the rules, constraints, and data. In this model, the
decision of each unit is some function of weighted input data. The decisions of
these units are not necessarily independent, and in some cases the units are
competing for the same scarce resources.
Most economic systems are open, e.g. the participants in the system can enter
and leave the system at will, but the system remains intact. Furthermore, the
decision-making units are not physically connected, but rather are connected
only by the information that they share. Attributes of economic systems that
may be of interest are price and substitution elasticities, changes in prices and
incomes, and efficiency in transformation of resources.
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Consider an economic system in the context of production decision making. In
this case, the inputs into the system are resource prices and the total quantity of
output desired. The percentage of the budget expended on each input (budget
share), and the total cost of production emerge as the system operates. The
problem that is given to the production system is to allocate resources given the
resource price and the desired quantity of finished goods to be produced. The
decision making units must choose the appropriate quantities of production
factors so that the production facility is capable of utilizing the factors to
produce the corresponding output. Of course, the expenditure on faclors of
production must be less than the total value of the output in order for the
producer to earn a profit. At the level of this discussion, the internal decision
units could represent alternative firms or production decision making units. In
my approach, the production technology is represented internally within the
system and is not specified by the modeler. In addition, decision rules such as
cost minimization or profit maximization are included implicitly in the system if
they exist.
A Systems Approach Applied to Economic Markets
Application of the systems approach to economic markets is straightforward. A
market exists within some larger economic and social environment. A market is
a trading arena in which buyers and sellers come together to trade specific goods
and services. In this context, the market is the principal unit of study and is
consistent with the definition of an economic system as a system wherein scarce
resources are allocated by trade among independent agents. It is composed of
agents that can be identified by the roles that the sub-units take, such as buyers
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and sellers. The buyers and sellers operate together in a manner that manifests
the attributes of the market.
The variables that emerge from trading are the price and quantity of goods that
are traded, the rate and timing of trades, patterns of trade and so forth. These
attributes cannot be determined by studying the buyers and sellers
independently, but must emerge or unfold over a period of time as interactions
take place. Certain markets may have attributes that are peculiar to themselves,
or may depend on the particular sub-units that participate in the market.
Fundamental characteristics of markets are determined by the control system or
market regulator. In economic terms, the market regulator is known as the
"institution". In some cases, the institution may participate in the market as a
subunit that filters all the interactions between buyers and sellers.
The researcher has a role as a meta-level observer who does not participate in the
workings of the market, but is able to view the interactions at meta-system,
system and subsystem levels as necessary. For instance, taking only a system
view would be analogous to learning how a radio works by observing the
radio's inputs and outputs. A reductionist approach, on the other hand, would
study the independent workings of the individual sub-units, without ever
gaining an understanding of the joint interactions among the sub-units. A meta-
system view permits a further change in scope that enables examination of the
system as it interacts with other systems in its environment. The systems
approach requires an observer that is cognizant of each of the meta- system,
system and sub-system levels, as well as the various roles that can be assumed
within each of these levels.
--_..._"-' -----_ .. --- -_.._--- -
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An economic system such as a market is composed of "smart" agents that can
learn and change their behavior. This is a crucial observation because the
subunits in a market, and economic agents in general, have the ability to study
the market in the same way as the researcher. That is, the sub-units in a market
can conceptually take any role and are capable of "stepping outside the system"
and, studying the market in the same manner as the researcher. This allows the
subunits to form strategies based on knowledge gained by studying the market
and the individuals in the market from an external vantage point.
However, it is vitally important to avoid the pitfall of assuming too much about
the abilities of the market and the economic agents within the market. In
general, I assume that economic agents are capable of learning from experience
and adapting to new situations including changing market conditions. These are
fundamental properties of the sub-units in the market system. Of course it
would be desirable for a model of a market to possess the same properties as the
genuine market at the system and sub-system levels. But a model is intended to
be an abstraction and simplification of reality, not a duplicate it.
The relationships between economic systems, economic agents, and the goods
and services that are traded in economic systems by economic agents may be less
than clear at this juncture. The following discussion is included to illuminate
these relationships.
Attributes of an Economic System. The economic system is perceived (by the
researcher) as a unit relative to its external environment. An economic system
can be distinguished from its environment because it has attributes that the
environment does not share. The attributes that the meta- level observer
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perceives relative to the environment are that the economic system has inputs,
outputs and contains sub-units. The observer may also note some pattern or
hierarchical relationship among the subunits. The inputs and outputs from the
system are economic variables and are sometimes known as instruments in
economic analysis. The sub-units will be called economic agents or just agents in
this discussion.
A distinguishing characteristic of all economic systems is the presence of trade
between the subunits. This feature distinguishes economic systems from other
types of social, biological and physical systems where exchange of goods and
services is not the focus.
Emergent Properties. The outputs that emerge from the economic system may
not be predictable from the characteristics of the agents comprising the system.
Such qualities are defined as emergent properties. In the case of economic
systems, the prices and quantities of goods exchanged are important emergent
properties of the system. Money emerges as a good that facilitates exchange in
all but the most primitive economic systems. The values of other economic
variables including interest and growth rates are system properties, not
properties of goods, services or agents. They emerge from the interaction of
choices of economic agents.
The Sub-Units of an Economic System. The sub-units of an economic system are
economic agents that operate together to manifest the perceived attributes of the
economic system. In microeconomics, the sub-units of an economic systems
have traditionally been defined as consumers and firms, however, other types of
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economic entities, such as households, governments, labor unions, churches and
schools exist and are recognized.
Economic entities such as firms, households and governments also contain
subunits whose interactions manifest the perceived attributes of the entity. The
subunits within economic entities have multiple roles, because each is part of
some larger entity and is also an atomistic consumer. Thus, many economic
agents can be perceived as economic systems in their own right.
A firm, for example, can also be understood as an economic system by
appropriately defining the environment in which it resides, observing that the
firm has attributes relative to its external environment, and identifying the
subunits that operate together to manifest the attributes of the firm. The
employees of the firm usually exchange labor for money and other benefits.
Additionally, firms are typically organized in a hierarchical fashion, which is
one of the attributes of a firm that distinguishes it from other types of economic
systems. Firms may also have other types of subunits that are organized
according to function, such as accounting, production, administration,
transmission and distribution. Of course,large corporations may own many
firms that interact in complex ways.
Economic Activities. Three economic activities are generally recognized;
production, consumption and trade. These are activities that economic agents
engage in, and make decisions about. To these fundamental activities I would
add control, as the function of governmental entities. These activities are
interdependent because the completion of each activity depends on the action of
other agents, and as mentioned above, the agents may have multiple roles in
___•• __._ •• ••••• 0· •
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production and consumption. To complete any activity, the agents must trade,
and therefore, trade is taken as the basic underlying economic activity in which
all economic agents engage. Uncoerced trade is mutually beneficial to the
participants because each exchanges for something that they deem to be of
greater or equal value.
Competitive Economic Systems. It is not my purpose here to analyze all types of
economic systems that can exist in the economic environment. Instead, I am
interested in the common factors shared by what can be recognized as
competitive economic systems. A firm is a cooperative economic system that
enlists individuals by trading money and other benefits for labor. There are
some elements of conflict between the goals of the sub-units and the goals of the
firm. However, the firm is cooperative in the sense that the sub-units are not in
direct competition with each other, but have, at least to some degree, a common
goal. The organizing principle of the firm is cooperative. On the other hand,
conflict and competition are inherent in market economic systems, yet trades are
usually mutually beneficial.
Competition can exist in at least three ways in market economic systems. There
can be competition between producers for market share and sales. At the same
time, consumers compete among themselves for scarce goods and services.
There is also a conflict between consumers and producers over the terms of
trade. Although the exchange between the consumer and producer is mutually
beneficial, the gains from trade are not necessarily divided evenly between
them.
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Motives of Economic Agents. One motivation behind trade is the prospect of
increased consumption of goods and services. The primary motivation behind
production is to produce a good or service that can be exchanged for more
desirable goods and services. The sub-units in production systems trade their
skills and time for the ability to consume. However, other personal and social
factors may influence trade.
In classical economic analysis, the basic operating principle ascribed to economic
agents is constrained optimization. Consequently, the mathematical tools of
constrained optimization are used for analyzing economic problems. In
modeling economic behavior, classical analysis assumes that the economic
agents have objectives and constraints. Firms are assumed to maximize profits
or minimize costs subject to the constraint of their production function. On the
other hand, consumers are assumed to maximize utility subject to the constraint
given by their income. In the first case, the producer has a well defined objective
function (cost), but a poorly defined constraint (a production function or
technology constraint), while in the second case, the consumer has a poorly
defined objective function (utility) but a well defined constraint (income).
Unfortunately, the optimization paradigm begins to become very complex when
the producer must maximize profits based on what the producer believes all
other producers and consumers plan for the future. (The same comment holds
for consumers). For this reason, strategies other than direct optimization are
often encountered in practice. While formal optimization may lead to
interesting insights about economic outcomes, few believe that such processes
are used by individuals to solve every-day economic problems.
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Interpretation of an Economy as a Distributed Computer
The above definition of an economic system leads naturally into the
interpretation of the economy as a distributed computer. By a distributed
computer I mean a computer wherein both computation and storage of
knowledge are spread throughout the system. In a free economy, each
individual operates in his own self interest. Operation is local but the combined
decisions of all the participants of the economy is in some sense optimal. The
prices and quantities of goods available in the economy emerge from such a
system without external coordination or control. The correct quantities of ball
bearings and oranges are produced at the prices corresponding to their relative
scarcity and by virtue of the productivity or quality of the resources. No
omniscient individual computes how much of each quantity to produce and the
prices to set for each item. Instead, these prices and quantities emerge from the
millions of interactions between buyers and sellers in the markets.
Buyers and sellers are the basic decision making units of such a system.
Messages consisting of potential exchange prices pass between them, however,
some information may be held privately by the individual decision making units
and is not shared. Many economic systems also include some type of institution
or control system. Patterns of exchange are formed in an economy over time.
However, search is an important part of economic exchange~ Learning by the
economic units can be understood as learning, not just of the individual agents,
but of the whole economic system. A type of self organization takes place where
entities specialize and differentiation takes place. As this process continues, the
driving force is at the decision making level, and results in a change in
organizational structure of the market. The relative price of a good in this
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system is the informational link that summarizes the good's status in the system.
If each individual begins with a given allocation of wealth, the system will
change through a series of local trades between the econom~c units until the
system comes to equilibrium. In the present research, the exchange prices,
quantities and stored wealth are all computed by individual units in the system.
Each unit acts with local knowledge depending on the messages that are passed
to it from other agents. There is no stipulation that all agents are directly inter-
connected or have perfect knowledge. Instead, each element receives input
signals or messages from many, possibly thousands, of other agents and in the
same manner sends signals to others that are dependent on the signals received
as well as any private information that is available to the unit. In the model
presented here, the economic agent weights the inputs and sends a signal that is
some function of the weighted inputs.
Distributed computers constructed of silicon chips are a comparatively recent
development when compared to distributed economic systems. However, the
ability to build and simulate distributed computers leads to the possibility of
simulating an economy by actually constructing a distributed model of an
economic system and allowing the agents to interact according to any principles
the experimenter chooses. Thus the experimenter has control over a broad array
of assumptions.
Economic systems can be understood as a type of parallel distributed computer.
That is, a computer made up of a large number of computing elements all
operating at the same time, with little (if any) central control. A free market
economy comprises a massive number of activities that proceed simultaneously
(massively parallel), and has little or no central control. However, as mentioned
--_.._._ --- - _._-- .
by Simon [Simon, 1981, 1982), both hierarchical and distributed aspects are
present in any economy.
The concept of the economy as a distributed computer is consistent with the idea
of general equilibrium in an economy. Assuming that each individual in an
economic system acts according to utility maximization, then the economy does
indeed act as a distributed computer, since there is no central processing unit
that computes the prices or the quantities of goods in the economy at the macro
level. However, some centralized control is apparent in business firms,
governments and markets. On closer inspection, this central control can be seen
as a feature that emerges in certain types of economic systems.
Herbert Simon appears to be the first modern writer to identify economic
systems as distributed computers. Earlier writers observed that system-wide
economic prosperity depends on the decisions and interaction of individuals, but
did not have the modern computer model to work with. The alternative to
distributed economic systems are systems that exhibit central control, which
removes the decision making from the individual. Both hierarchic and
distributed economic systems are observed in the world, and it appears that
most economic systems embody some combination of control.
The significant points can be summarized as follows:
1. An economic system is competitive at some level, so that conflict is inherent
in the system.
2. Trade takes place when it is mutually beneficial to the interacting
participants.
--_..._,,_._--_ ... _.__._ ....
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3. Some of the criteria for trade are not observable by the participants or by the
researcher.
The researcher is dealing with imperfect information about the agents and
cannot predict in advance what properties will emerge from the interaction of
the agents. However, according the systems paradigm, even if the researcher
had perfect information about the agents, there are some emergent properties
from the interaction of the agents that cannot be predicted solely from the
known attributes of the agents.
As mentioned earlier, the traditional approach to answering questions in
economics relies on aggregation to reduce problem complexity. Unfortunately,
this aggregation masks the variability that is inherent in individuals in the
market, and reduces the observed diversity and complexity of the world. The
research reported here looks for what emerges from a disaggregated approach
that is not forthcoming in the usual collective approach. Additionally, the
approach by which the system comes to equilibrium under various assumptions
about how the independent agents behave can be studied directly with this
technique. The behavior of agents may be frustrated and the agents may not be
able to satisfy all their needs.
DISCUSSION
It is proposed that some type of group or system learning is demonstrated by
economic systems. At the start of such an operation, prices are not known to any
of the participants of the system, but after trading for a short time, all the
participants come to some common knowledge or consensus about the prices
and quantities of traded goods. The system has learned the prices, quantities,
35
relative efficiency and scarcity of goods that are exchanged. Note that data about
available resources or wealth are introduced from the external environment and
the physical resources remain outside the system. Data about changes and
transfers of resources leave the system to the external environment. The system
learns in an unsupervised way about the allocation of goods and about the
relative prices of the goods.
Not all economic systems need adhere to the framework described above. An
economic production system, for example, can be observed by isolating a
subunit of a market system that specializes in economic production processes.
Inputs into such a system are the prices that arrive from its external
environment. This data is used by the producers to allocate their expenditures
among the factors of production. Again, the system is distributed because
knowledge of the technology and relative scarcity of the goods is distributed
across the network. In addition, the computation of needs for each unit is done
locally without any central control, but the final result depends on all the
producers and how they interact.
An interesting aspect of this conception of a system is that the decision making
units can have multiple roles. The decision making unit may act as a consumer
of goods, but also as a factor of production. The decision units may be buyers in
one market but sellers in another market. Consequently, defining the
perspective of the observer is critical.
Economic systems are open in the sense that individuals may enter and leave the
system at will. The economy adjusts dynamically when economic actors enter
and leave the system. In addition to the distributed computation of the relative
--_.. __.- -._---_.... '- ---- .. -
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prices and quantities in economic systems, the market structure is also
computed. By market structure, I mean the number and type of decision making
units, and how they are employed.
Distributed economic systems may provide some interesting insights regarding
market structure and unemployment. For instance does efficiency in a market
gradually degrade as the number of decision making units falls? In addition,
what does this distributed computational model say about monopoly theory and
the tendency of a single producer to dominate some types of markets while other
markets are made up of many small buyers and sellers? Distributed
computational models are a novel way to study questions about market
structure. Not only are price and quantity computed by the market, but also the
ultimate number of decision making units in the market. New subunits enter or
leave the system when certain conditions exist in the system.
The place of institutions and governments is important in distributed models.
Typically, distributed economic systems contain buyers and sellers, as well as
control units that permit only certain types of transactions and punish
inappropriate behavior. However, the institution is not created by a greater
power, but is an instance of self organization and control.
--_. .._ _-- - -_._- .._ .
CHAPTER III
MODELS OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Classical economic models are based on the concept of optimization in a perfect
economic market, as well as assumptions about the motives of the individual.
The underlying model assumes that buyers and sellers are rational and are
optimizers. That is, consumers maximize utility or preferences, while producers
minimize costs (a somewhat weaker assumption than profit maximization). The
assumption of rationality is critical for these models and gives a guide for
interpreting the models. A second critical assumption is made regarding the
expectations of consumers and producers in these models.
All the models that will be considered here have a one period lag between
production and consumption of goods. In other words, the production decision
is made in the period prior to the period in which the consumption decision is
made. The total quantity of goods available in period t+1 is determined in
period t, based on the price that is expected to emerge in period t+1.
Consumption occurs in period t+1 based on the fixed quantity of goods that are
available. The price emerges in period t+1 from the interaction of buyers who
bid for the fixed quantity of goods. When supply of the good exceeds demand,
the price falls relative to the price of the previous period. Conversely, when
demand exceeds supply, the price increases.
----..__ ...- _._------ - --- . _.
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THE ROLE OF EXPECTAnONS
The quantity of goods available in period t+1 is set by each producer in period t
based on the expected price in the next period. Three models of price
expectations have been widely discussed in the economics literature. These
models are static expectations, adaptive expectations, and rational expectations.
In the linear form the model can be set up as follows:
Supply: QS =a + bpe
Demand: Qd = c - dP
Demand =Supply: QS =Qd
In these equations Q represents the quantity of goods available in period t+I,
and pe is the expected price for the t+l period. The supply computation takes
place in period t so the actual price in period t+1 is not known until it emerges.
The price that actually emerges in period t+1 is denoted P. The stability of the
linear model can be determined from the coefficients, a,b,c,d. A more general
formulation drops the linearity assumption and just states:
Supply: QS =f(pe)
Demand: QS =g(P)
where f and g represent the supply and demand relations. An assumption that
is usually made in these models is that the supplier knows the supply relation.
The supplier then makes plans for the next period based on the expected price.
Exactly how the price expectation is formed is not known with certainty,
--_.._---- . __._.... _.-_._--
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however, many models have been proposed. Most models propose a subjective
estimate of price for the next period.
Simple supply and demand models do not allow speculation by the buyer or
seller. Inventories do not carryover into the future, implying that all production
in period t is sold and consumed in the same period.
Static Expectations
In the static expectations model, the producer expects the price in period t+1 to
be the same as the price in period t. In another context, this is similar to
predicting tomorrow's weather by assuming that it will be the same as today's
weather. In economics, the model is frequently simplified by assuming linear
supply and demand curves. This combination of assumptions results in
predictable oscillations in price that can easily be observed by participants in the
market if they have meta-observer capabilities, or even a short term memory.
The linear model can be set up as follows:
Supply: QSt = a + bPt-l
Demand: QSt = c - dPt
The relative magnitude of the parameters a,b,c,d determine the stability of the
model. In the static expectations model, the equilibrium price p* is reached
when Pt-l=Pt=P* and there is no further price adjustment. It can be shown that
the equilibrium price is p* = (c-a)/(b+d), however, the economic agents do not
discover this relationship. Furthermore, the price at any time t could be
predicted with certainty if the parameters band d are known, because
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Pt = [PO -P*](-b/d)t + plio. Again, the economic agents in the static expectations
model not discover this price vs time relationship.
Note that the model as shown above is perfectly deterministic rather than
stochastic. The model becomes stochastic by adding independent error terms to
the supply and demand equations.
At a meta level, static expectations appear to be naive on the part of the
producers because regular oscillations emerge, but the producers do not
incorporate this information in their price expectations. Additionally, the
producers do not attempt to solve the equations or reduce the errors in their
forecasts.
The cobweb model from economics is a well known example of a static
expectations model. This model is often explained in the context of pig farming
and is called the hog cycle. In the hog cycle, the producers look only at the price
that hogs are selling for in the current period. They plan production for the next
period based on the market price of hogs in the current period. The time lag
needed for breeding and raising hogs that are ready for market is one period in
this model.
If the price in the next period does turn out being equal to the price in the
previous period, then the hog farmer produced the correct quantity of hogs.
However, any perturbation resulting from unexpected shocks such as weather
variations could lead to the cyclical fluctuations described above. The
(hypothetical) hog farmers never catch on to the cyclical price pattern and
continue to follow the static expectations assumption.
-il
An example of static expectations that may be closer to home in the academic
community is the choice of majors by college students. When students enter
college, they may survey the market and choose a major that is currently in high
demand and consequently is paying a higher than average market wage. Large
numbers of students may choose such a major, leading to a large number of
graduates within a few years. By the time the students complete their college
degree, the market has an excess supply of new graduates in the field and the
new entrants to the field may not find jobs at the wages they expected. The
news of a glut on the market and the relatively low wages will then discourage
students from entering the field, which of course results in a shortage of
qualified graduates within a few years and the cycle begins anew. Such cycles
have been reported for several fields including engineering.
Adaptive Expectations
A somewhat less naive model of an economic market allows for learning by
economic agents. Agents still form subjective expectations about future prices,
but the error in previous price projections is taken into account. They calculate
the price expectation for period t based on the error in previous expectations.
The price expectation rule becomes:
In the adaptive expectations model, the coefficient h is called the learning rate.
As a result of applying this price adjustment rule, errors in forming the
subjective estimation of price in the next period become increasingly smaller in
each period. The producer learns at each round and the error rapidly
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approaches zero. The adjustment rule applies a weighted average of last periods
price and the expected value ofthe price as follows: pet = hPt-l + (l-h)pet_1
The adaptive expectations model is often demonstrated with linear supply and
demand functions. The supply function is written: QSt= a+ bpet_1, and the
demand function is written: QSt = c - dPt. Under these conditions, the error
approaches zero from above, in a manner similar to a geometric series. Again,
the error at any time can be computed by the producers who know only the
supply relation. What the supplier "learns" is how to adjust for the error in the
price forecast of the last period. No overall "meta" learning is implied by this
model, and the adaptive expectations model can be criticized for this reason.
Each time there is a disturbance, the economic agents must learn again.
Econometrically, this type of model is estimated by including the previous
quantity term in the model as follows: Qt= ah + bhPt-l + (l-h)Qt-l + Ut.
It can be shown that this is equivalent to estimating Qt = a + bhL(l-h)sPt-s + Ut
where the sum is over s=O to 00. However, the estimation is finite in the first case,
and easily estimatable, while the second case has an infinite number of terms
and is impossible to estimate directly. The result of the mathematical
manipulations is that a new variable (Quantity in the t-l period) is included as
an independent variable in the supply equation.
Taking a meta level view of the adaptive expectations model resul ts in a
criticism similar to the criticism of the static expectations model. Although the
economic agents adapt to errors in price estimation in the model, a decided
improvement when compared with the static model, there remains a consistent
bias in the errors. The economic agents do not learn to adjust for the bias, and as
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a result, there is the opportunity for economic agents to make a systematic profit
by exploiting the predictability of such models. It is widely believed that
economic agents in markets can learn and observe patterns at the meta level.
Thus the problem is not to estimate the price in the next period, but the
equilibrium price p... At the meta level it is supposed that if such patterns are
observed, then the agents making the observations will change their behavior to
take advantage of them.
It was the shortcomings of models similar to the adaptive expectations models
that gave rise to a new generation of models in the 1960's. Two of the critics of
theses models worked together in the 1960's at Carnegie Mellon University but
came to very different conclusions about the capacity of humans to understand
economic systems in which they participate. Herbert Simon and John Muth
were part of the same working group that was studying economic decision
making. Muth developed the idea of perfectly rational actors that operate as
optimizers, while Simon developed the idea of bounded rationality, where
economic actors make decisions that are not based on an optimizing paradigm at
all.
Rational Expectations
Muth introduced the rational expectations approach with his paper "Rational
Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements," [Muth, 1961]. Rational
expectations models demand that the participants in economic markets are
rational, and use all information available to them to make decisions about the
future. In the rational expectations model, the producer would use all tools
available, going so far as to discover the correct functional form and coefficients
of the market supply and demand curves. In the case of the linear model, the
--------.--_.-_.- - ------- - -.
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producer could solve for the equilibrium price p* = (c-d)/(b+d). This
information could then be used to form the price expectations:
pet = p* =(c-d) / ( b+d).
This model is free of the predictable oscillations of the static and adaptive
models. In fact, under the rational expectations model, the price reaches
equilibrium instantly because the producers know that this is the optimum price,
and they cannot improve their lot by forecasting any other price. The economic
actors are able to observe the system and make meta level optimizing decisions.
One of the implications of the rational expectations model is that the economic
actors cannot use information in the market to "beat" the market because the
same data is available to all. By the same token, the agents cannot rationally
ignore useful data. The stochastic error term remains in the model resulting in
small random errors that cannot be eliminated.
Note that the supply and demand models described here address only the
behavior of the producer, while ignoring the decision making behavior of the
consumer. Adding storage capacity for the demand side of the model would
allow the consumers to take advantage of low prices by purchasing more than
enough goods for consumption in the current period. My analysis is also
focused on the producer's decision making process.
MARKET STRUCTURE
The number of agents in a market and their awareness of each other plays an
important role in the production decision. Consider a market with only 2
producers (duopoly). The market price depends on the quantity that each
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producer brings to market in the period. If each producer is bound by a
production function:
1 - fI( 1 1 1)q - x 1,x 2,''''x n
2 - f2( 2 2 2 )q - x 1,x 2,· ..,x n
where qI and q2 are the outputs of producers 1 and 2, respectively, f1 and f2
represent the respective production functions of the 2 producers, and xij is the
level that the ith producer uses of the jth input resource. The price at time t is
then some joint function of the quantity of goods produced by each producer in
the previous period: Pt = g(qI,q2)t_I
The price, and thus the profits of each producer, are affected by the production
decision of its competitors. The input prices Wj ,... , wn are also jointly
determined by the demand of the producers: Wj = w(xIj,X2j), j=1,2,...,n.
Assuming that each firm is attempting to maximize profits (1t), firm 1 may set the
problem up as follows:
(1)
with the production constraint:
by choosing the output quantity ql and the input quantities XII,. ..XIn.
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The n+1 first order conditions from the Lagrangian method are:
(2)
ql=fl(xll,x12,···,xLn).
The key point is that each producer must take into account the other producer's
aq2
actions in order to maximize profits. The term a
q
l is especially important to
this analysis because it indicates the change in the output of producer 2 as the
first producer changes output. This term is known as the conjectural variation
(CV), because it is subjectively arrived at by the producer. Various assumptions
can be made by the producer about the reaction of the other producer. The most
naive assumption is that the other producer will not react at all, in other words,
the conjectural variation is 0 in Equation 2. Cournot was the first to analyze the
case where both producers assume that the conjectural variation is O. From the
meta level, this assumption leads to predictable oscillation in output, much like
the static expectations model. Contrary to the evidence, both producers continue
to assume that the competitor is not making any adjustment to output.
The Stackelberg analysis allows for conjectural variations that are not zero. For
instance, producer 1 may conjecture that producer 2 has assumed a 0 conjectural
variation, and has adjusted production accordingly. If this set of assumptions is
accurate, the result is a Stackelberg equilibrium wherein producer 1 receives a
higher share of production and profits than producer 2. However, if both
producers use the Stackelberg assumption, then the result is a Stackelberg
disequilibrium, that is not Pareto optimal for the producers. The Stackelberg
analysis in this case is identical to a 2 person non-zero sum game that yields a
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Prisoners Dilemma. Figure 2 shows an example of a payoff matrix under
various conjectural variations.
Producer 2
Cournot Reaction Stackelberg Reaction
Producer 1
Cournot Reaction
Stackelberg Reaction
Coumot Equilibrium Stackelberg Equilibrium
For Producer 2
Stackelberg Stackelberg
Equilibrium Disequilibrium
For Producer 1
Figure 2. Payoff matrix for Stackelberg agents.
The Stackelberg analysis is not limited to the duopoly case, because more
producers can be added to the market without affecting the outcome
appreciably. However, as the number of producers approaches infinity, the
perfect competition price and quantity solution emerges. One of the insights
resulting from the Stackelberg analysis is that there may not be a clear
optimization solution available to the producers, even if they are capable of
forming and solving Equations 1 and 2.
BOUNDED RATIONALITY
Herbert Simon rejected the optimizing model of economic behavior that was (is)
widely accepted in economics. In its place, Simon developed models that are
based on a concept that he called satisficing. Simon coined the word "satisfice"
to indicate a strategy wherein economic agents choose any solution that is "good
enough" to satisfy their subjective criteria. The central idea is that economic
-is
agents are not capable of performing the computations that are required [or
optimization. In fact, computers and non-linear programming techniques that
are required to solve such problems have only recently become available, but
economic markets have existed for thousands of years. Furthermore, according
to Simon, individuals do not even attempt to optimize but are satisfied by any
solution that meets their subjective criteria. An interesting question is whether
markets in which computers are available to the participants perform in ways
that are significantly different from markets where computers are not present.
Even when computers are available, it is not apparent that all participants
would use optimizing procedures. It is not that economic agents are purposely
irrational. On the contrary, non-optimal solutions to real economic problems
may occur because people simply do not base all economic decisions on
optimizing techniques. For instance, futures traders use a variety of techniques,
ranging from fundamental analysis to scalping (trading on microscopic
fluctuations in prices).
Simon proposed that real economic agents use heuristic strategies for problem
solving and to simplify economic decision making. For instance, a knowledge
based technique that relies on discovering a relationship in historical data could
be used to form expectations about future demand in the market. Actual market
behavior varies considerably, with different actors favoring their own
proprietary approach to forming expectations. Such heuristic strategies can also
use meta level observations about market behavior in forming expectations
about future market behavior.
--_ - ._--_._---
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FRACTALS AND CHAOS IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
In the early 1960's, Mandelbrot pointed out that many distributions of economic
data are not necessarily Gaussian [Mandelbrot, 1961, 1963a, 1963b]. Distribution
of prices, income and other economicfquantities are often skewed rather than
centrally distributed. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for economic data to
contain outliers in the distribution tails. Mandelbrot's contention is that
economists overlook these details and continue to assume that their data is
Normally distributed (Gaussian), even though the evidence of the data
sometimes rejects the Normality hypothesis. Mandelbrot proposed the use of
the Paretian distribution as an alternative to the Gaussian. The Paretian and its
relatives, such as the stable distributions of Levy agree better with the empirical
evidence of economic data.
Mandelbrot's study of corn prices is of special interest. First, Mandelbrot points
out that in reality, prices are not continuous, as is usually assumed. Large
changes in prices occur frequently in speculative markets. This is common
knowledge among market analysts and traders. (For instance see [Commodities
Trading Handbook. Chicago Board of Trade, 1990]). The evidence does not
suggest a smooth or even continuous price generating function in real markets.
Where such constraints are imposed by economists when choosing a functional
form, the departure from reality may be stunning. It is precisely these large and
sudden price movements that market participants would like to forecast, but are
ignored by theory.
Second, Mandelbrot shows that price movements follow a generating process
that is consistent, regardless of the time scale of measurement. (e.g., the
SO
generating function is the same, regardless of whether the prices are monitored
on a daily, weekly, monthly, or annual basis). Further the generating process
showed only minor changes in over 100 years of monitoring, indicating that the
underlying process is very stable.
Mandelbrot goes on to name the Paretian exponent the "fractal dimension" (also
known as the Hausdorff dimension), and links this approach to a wide variety of
physical phenomenon. Since that time, a good deal has been written about
deterministic price formation that links the fractal dimension with chaos. In the
late 1980's several researchers reported finding evidence of deterministic
relations in financial market prices [Brock, 1988], [Scheinkman & Le Baron,
1990].
The introduction of non-linear methods into economic models acknowledges
that actual supply and demand functions may be non-linear or discontinuous.
But an even more important contribution is the notion of determinism in
economic systems. That is, under these models, economic agents may follow a
deterministic, rule based approach, that incorporates discontinuous or non-linear
adjustments. With the exception of Simon's model, the traditional economic
models mentioned above do not allow for these features.
MODELLING DISTRIBUTED ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
The usual methods used for modeling economic problems are based on a
theoretical or top down approach. That is, the researcher is guided by existing
notions or theories about the economy, usually based on the concept of the
human being as an optimizer. A refinement of this approach is the axiomatic
work of Un and Perry [Lin and Perry,1988, 1989]. In these works, economic
--'-'--'-'---"- ..- ..-._-_.
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knowledge about the world is stated explicitly as a set of axioms which are
expressed in PROLOG, a logical programming language. Data observed in the
economic world can be tested directly for consistency with the axioms of
economic theory. Furthermore, the axioms and the observed data can be used
together to forecast economic behavior with a logic program. In the axiomatic
approach, knowledge of economic behavior is encoded in a logic program.
However, in the research reported here, a variety of economic behaviors are
feasible; it is the interaction of these behaviors that manifest the system level
attributes.
The main goal of my research is to determine how different types of agents affect
the emerging price, quantity, number of agents, and stability in a distributed
economic market. The distributed market simulation is composed of
independent computer programs that act as producers and consumers. The
market is distributed in the sense that the programs represent agents that make
decisions independent of any central control.
The agents are programmed as either producers or consumers of some
imaginary good. The research concentrates on the producer's decision making
process. Three general types of strategies are incorporated in the agent's
decision making process: optimization, satisficing and Stackelberg.
Optimizing Agents
These agents maximize expected profits in the next period based on historical
information. Two optimizing programs are constructed, but multiple instances
of each program may operate simultaneously. These agents use neural networks
to recognize patterns and make decisions. The networks apply a hill climbing
(optimizing) algorithm known as backpropagation to adjust weights in the
network. Taken together, the pattern of weights summarize the knowledge
gained in past experience, but do not easily reveal the explicit knowledge of the
rule based approach.
The actual outcome is observed and is compared to the expected outcome. The
weight adjustments are based on the difference between expected and actual
outcomes. The problem is to adjust weights to maximize profits where the
inputs include the state of the market in the past, as well as the current state.
Satisficing Agents
The satisficing agents use simple subjective decision making criteria to adjust
price and quantity. These agents do not attempt to find the optimal solution, but
are satisfied with any solution that meets their subjective criteria. The satisficing
approach is equivalent to the rule based approach in artificial intelligence. This
type of strategy is consistent with a knowledge based or heuristic approach. The
agents may incorporate generalized knowledge (supplied by the researcher or
programmer) into their decision making criteria.
Stackelberg Agents
The Stackelberg agents are based on the decision making strategy put forth by
Hen,rich von Stackelberg in 1952 [Stackelberg, 1952]. These agents have
knowledge of the consuming agent's average market demand, but do not know
the intentions of the other producers in the market. With knowledge of the
demand curve, and the actual quantity of goods in the market, the Stackelberg
agents are able to compute the theoretically expected market clearing price
(e.g.the price at which the supply and demand for goods are exactly equal).
The key feature of the Stackelberg approach is that the Stackelberg agents make
a conjecture about how the other producers in the market will respond to
changes in production. This conjecture is then incorporated in the Stackelberg
agents production decision. Stackelberg agent's explicitly solve classical
optimization equations based on the average demand curve, and on their
conjecture about the production intentions of the other producers in the market.
CHAPTER IV
NEURAL NETWORKS
Designers of neural network models have used biological brain as their primary
inspiration. The structure of the brain allows mental processes such as thought
and learning to exist in humans. From this perspective, we see that the type of
tasks humans are able to perform depends on the biological character of the
brain and its components.
The brain is composed of millions of specialized cells known as neurons (see
Figure 3). Neurons have sensitive sites that can send, and others that can receive
electrical and chemical signals. Each neuron receives inputs from approximately
a thousand other neurons through junctions known as synapses. Additionally,
neurons send signals to approximately a thousand other neurons via its output
member, called an axon. The signal that is sent is a function of all the input
signals that are received. Neurons do not send a continuous signal, but rather a
charge builds up until some threshold is passed, and when the threshold is
exceeded, the neuron "fires", sending a signal (bust of pulses) to other neurons
connected to it.
Each of the approximately 1011 neurons in the brain may be connected to as
many as 103 other neurons (i.e, when a single neuron fires it sends a signal to
about a thousand of its neighbors). Overall brain activity does not depend on a
single neuron, but on the collection of neurons and the input stimulus.
Memories and knowledge are not stored in a single location in the brain.
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Instead, knowledge is stored as a pattern among the millions of neural
connections.
Figure 3. The parts of a neuron.
The brain is fault tolerant because of the way information is stored. For instance,
loosing a single brain cell does not result in a person forgetting their
grandmother or how to count. Rather, such memories are stored in the
connections between many neurons. This apparent redundancy allows the
brain to be very resilient to damage. As damage increases, the response of the
neural system gradually degrades.
The nature of the brain may also determine why some tasks are relatively easy
for the typical human while others are quite difficult. For instance, recognizing
a familiar face or voice is naturally easy for most people, but precise
mathematical computations are difficult, or at least time consuming, for most of
us. On the other hand, the situation is reversed for serial computers. For most
computers, recognition of facial features and voice recognition are difficult while
mathematical computations are done quickly and accurately. Researchers
speculate that the micro-structure of the brain facilitates some tasks but is not
well suited to others.
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The Venn diagram in Figure 4 compares the capabilities of the human brain and
serial computers or more generally, von Neuman machines. The motivation
behind neural networks comes from the type of problems that the brain is able to
solve. The mundane problems of every day experience have proved to be quite
difficult for serial computers programmed with problem solving algorithms. It
is a requirement of the technology used in serial computers that each bit of data
is stored in a unique site in the computer's memory. The processing units of
these computers are complex, and as the name implies, require a single stream of
input and output data. They are called serial computers because they only
perform one task at a time.
Summarization
Pattern Recognition
High Level Thinking
Personal
Perspectives
Human Computer
Figure 4. The capabilities of humans and computers.
Confusion sometimes arises when speaking of different computer architectures
such as serial, parallel, and distributed. Serial computers as defined above, have
a single complex processing unit and can perform only one task at a time.
Parallel computers are made by linking the complex processing elements of
--------_._----_. -
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independent serial computers. Some advanced parallel computers have
thousands of linked 386 or 486 processing units. Other parallel compu ting
designs use networks to link independent PC's. These parallel computing
schemes all work by decomposing a large problem into small chunks and storing
knowledge in memory. The chunks are distributed to local processing elements
so that processing takes place on different segments of the problem
simultaneously. Synchronization and communication take place by passing
messages over the links between processors.
The concept underlying neural networks, on the other hand, is based on the
interaction of thousands of simple processing elements. In this scheme,
knowledge is distributed over the network of connections and is not held in any
particular processing element. The networks are massively parallel in that
thousands of processing elements are operating locally and simultaneously. In
practice, neural models can be simulated on serial or parallel computers.
Furthermore, in recent years several organizations have implemented neural
models on silicon chips.
The conceptual force behind neural network models comes from an abstraction
of the micro-structure of the human brain. Figure 5 shows an abstraction of a
single processing element in a typical neural model. This example processing
element has 4 inputs and a single output that splits into 3 branches. The inputs
Xl through X4 are multiplied by the corresponding weights WI through W4
before entering the processing element. The processing elements in neural
models are very simple, usually having 2 segments or functions.
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Inputs
Outputs
Figure 5. The structure of a neural processing element.
First, the product of the weights and the inputs is summed. Mathematically
speaking, this is simply the inner-product of a vector representing the inputs and
a vector representing the corresponding weights. Second, the output Y is some
function of the result from the inner product calculation. This function is called
a transfer function and is chosen by the network designer. The transfer function
is usually non-linear, but combinations of linear and non-linear transfer
functions may be used in a single network. A logistic (or sigmoid) function is a
common choice for the transfer function, although many other choices are
feasible. The sigmoid transfer function results in a continuous output between 0
and 1. Furthermore, it has an advantage from a mathematical perspective
because it is differentiable.
Neural networks typically contain many processing elements that are connected
in parallel. The elements are usually organized in layers, but many
arrangements or architectures are possible. The number of processing elements
and the choice of network architecture are critical variables that are chosen by
the network designer. Since the mid 1980's most network architectures contain
at least 3 layers of processing elements. The input and output layers are usually
separated by one or more "hidden" layers of processing elements. Figure 6
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depicts a simple network architecture showing the input layer, one hidden layer,
and the output layer. Input signals are applied to the network simultaneously
and move through the hidden layer to the output layer in one forward pass
through the net. No processing takes place in the input layer; it merely acts as
an input buffer. The processing elements in the hidden and output layers act as
described above. The hidden layer is an important substructure in the network
because it permits recoding of the inputs before reaching the output layer. The
implications of the hidden layer will be discussed in more detail later.
Output L.'-Yer
Hidden L.'-Yer
Inpl.lt L.'-Yer
Figure 6. A simple neural network.
The network shown in Figure 6 is an example of a feedforward neural net. This
simple structure has proven to be effective for solving a wide variety of
problems. Another type of network that is often encountered in the neural
network literature includes feedback between processing clements within and
between layers. Networks containing feedback have a dynamic character as
opposed to the static nature of feedforward nets. The feedforward vs feedback
distinction is an important design criterion that depends on the type of problem
or application.
-~_.. _- .._.-..-_._.....- .. _..
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So far, the network described mimics the brain by performing distributed and
parallel computations and passing the results to the next layer. Knowledge can
be stored in such networks by adjusting the weights in a process that is
analogous to learning. As mentioned above, knowledge in the brain is not
stored in specific neurons but in the patterns among the connections between the
neurons. Neural nets have the ability to mimic learning processes by changing
their weights. One of the major choices to be made by the network designer is
the learning algorithm that will be applied to the network.
Learning algorithms can be distinguished by the presence of a "teacher" that
knows the output desired from the network in advance. The learning algorithm
is called supervised when the desired output is known in advance and is used to
train the network. An unsupervised network learns without pre-existing
knowledge of desired network outputs.
To summarize the design choices open to the network researcher, the net is
composed of:
Processing Elements - Type of transfer function.
Architecture -- The number of processing elements and the connections between
them. The connections between the elements may form layers and other
structures. In addition, the connection paths determine whether feedback will
be present in the network.
Learning Algorithm -- The major distinction is whether the network training is
supervised or unsupervised. Supervised learning is a process that uses global
information and a "teacher", while unsupervised learning uses local information,
and is self-organized.
The major distinctions between architectures and learning algorithms are shown
in one possible classification scheme in Figure 7.
Training
Supervised Unsupervised
Connection Feedforward
Structure (statiC>
Feedback
(dynamiC>
Figure 7. Classification of neural networks.
THE MAPPING PROBLEM
In an abstract sense, neural nets perform some mapping from inputs to outputs.
The network exists within some problem context such that the problem is
represented by the inputs into the net. The measurement (sensory data) may be
partially processed before it reaches the neural net, much like the primary
processing that takes place before visual or auditory signals reach the brain. By
the same token, the outputs from the net also are some representation of the
problem. What takes place within the net is some transformation of inputs to
outputs. In neural networks, the mapping problem is solved by adjusting the
weights in such a way that the network is able to perform the desired input-
output mapping.
In terms of binary inputs and outputs, the problem can be represented as in
Figure 8. Let the figure represent a black box with n binary inputs and a single
binary output that conveys a representation of a problem in some given context.
--- _.- .. _--_... ..- _._-_ .._. - .._ - _.
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The condition that the inputs and outputs are binary is only for convenience and
will be dropped shortly.
~
-
Output
...
New-al Net With Adjustable Weights....
-
...
-
~
...
Teacher
-
.....
nlnputs
Figure 8. A supervised neural network.
Figure 8 represents a supervised learning context and includes a "teacher". The
teacher monitors the inputs into the net and the corresponding outputs. If a
given input does not produce the desired output, then the teacher adjusts the
weights in the network according to some prespecified procedure called the
training algorithm. With the restriction that the inputs and outputs are binary,
there are a known number of possible input-output mappings: 22n where n is
the number of inputs, 2n is the number of possible input patterns, and 22n is
the number of possible mappings. It should be apparent that the number of
possible mappings increases extremely rapidly as the number of inputs into the
network increases. For instance, 4 inputs results in 256 mappings but 10 inputs
results in over 10300 (substantially over a trillion, trillion) possible mappings.
Thus there is an explosion in the size of the mapping space as the number of
inputs increase.
A given network may not be capable of performing all the theoretically possible
input-output mappings. Generally, the number of mappings that the network
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can be made to perform is orders of magnitude smaller than the number of
possible mappings. The network search is confined to those mappings that a
given net can perform by adjusting the weights in the net\vork. Using the
notation of Lendaris [Lendaris, 1990b], the space of mappings that the network is
capable of performing by adjusting the weights is called the performance space
of the network. The input-output mapping that the teacher specifies is a point in
the set of all possible mappings. Usually, however, the number of input patterns
for which a specified output is required is smaller than the whole set. In this
circumstance, the teacher specifies a partial function over ,,,,hat we call the "care"
terms. Each unspecified input pattern can be given any output, Le, we "don't
care" what value is assigned to them. If there are n don't care terms, there are 2n
ways to specify them while still having the desired assignment to "care" terms.
These are called extensions of the partial function defined on the care terms, and
comprise a 'care set' of allowable total functions that perform the desired
mapping on the care terms. The given neural network is capable of performing
a specified mapping only if its performance space and the care space have at
least one point in common. If there is not any overlap between the care space
and the performance space, then no solution to the mapping problem exits for
the given network. These situations are depicted in Figure 9. In Figure 9A, the
performance space of a given network does not overlap with the care space
associated with a specified desired mapping, so no solution to the mapping
problem exits. Figure 9B depicts a situation where the neural network has a
number of possible weight configurations that will perform the desired partial
mapping; the task of the learning procedure is for the network to find one of the
solutions in the overlapping region. Usually it is not possible to determine in
advance if the care space and the performance space overlap, Le, if it is possible
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for the given neural network to perform the given input-output mapping.
Solving the mapping problem is accomplished by searching the performance
space of the network with some learning algorithm.
A. No network solution exists. B. Network solution exists.
Figure 9. The problem space.
In neural network parlance, the search strategy is known as the training
algorithm. As mentioned above, the type of search strategy used to train the
network is a major design consideration. Training algorithms are usually
couched in terms of learning the given set of input-output responses by some
type of error correction or adaptive algorithm. Such algorithms will be discussed
in more detail later.
In the case where the performance space and care space overlap, it is possible to
find a solution. But no such overlap is guaranteed, and even if it does exist it
may take a very long time to find it. In the event that no solution to the input-
output mapping is forthcoming from a network, alternative strategies include
that of moving the performance space (Le, changing the network structure, and
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hence the set of mappings that the neural network can perform). Changing the
network architecture results in a new performance space. Some attempts at
tailoring the neural network architecture have begun to appear in the literature
e.g. [Weigend et. al. 1990, 1991]. Only recently are guiding principles starting to
emerge for designing an architecture for a given problem [Lendaris, et. al., 1993).
This task amounts to searching the set of all possible mappings by incrementally
changing the network architecture.
Another alternative for moving the performance space of the network is to
change the problem representation. A problem that is difficult or impossible to
solve in one representation may prove to be trivial in another representation.
Problem representations may be changed by transforming the input-output data
in some way. A typical example from human experience is the perceptual
difference between textual and graphic representations of the same problem.
Problems that are displayed graphically are often easier to solve.
The problems discussed above were confined to binary inputs that have exact
representations. The problems are compounded when the data is continuous
and stochastic. In such cases, the set of possible mappings increases without
bound because the inputs and outputs are continuous. Furthermore, with
stochastic relations, identical inputs can result in different outputs.
PRINCIPAL RESEARCHERS
Scholars in a broad range of disciplines have conducted neural network research
since the 1940's, but widespread interest in neural computing has been irregular
over time. In 1943 McCulloch and Pitts, published the first paper to discuss
neural computing. McCulloch and Pitts had backgrounds in neurobiology and
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statistics, respectively. Since that time, neural nets have been investigated by
researchers from widely different fields.
Donald Hebb is credited with one of the first learning rules for neural elements.
In 1949 Hebb proposed a learning rule based on reinforcing weights between
neural elements that fire simultaneously [Hebb, 1949]. Rumelhart and
McClelland [Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986], restate this rule as follows:
"When unit A and unit Bare simultaneously excited, increase the strength of the
connection between them."
This general approach has been widely used and modified over the years, but is
not used in its original form anymore. However, the Hebbian principle
underlies virtually all training algorithms used at this time, whether supervised
or unsupervised.
Marvin Minsky has shown a long-term interest in learning machines. In 1951 he
constructed his first learning machine from hundreds of tubes, motors and belts
and clutches. This device actually learned by adjusting its own control knobs
through a series of clutches. Later, in 1956, Minsky was one of the organizers of
the first artificial intelligence conference. It is reported that the participants of
this conference outlined several targets for artificial intelligence research
including natural language processing, pattern recognition, learning, acquisition
and application of expert knowledge, and so on. The problems that were
assumed to be easier were the mundane problems of every day human
experience, while acquisition and application of expert knowledge were deemed
more difficult. Time has shown that the more difficult problems to solve are the
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mundane and commonplace. As of this time, Minsky is still actively working in
the artificial intelligence arena.
Frank Rosenblatt and Marvin Minsky were associates ~nd rivals in the early
development of neural networks. Rosenblatt developed a neural like element
that he called a Perceptron in 1957. By 1962 he had done further research and
published a book called Principles of Neurodynamics [Rosenblatt, 1962] in
which he develops the Perceptron learning theorem. This theorem asserts that
for a network containing a single adaptive Perceptron, if a solution to a given
mapping problem exists (Le, the solution is contained in the Perceptron's
performance space) then the Perceptron will find it in finite time. The
Perceptron proved to be a simple but powerful learning mechanism and was
widely applied in the 1960's. Unfortunately, the ~hen existing theoretical results
applied only to the single-Perceptron case, and provided no guidance for
training more complicated networks.
Minsky and Papert published a thorough mathematical study of Perceptrons in
1969 [Minsky & Papert, 1969]. This book was credited with reducing the
popularity of neural network research for over 10 years. Minsky and Papert
found that Perceptrons could solve only those classification problems that are
called linearly separable. These restrictions on Perceptrons implied, in Minsky
and Papert's view, that Perceptrons could not solve most interesting problems.
The combinatorial explosion was so serious that the problem domain was
restricted to toy problems.
After the revitalization of neural network research in the 1980's, Minsky and
Papert revised Perceptrons in light of new knowledge [Minsky & Papert, 1988].
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However, many of their basic conclusions remain unchanged. Combinatorial
explosion results in enormous search areas that must be traversed to find
solutions. The newer network models use learning algorithms that are
equivalent to well known hill climbing methods with all their faul ts. In
addition, Minsky and Papert claim that the new generation of neural researchers
are repeating many of the same mistakes as the earlier researchers, especially in
regard to critical evaluation of research work. Furthermore they criticize the
continuous rediscovery of what was well known to an earlier generation. In the
other direction, many current researchers criticize the Minsky and Papert books
as overly pessimistic.
A few researchers such as James Anderson, Teuvo Kohonen and Steven
Grossberg continued to study and experiment with neural networks throughout
the 1970's. Anderson worked with linear associators and various extensions.
Kohonen did pioneering work in adaptive memories and competitive learning.
Grossberg developed neurologically inspired models and developed what is
known as Adaptive Resonance Theory.
John Hopfield is credited with breathing new life into the neural network
community with the delivery of a research paper in 1982 [Hopfield, 1982] which
successfully treated a significantly more complex neural network architecture.
Hopfield, who is a physicist, presented a new view for thinking about and
developing training algorithms. His algorithm was based on the notion of
finding the minimum of an energy function and proved to be quite effective for
solving certain types of problems. Unfortunately, later research has shown that
Hopfield networks often find very poor local minima rather than the global
energy minima. Many modifications are being introduced to alleviate some of
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these difficulties. More significantly however, Hopfield's success motivated
other researchers to work with a variety of new architectures.
In their two volume 1986 book, Parallel Distributed Processing, Rumelhart and
McClelland [Rumelhart and McClelland,1986] provide a foundation for the new
neural networks movement. Rumelhart and McClelland are editors of the book
and leaders of a research team known as the PDP group (then located at UC San
Diego). Rumelhart rediscovered and effectively applied what he called the
backpropagation algorithm using a "generalized delta rule". This algorithm
broke the barrier of a single element, single layer network that plagued the
Perceptron algorithm, and has become one of the most widely used neural
learning procedures. The algorithm effectively performs a type of gradient
descent, or hill climbing on a surface defined by a least-squared-error criterion
function. Another important contribution of the PDP group is the demonstration
of the importance of hidden layers for solving problems that were not solvable
by single layer Perceptrons. The authors relate an excitement and enthusiasm
for their work that is not shared by Minsky and Papert, as mentioned above.
Indeed, their Generalized Delta Rule solved some of the problems that Minsky
and Papert complained about so much in their books.
More recently, Linsker has introduced another new concept for thinking about
and analyzing the training process. Linsker introduced an Infomax principle
which effectively maximizes entropy in each layer of the network while still
using a Hebb type rule [Linsker, 1988]. This new approach shows promise for
solving problems of self organization. Linsker has developed a careful
mathematical analysis to guide his approach.
------...-. _.-- ..._-_ ..
In the late 1980's Halbert White, a well known economist, published several
research papers that tie feedforward neural networks with stochastic
approximators [White, 1989]. Further ties with statistical theory and non-linear
approximation are discussed in his papers published in 1990 [Hornick,
Stinchcome & White, 1990], [White, 1990]. These papers detail methods for
statistically testing the significance of coefficients or weights resulting from
neural estimation. In addition, White shows that with certain modifications,
neural models can be shown to be statistically efficient.
While many of the early developments in neural computing were based on
empirical data and heuristic insights, a broad theoretical base is beginning to
emerge in the field. Simultaneously, there is a veritable explosion in the
numbers and breadth of applications of this technology. This dissertation puts
forth another such application.
CHAPTER V
THE BLACKBOARD MODEL: AN EXAMPLE OF A DISTRIBUTED
ECONOMIC COMPUTER
INTRODUCTION
Blackboard Systems
Recently certain types of systems have been studied via a class of distributed
models known as blackboard systems [Nii, 1986], [Engelmore & Morgan, 19881.
A blackboard model typically consists of a system with subunits of two general
types:
1. Blackboard structure
2. Multiple knowledge sources
The blackboard is a shared resource to which all of the knowledge sources have
access. The system has data inputs from the environment that are written
directly on the blackboard. The knowledge sources simultaneously respond to
the state of the world as it is represented on the blackboard structure. The
knowledge sources are able to read from and write to the blackboard in real
time, thus altering the state of the blackboard.
If the blackboard reaches a steady state, a consensus has emerged among the
knowledge sources. Depending on the context, the steady state may be a
solution to a problem which emerges from the interaction of multiple knowledge
sources, or to the data that entered from the environment.
There is no central control or processing unit in the general blackboard model.
Instead, control may reside in the blackboard, the knowledge sources, in a
separate unit, or in some combination of the above. In general, communication
between knowledge sources occurs only through the blackboard.
The knowledge sources may have specific domain knowledge about some
aspects of the problem presented by the data on the blackboard. Thus, the
knowledge sources may deal with entirely different portions of the problem
space, where there may be starkly different representations of the problem, and
bring radically different problem solving strategies to bear on the problem. In
fact the knowledge sources may not even agree on the definition of the problem.
A type of debate develops in a blackboard system that is engendered by the
multiple views and specific knowledge of the participants in the system. The
blackboard system provides an ideal environment in which to study the effects
of multiple approaches to problem solving, and the interaction among various
types of agents that have different goals, and use different problem solving
techniques.
This view of a blackboard system is broader than that normally expressed in the
blackboard systems literature, where the focus is typically on cooperative
problem solving. In such cases, the researcher designs a blackboard model for a
particular problem context, and the knowledge sources represent a well ordered
and cooperative approach to solving the specific problem selected by the
researcher. However, I have taken the position that there is no reason to restrict
blackboard systems to cooperative problem solving.
The following quote from Engelmore and Morgan illustrates the common
thinking about control in blackboard systems:
'The focus of attention indicates the next thing to be processed. The focus of
attention can be either the knowledge sources (that is, which knowledge sources
to activate next) or the blackboard objects (Le. which solution islands to pursue
next), or a combination of both (Le. which knowledge sources to apply to which
objects). Any given system usually employs one of the three approaches, not all"
I believe that this approach to control and problem solving in blackboard
systems is unnecessarily restrictive. The blackboard application that I will
describe will not have a directed, cooperative problem solving approach.
Instead the approach used in this research is competitive and is not centrally
directed. The agents that share the blackboard have conflicting goals.
History of Blackboard Systems
The blackboard concept is very general and has given birth to several distinct
problem solving strategies. An area of common or global computer memory is
the central concept that is shared by blackboard models and applications. The
earliest reference to a blackboard structure in the artificial intelligence literature
was by Allen Newell:
"Metaphorically we can think of a set of workers, all looking at the same
blackboard: each is able to read everything that is on it, and to judge when he
has something worthwhile to add to it. This conception is just that of Selfridge's
Pandemonium (Selfridge, 1959): a set of demons, each independently looking at
the total situation and shrieking in proportion to what they see that fits their
natures ..." [Newell, 1962, as printed in Englemore and Morgan, 1988J
----.----_._--.--_.._-_.. - - - ---.- -
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Newell's collaborator and research partner, Herbert Simon also made occasional
references to blackboards. By 1972 the original concept of the blackboard
evolved into the production system. [Newell and Simon, 1972]. A number of
goal-directed, generate-and-test systems use the basic concept of global shared
memory within a given problem solving context. Simon defined the blackboards
as follows: "... I will call the information about the task environment that is
noticed in the course of problem solution and fixated in permanent (or relatively
long-term) memory the 'blackboard' ..." [Simon, 1977] The blackboard metaphor
for a shared memory structure has fallen into disuse in the rule based areas of
artificial intelligence. However, the blackboard concept continues to be widely
used in the area of speech understanding and recognition.
Applications of Blackboard Systems
Herbert Simon is credited with suggesting the blackboard concept to Reddy and
Erman, who applied the concept in the Hearsay II speech understanding project
in the 1971-1976 period. In the Hearsay II implementation, the blackboard
emerged as a recognizable entity with multiple levels of problem solution. The
blackboard was operated on by knowledge sources such as signal acquisition,
word spotting, phrase-island generation, phrase extension, rating and
interpretation.
Hearsay II generally uses a cooperative approach for solving a speech
understanding problem. Problems of competition among the different
knowledge sources are of two types. First, there is a scheduling competition that
is generally solved by the control module, which decides which knowledge
sources can access the blackboard first. Second, ambiguity problems arise where
different knowledge sources come to different solutions based on the same
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evidence. Similar problems can arise in the rule based systems that use and alter
global memory. Competition of this nature is resolved within the system, often
by a control function. This is distinctly different from the type of competition
found in economic systems.
The approach used by Hearsay II was successful enough to spawn many
followers in speech understanding research. The flexible approach of blackboard
systems has encouraged researchers in numerous other fields to apply them as
well. For example:
Three dimensional structural modeling of proteins [Hayes-Roth et. al., 1985] .
System for designing construction layouts [Tourmaline et al., 1987a]
Control problems [Hayes-Roth et al., 1985].
Sonar interpretation [Ni and Feigenbaum, 1978].
Vehicular tracking and testing [Lesser and Corkhill1978].
Protein crystallography interpretation [Terry, 1983].
Planning systems [Hays-Roth et al., 1986].
Blackboard systems seem to be particularly effective for problems that:
1. Require many distinct kinds of knowledge for solution.
2. Integrate disparate information.
3. Contain natural domain hierarchy ( Le. micro and macro level data)
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4. Have continuous data and thus may not have a "final" solution.
5. Have uncertain knowledge and data.
In short, blackboard systems provide a flexible and adaptable conceptualization
for modelling real world parallel and distributed systems where information
and knowledge are readily shared, but different goals, values and perspectives
interact.
For instance, some may have microscopic knowledge of particular areas, while
others have global system or meta-system level knowledge. The intent is to
collect knowledge sources that interact synergistically in real time. This research
expands the blackboard concept to allow for competition rather than just
cooperation among the agents, and discards the control restrictions that are not
consistent with economic systems. This model of a distributed economic system
is more consistent with the nature of an economy than the traditional classical
models. This approach allows agents with disparate stratagems and goals to
exist side-by-side in the same market. While a neural network is a distributed
computing system, it does not provide a conceptually satisfactory way to model
an economic system. However, a neural network is a reasonable computational
technique to use for an agent that learns about the market that it participates in.
The next section describes my implementation of the distributed computer
market and details the format of the input and output from the market. The
distributed market consists of several computer programs that operate
independently but share information through a blackboard structure. The
programs run in the DOS environment and thus are not truly parallel, but
simulate a parallel system. Timing and sequencing are provided by the top level
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program t.exe. The top level program has no awareness of the decisions or
interaction in the market, so the system is distributed in the sense that decisions
are made by independent agents.
ASSUMPTIONS
A market exists within an economic environment where agents exchange at least
two goods. All consumption occurs within a single time period. In the initial
time period a quantity of goods is assigned to each agent by the researcher. A
production decision is made at the end of each period. Each agent has an
internal value, in terms of the unit of exchange, that is assigned to the goods in
their possession. The value of the goods is known only to the agent that
possesses the good and varies among the agents. These value schedules
comprise values from within the bounds of the region in which the agents can
make gains from trade (the feasible region). Trade takes place at a value in the
interval between the buyer's and seller's internal values.
The interval between the buyer's internal value and the seller's internal value is
known as the feasible region. The gains from trade are not necessarily evenly
distributed, but depend on the sales price that is negotiated between b,uyer and
seller.
The price variable (denoted p in the supply and demand equations) is a key
emergent variable in the system. All the producers and consumers may not use
the same value for p. The overall supp'ly in any period is given by the sum of
the quantities supplied by the producers, and is fixed at the beginning of the
period. Each producer sets its expected quantity and price at the beginning of
the period, and advertises them on the blackboard. The consumers are then
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faced with an array of prices and quantities for the good that is available in the
market. The consumers are price takers; they make demand decisions based on
the price in the market and cannot bargain for a better price. Producers do have
the ability to change prices at any time, but must wait until the end of a period to
change the supply. Thus a producer may adjust prices within a period, but may
adjust quantity only between periods. How agents make decisions is not under
any central control. The agents are free to use any means to make trades that are
deemed favorable to themselves.
Time is treated as a finite number of discrete chunks that are aggregated into
intervals of longer length called periods and rounds. A period is made up of a
given number of time steps. A round is made up of a given number of periods.
An experiment is made up of a given number of rounds. The actual number of
steps per period, periods per round, and rounds per experiment are assigned by
the researcher, and are common knowledge for all agents. Knowledge that is
available to the agents includes
The number of buyers and sellers
The identity of each buyer and seller
Number of time steps, periods and rounds
The current time, period and round
The price and quantity of previous trades
The agent's own internal valuation schedule
Knowledge that is not known to the agents includes
---_._.- ----_.--- .-... ---'--- - ~ -
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Equilibrium price
Equilibrium quantity
Quantity that is produced in the next period
Internal value schedule of other agents
After the initial period, the producers decide how much of the good to produce
in the coming period. This quantity of goods remains fixed within each period,
and goods cannot be held over from one period to the next.
The blackboard is equally accessible to all agents in the market. The blackboard
contains all information that is common knowledge. The blackboard is
analogous to a newspaper where prices and terms of trade are advertised. The
sellers advertise the price at which they are willing to trade on the blackboard in
each time step.
At each step, all consumers make a buy decision that entails buying a quantity of
the good from a particular seller at the seller's advertised price. The consumers
cannot spend more than their income for the period. All exchanges are made
directly between buyer and seller without relying on a middleman, monitor or
auctioneer.
If multiple orders are received by a given seller in a time step, then one of the
orders is chosen at random to fill first. If all the seller's goods are not sold, then
another order is chosen at random to fill, and so on until all orders have been
filled or the seller's supply is exhausted. Orders can be partially filled, but on a
first-come, first-served basis.
---' _.•._-_ _--_.
80
PROGRAMS AND INPUT FILES
market
The market file is a text file that contains information about the market
characteristics that are used in the market simulation. This file can be changed
by the researcher with a text editor. An example of a market file is shown in
Figure 10.
5 number of time segments in each period
4 number of periods in each round
90 number of rounds in the market simulation
1000 initial wealth for each producer
Figure 10. Listing of a typical market setup file.
agents
Each line of the agents file contains information about a single agent in the
market. This information consists of the program name of each agent, the role
the agent is assuming in the market, (p for producer or c for consumer), and a
name that identifies the agent. The agents file is a text file and can be changed
by the researcher.
Any number of agents can be listed in the agents file, and a single agent
program can be used more than once, allowing multiple copies of the same
program to compete. The agents do not have to be listed in any special order,
but arrangement of information on each line is fixed. An example of the agents
file is shown in Figure 11.
Agent
prodl.exe
prod2.exe
prod3.exe
prod4.exe
prod1.exe
prod2.exe
consl.exe
consl.exe
cons1.exe
consl.exe
consl.exe
consl.exe
~
p
p
p
p
p
p
c
c
c
c
c
c
~ame
producerO
producerl
producer2
producer3
producer4
producerS
consumerO
consumerl
consumer2
consumer3
consumer4
consumerS
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Figure 11. Listing of a typical agents file.
This example file shows 4 different producer programs and 1 consumer program
in a market consisting of 6 producers and 6 consumers (Le. each of the
consumers is implemented by a separate copy of the same consumer program).
While the code for consumer programs is identical, in application, the programs
are distinguished by supplying them with random parameters that will be
discussed later.
The top level program is responsible for timing and sequencing the calls to the
individual agents as well as taking care of bookkeeping and other maintenance
tasks. The basic structure of the market is determined by this program. For
instance, the program randomizes the order of agents in the queue to insure that
the agents are not called in the same sequence repeatedly. Questions such as
whether the producers can be called only between periods are determined by the
structure of the top level program.
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t1.exe
This program is called only once during a market simulation. The purpose of
t1.exe is to set up the blackboard after reading the agent and market files. The
program tl.exe also assigns a set of random coefficients to each agent that are
used by the agent throughout the market simulation. These coefficients
distinguish and individualize agents of the same type by providing some unique
characteristics to each agent.
prod.exe and cons.exe
Programs describing the behavior of producers and consumers are independent
of each other and of the top level program. These programs read from the
blackboard file, make some decisions about production, consumption and trade
under the current market conditions, and write the results of these decisions on
the blackboard, thus modifying the state of the market. As mentioned above, the
names of the programs are stored in a queue that is shuffled between calls to
prevent favoring agents solely because of their position in the queue.
Basic characteristics of the agents such as supply and demand relations are
directly under the researcher's control. Each agent receives a set of coefficients
that are stored at the start of the market and retains them throughout the market.
update.exe
The update program reads the blackboard and records the prices and quantities
that are advertised at the end of each period. In addition, the time, period and
round counters are updated by this program.
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record.exe
The record program transfers data from the blackboard file to a text file when
the market closes.
OUTPUT FILES
bb.bin and bb.txt
Data accumulates in several files as the market evolves. bb.bin is a binary file
that is available to all agents for reading and writing. As mentioned above, this
file is converted to a text file when the market closes, thus recording the final
conditions in the market.
trade.txt
Each completed trade is noted in the trade file by the consumer that completes
the trade. Reading from left to right the trade file records: round, period, time,
producer, consumer, price and quantity traded. The trade file can accumulate
large quantities of data, mostly useful for debugging, and is not generated for
most tests.
hist.txt
The history file records the state of the blackboard at the end of each time
interval. It records from left to right: round, period, time, price advertised by
each producer, and quantity that each producer has in inventory. This file is
updated by the update.exe program. The history file is most useful for
debugging and is not generated for most tests.
~------- ----_._----
ave.txt
The average file is updated after each time step. This file records cumulative
quantities, values and average prices within each period, round and market.
The data are grouped as follows:
ave price
total quantity
total value
Total trades in the period are updated after each time step in the period. The
value is computed as PiXi at each time step, and the average price is computed
as: average price = total value/total quantity. The figures accumulate
throughout the period but are reset to aat the beginning of the next period.
DESCRIPTION OF THE AGENTS
The following variables are defined and are used in the description of the
agents:
P = Market Price
Pe= Expected price
Q = Market Quantity
Qe= Expected Sales Quantity
T = Number of time steps per period
S =Number of consumers in the market
--"--_ ..._- .. - ._.-_ ....__..
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N =Number of Producer in the market
i = Index identifying an individual agent in the market
~
The same consumer program is used for all the market simulations. Many
instances of the same program run at the same time, but are differentiated by
supplying each agent with unique coefficients. The consumer program operates
as an agent that is a price taker. That is, the consumer takes the advertised price
as given, and does not attempt to bargain with the seller. The consumer does
optimize by choosing the lowest price available. Each agent examines the
blackboard and chooses to trade with the producer offering the lowest price.
The quantity that the consumer offers to buy is a function of the individual
agent's demand curve. At a given price, each consumer has a different demand.
Some may not be willing to purchase anything, while others may purchase a
substantial amount. The offers are filled by the producer that offered the lowest
price on a first-come-first-serve basis. The producer may not be able to fiII all
the orders from inventory, so some orders may go unfilled or partially fille~. In
order to simulate a parallel system, the offers are shuffled on the offer queue to
prevent always filling the same consumer's order first. The consumer program
also has several maintenance functions. These include updating the screen, the
blackboard and the trades file.
SATISFICING AGENTS
The logic used by the satisficing agents was not based on optimization in any
explicit way. These agents make decisions based only on the inventory held and
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the historical market price. The basis for making the production quantity
decision for the next period varies widely among the satisficing agents.
This agent adjusts price in the period based on the time remaining in the period,
and the quantity remaining in inventory. Fixed expectations are used as the
guideline for adjusting price. That is, if after a percent of the time in the period
has expired, and more than ~ percent of the starting inventory remains in stock,
then decrease price. Alternatively, if less than a percent of the available time has
expired, and more than ~ percent of the agent's starting inventory has already
been exchanged, then raise price. These relations are shown below in Figure 12.
Time
t>a t<=a
Quantity q>~ Raise No
Price Change
q<~ No Decrease
Change Price
Figure 12. Price adjustment scheme for psI.
The size of the price adjustments employed for these experiments was 5.0
percent in each time step. At the beginning of each period, agent ps1 attempts to
capture market share by bidding slightly lower than the competition's price. For
these experiments, the agent opens the period with a price that is (l-a) less than
the average price in the previous period.
Pe= W:PiQi/LQi for all transactions i, 0 < a <= 1.
The value of a was 0.99 in the experiments reported here. This agent makes the
quantity decision for the next period by examining the change in profit over the
--_....--- ._-_ ...__., .
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previous two periods, and additionally, the unsold inventory at the end of the
period (See Figure 13).
Excess Stock
Yes No
Increase Small Large
Profit Decrease Increase
Decrease Large Small
Decrease Increase
Figure 13. Quantity adjustment scheme for psI.
The second satisficing agent, ps2, was identical to psI, with the exception of the
period opening price formation rule. ps2 employed the average price from the
previous period as the opening price.
Pe= <x:EPiQi/:EQi for all transactions i, <X = 1.0
As a result of using this price rule, this agent does not engage in price wars, but
follows the market.
ps3
Agent ps3 follows the pattern set by agents psI and ps2, with the exception that
it increases price at the beginning of each period using average price in the last
period as the base. This removes some of the risk of selling below market price
in an uncertain market. The agent has the opportunity to adjust price if fewer
than expected sales are made in the early part of the period. The value of ex was
0.1 in these experiments.
Pe= (1+<x):EPiQi/:EQi for all transactions i, 0 <= <X <= 1.
--"_._- _ .. - -.._.-._--"
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Agents ps4, ps5 and ps6 were eliminated in the preliminary experimen ts tind tire
not reported on here.
ps7
This agent bases it's production decision on capturing a "fair share" of the
market. The agent produces for the next period based on the total quantity
available in the previous period, divided by the total number of producers. e.g.
q(t+l)= Q(t)/n. Thus the agent assumes that each producer will supply an
equal portion of the market, and that the demand in the next period will be
unchanged (e.g., the agent uses a static expectations model to forecast
production). The opening price is based on the 10 percent over average price
rule shown for agent ps3.
ps8
The satisficing producer ps8 bases its quantity decision for the next period on the
remaining inventory at the end of the last period. The end-of-period
equilibrium inventory for this agent is between preset limits. An ending
inventory below the limit results in an increase in the quantity produced, while
an ending inventory over the limit results in a decrease in quantity produced.
An objection to this rule is that it is not consistent with economic rationality.
That is, if the producer comes to equilibrium with between a arid Ppercent of
stock remaining in inventory at the dose of the period, then the producer could
increase profits by decreasing production. However, such rules are used in the
case of some products where production costs are low, and the price changes
infrequently while the demand fluctuates daily. Newspapers are an example of
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such a product. Another response to this objection is that these agents are not
optimizers and thus do not necessarily follow the classical economic logic.
Ending Inventory =q
Expected Sales =qe
q <= exqe
q >= pqe
Increase qe
No Change
Decrease qe
The value of ex was 0.03, and pwas 0.05 for these experiments. The opening
price for agents ps8 is based on the 10-percent-over-average-price rule as shown
for agent ps3.
STACKELBERG AGENTS
The Stackelberg class agents include a substantial gain in knowledge about the
market when compared with the satisficing agents. The Stackelberg agents have
knowledge of the average demand relation used by the consuming agents.
Thus, if the total quantity produced by all agents in the period is known, the
Stackelberg class agents can compute the market clearing price. These agents,
however, do not know the intentions of the competing producing agents. The
Stackelberg agents are assigned different coefficients that represent their
conjecture about the response of other agents to a change in their own
production. The conjectural variation (CV) used by these agents are shown in
Table I.
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TABLE I
CONJECTURAL VARIATION APPLIED TO STACKELBERG AGENTS
AGENT CV
pcOOO 0.0
pc025 -0.25
pc050 -0.50
pclOO -1.00
The Stackelberg agents compute the quantity for the next period based on the
following equation:
Where qe is the expected production for the next period, aO and ~1 are
coefficients from the cost and demand functions that are known to the
Stackelberg class agents. T represents the number of times trading is allowed in
each period, while S represents the number of consumers in the market. CV is
the conjectural variation assigned to the particular implementation of the
Stackelberg agent. The agents use their knowledge of the average demand curve
of the consumers to set an expected market clearing price.
Where pe is the expected price for the next period, Qe is the expected total
production for the next period, ~O and ~1 are coefficients from the demand
function that are known to the Stackelberg class agents. T represents the number
of times trading is allowed in each period, while S represents the number of
consumers in the market.
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The Stackelberg agents also adjust price in each time step by using the above
equation, but substituting the actual inventory that is in the market for Qe. The
market inventory is available to all agents after the first time step when
quantities are advertised on the blackboard. These agents take advantage of the
market inventory data to compute the market clearing price and make
adjustments to their price as necessary.
OPTIMIZING AGENTS
The optimizing agents have no specific knowledge about the form or coefficients
of the demand curve, or about other the producers that they are competing with.
Instead, the optimizing agents learn about the environment that they are in.
Two optimizing agents were created for this research, and both use neural
networks to make their decisions.
The agent pn1 uses two internal neural nets to make quantity decisions, but
bases opening price decisions on the average price in the market. The agent pn2
incorporates three neural networks, and uses them to make opening price and
quantity decisions. The logic used in the neural optimizing agents is shown
below in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Neural nets for computing output and profit.
The first net has 7 inputs (plus a bias term), 1 output, and 5 elements in its
hidden layer (See Table II). The function of the network is to make the best
possible guess about the total expected sales by other agents. That is, the net is
attempting to forecast the amount of sales that all of the other producing agents
expect to fulfill in the next period. Internally, the network uses a sigmoid
transfer function in each element.
This agent avoids the problem of making a predetermined and unchangeable
conjecture about the response of other agents in the market, since this is
implicitly included in the reaction of others, and is learned by the network
through repeated exposure to the data.
93
TABLE II
INPUTS AND OUTPUTS FOR NET 1
Inputs(Time = t-l)
Number of Producers
Number of Consumers
Times per period
Expected Sales by Agent
Unsold Inventory Owned by Agent
Expected Sales by Other Agents
Unsold Inventory Owned by Other
Agents
Output (Time = t)
Expected Sales by Other
Agents
The function of the second network is to compute the expected profit in the
ensuing period. The second network includes 5 inputs (plus a bias), one output,
and three elements in the hidden layer. This net uses a hyperbolic tangent as a
transfer function, which allows negative values (losses instead of profits), and
ultimately produced much better results than the sigmoid transfer function. The
price is not explicitly included in the network, but is included implicitly as a
function of the exogenous variables.
TABLE III
INPUTS AND OUTPUTS FOR NET 2
Inputs(Time= t-U
Number of Producers
Number of Consumers
Times per period
Expected Sales by Agent
Expected Sales by Other
Agents
Outputs (Time = t)
Expected Profit by Agent
After updating the weights and computing the expected sales by others in the
first net, the only remaining unknown is the expected sales by the agent. The
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agent optimizes its expected profit by adjusting its expected sales. That is, the
agent starts with a low level of expected sales and computes the corresponding
expected profit with the network. The agent then increases the expected sales
and recomputes the expected profits. This process continues for an interval
surrounding the value of expected sales in the previous period. The agent then
chooses to produce the quantity that yields the highest expected profit.
The network cycles through the data 100 times at the end of each period,
adjusting weights with the backpropagation algorithm at each cycle. After
updating the weights to include the most recent data, the weights are fixed and
the data from the most recent period is used to compute the expected sales by
others in the next period.
The neural optimizing agents must be "matured" by exposing them to a variety
of markets for the purpose of learning. A naive agent has a random set of
coefficients and has no experience on which to base decisions. As implemented
in these agents, the learning process is actually a dynamic weight adjustment
procedure that proceeds both on and off line. Each neural agent maintains
weight files where the connection weights are stored. Separate weigh and data
files are maintained for quantity, profit and price projections for each agent. The
weights are adjusted on-line at the end of each period. The data on which
training and decision making are based accumulates in files at the end of each
period.
The on-line adjustment procedure calls for 100 passes through the last 100
observations in the data file. The number of passes and observations included in
the training set were chosen to balance speed and quality of projections. Longer
_._-_.-.~".- '-..'._.'-'--_.... - ._----
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training periods with more data may produce somewhat better results but make
the computational load excessive. This was compensated for by accumulating
data from market simulations and training the agents off-line for up to 30,000
passes through the data retained from other markets. The mature weight files
used for the tests of agent pn2 were developed through exposure to a wide
variety of market types.
The on-line training allows the agents to respond to local conditions in the
market in which they are participating. Additionally, limiting the data to the
last 100 observations encourages response to current conditions rather than to
older historical averages.
The dynamic nature of the weight files indicates that the behavior of a given
agent evolves over time. This has important consequences for experimental
design. For instance, when measuring the performance of a neural agent in a
round robin competition, the order of the trials could have serious consequences
because the weight file changes during each exposure. This was observed in
some preliminary experiments. This affect was avoided in the experiments
represented here by starting all trials with the same mature weight file.
pnl
Agent pnl uses the two networks described above to make the profit
maximizing quantity decision, and in addition uses an adaptive expectations
scheme to set the opening price in the new period. This is based on the expected
price at the beginning of the last period, and the average price that emerges.
The agent adjusts price to the average price of all trades during the period.
..
Adaptive Expectations Price Rule:
pe(t) = hP(t-1) + (l-h)pe(t_1), 0 <= h <= 1.
This rule is used only for setting the opening price at the start of each period.
The learning rate h was instantiated at 0.5. The price adjustment in each period
was based on the average price observed in the period.
pn2
Agent pn2 uses the two networks described above to make the profit
maximizing decision, and also incorporates a third network to compute the
expected price in the next period. The price net has 6 inputs, one output, and 4
elements in the hidden layer. The inputs and outputs used by the price
estimation network are shown in Table IV. This network uses a sigmoid transfer
function in the network elements, and is trained 100 times at the end of each
period. (Le., 100 passes through the data).
TABLE IV
INPUTS AND OUTPUTS FOR NET 3
Inputs(Time=t-l)
Number of Producers
Number of Consumers
Times per period
Period
Round
Total Quantity in Market
Outputs (Time = t)
Expected Price
CHAPTER VI
VERIFICAnON OF THE DISTRIBUTED MARKET
The computer market was verified by performing a number of control market
simulations. The control experiments were designed to imitate the well known
static and adaptive expectations models of price formation. The purpose of these
tests was to verify that the programs comprising the computer mnrket come to
the results predicted by the theoretical models.
The market simulation model is a distributed model composed of control and
utility programs, several input and output files, and the agent programs as
shown below in Table V.
TABLE V
PROGRAMS AND FILES IN THE DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER MARKET
CONTROL
t.exe
UTILI1Y
t1.exe
update.exe
record.exe
INPUT
agents.
market.
OUTPUT
trades.txt
ave.txt
bb.txt
hist.txt
AGENTS
prod03.txt
cons03.txt
Assumptions regarding the behavior of agents in static and adaptive
expectations models are quite restrictive and are dropped in the following
research. They are employed here only for testing the accuracy and robustness
of the market mechanism under various conditions. In this case, the market is
composed of identical producers and consumers. The producers make a
production decision based on the price of goods in the previous period, while
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consumers base their consumption decisions on the price in the current period.
However, the price in the current period depends on the quantity available. The
way that the price is set in the control models is distinctly different from the
price formation in my research models. Traditional models do not investigate
the behavior that results in the emergence of this important variable. Rather,
traditional models simply assume that the price is automatically and
instantaneously adjusted to correctly ration the quantity of goods that is
available. This is the assumption that is used in the present control simulations.
In the control experiments, the agent's price adjustments are made immediately
in a single time step. No trading takes place until the equilibrium price for the
given quantity of goods is reached. As a result, all goods are actually sold in
each period.
The parameters that were adjusted within the agent programs were the slope of
the supply curve in the consumer programs, and the learning rate in the
producer programs. Characteristics of the market, such as the number of
agents in the market, and the length of market trading were also varied. The
decision equations used in the programs are shown below:
Supply Quantity: qg = 20 + 2pe
Expected Price in next period: pet+1 =Pt h + (1-h) pet
Demand Quantity: qd = 100 - mPt
Market: qd =qg
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In these equations, qs and qd signify the quantity supplied and demanded, P
and Pe represent the actual and expected prices, while hand m are parameters
representing the learning rate and slope of the demand curve respectively. The
parameters (h and m) are internal constants that are stored in the compiled agent
programs in contrast to the quantity and price variables that are computed by
the interaction of the agents.
Given the assumptions above, and values of hand m, the equilibrium price is
given by:
p* = 80 / (m + 3h -1)
The price in the market at any given time by can be computed if the initial price
Po is known. In the control experiments, the initial price Po was set to 27.0 or
30.0 and h was set to 1.0 for the static expectations model. Under these
conditions the price at time t is computed as:
Pt = Po - P*(-2/m)t + p*
A market composed of these agents was tested and found to reproduce the
theoretical results under a variety of conditions as shown in Table VI. The
market was tested over various time periods with up to 500 time steps. Figure
15 graphically shows that the market converges to the equilibrium price when
the parameters m and h equal 2.1 and 1.0, respectively. The market oscillates
predictably toward the equilibrium price. In the cases where the market does
reach equilibrium, the equilibrium is stable and there is no tendency to deviate
from it. The market was found to perform well with up to 970 agents, however,
the data produced by such large numbers of agents is overwhelming. In order
~.._---..:....,- .-.~_._---_.
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to minimize the data collection effort, the file hist.txt was not generated for
lengthy simulations comprising large numbers of agents.
TABLE VI
MODEL VERIFICATION WITH AGENTS PROD03 AND CONS03
Description m1 bb1 m1 bb2 m1 bb3 m1 bb4 m1 bb5 m1 bb6 m1 bb7
Demand Slope (m) 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Learning Rate (h) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of Producers 1 1 16 4 64 256 485
Number of Consumers 1 1 16 4 64 256 485
Total Agents 2 2 32 8 128 512 970
Time Steps per Period 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Periods per Round 1 1 1 1 I 1 1
Rounds 200 500 100 200 50 50 25
Price in Final Round 19.51 19.51 19.57 19.51 20.17 20.17 17.30
Quantity in Final Round 59.02 59.02 58.90 59.02 57.65 57.65 63.67
Computed Price in Final Round 19.51 19.51 19.57 19.51 20.17 20.17 17.30
Computed Quantity in Final 59.02 59.02 58.90 59.02 57.65 57.65 63.67
Round
Computed Equilibrium Price 19.51 19.51 19.51 19.51 19.51 19.51 19.51
Computed Equilibrium Quantity 59.02 59.02 59.02 59.02 59.02 59.02 59.02
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Figure 15. Price vs time outcome for a static expectations market
(m=2.1, h=1.0).
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As expected, the market converged to equilibrium or diverged according to the
relative size of the parameters in the demand and expected price equations. The
case m=2.0, h=1 produced stable oscillations around the equilibrium as shown in
Figure 16, while m=2.1, h=1 resulted in a gradual approach to equilibrium with
prices alternating above and below the equilibrium price (See Figure 15 and
Table VII). On the other hand, the market diverged for m > 2.0, h=l with larger
alternating deviations around the equilibrium price until the market collapsed.
TABLE VII
MODEL VERIFICATION WITH CYCLICAL PRICE VARIAnON
Description m2bb1 m2bb2 m2bb3 m2bb4
Demand Slope (m) 2 2.1 2.6 3
Learning Rate (h) 1 1 1 1
Number of Producers 4 4 4 4
Number of Consumers 4 4 4 4
Total Agents 8 8 8 8
TIme Steps per Period 1 1 1 1
Periods per Round 1 1 1 1
Rounds 100 100 100 100
Price in Final Round 30.00 19.57 17.39 16.00
Quantity in Rnal Round 40.00 58.90 54.78 52.00
Computed Price in Final Round 30.00 19.57 17.39 16.00
Computed Quantity in Final Round 40.00 58.90 54.78 52.00
Computed Equilibrium Price 20.00 19.51 17.39 16.00
Computed Equilibrium Quantity 60.00 59.02 54.78 52.00
A second cause of market collapse was found when the starting price Po was set
at 30 or above, and the slope of the demand curve was steep. Under these
conditions, the producers do not recover sufficient revenue to meet costs and as
a result, wealth falls below zero and they are eliminated from the market.
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Figure 16. Stable price cycles in the static expectations model
(m=2.0, h=1.0).
Table VIII summarizes the results of market simulations when the parameter m
was fixed at 2.0 and the learning rate varied over the range 0 <= h <= 1 . The
market performed as expected, converging more rapidly as the value of h
approached 1/2 from above.
TABLE VIn
MODEL VERIFICAnON WITH ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS
Description m3 bb1 m3bb2 m3bb3 m3 bb4 m3 bb5
Demand Slope (m) 2 2 2 2 2
Learning Rate (h) 1 0.9 0.6 0.25 0
Number of Producers 4 4 4 4 4
Number of Consumers 4 4 4 4 4
Total Agents 8 8 8 8 8
TIme Steps per Period 1 1 1 1 1
Periods per Round 1 1 1 1 1
Rounds 100 100 100 100 100
Price in Final Round 27 20 20 20 10
Quantity in Final Round 46 60 60 60 80
Computed Price in Final Round 30.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
Computed Quantity in Final Round 40.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 100.00
Computed Equilibrium Price 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
Computed Equilibrium Quantity 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
--_..•_..- _--_ _._-_.
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These markets approach price equilibrium by alternating above and below the
equilibrium price. Values ofh such that 0 < h < 1/2 approach equilibrium from
below, and never overestimate price, as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Model verification with adaptive expectations
(m=2.0, h=O.25).
In conclusion, the simulated market produced the theoretically expected output
in every case where sufficient time was allowed for the market to come to
equilibrium. The problems encountered were operational rather than
theoretical. Markets composed of over 100 agents generate large amounts of
data and it was determined that the file hist.txt could be eliminated unless
specifically needed to examine the trading behavior of an individual agent.
Additionally, larger markets take a proportionately longer number of periods to
come to equilibrium. It was found to be especially important to save the file
bb.txt, because this file summarizes the market and records the results as the
market closes.
--_.---,.- .~....--_."
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PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS WITH STACKELBERG AGENTS
One set of preliminary experiments focussed on the appropriate number of
consumers to include in the markets. Table IX shows the theoretical and
experimental results of a market composed of 4 producers of the Stackelberg
class. The CV for these agents was 0.0, making them true Cournot strategists.
TABLE IX
STACKELBERG THEORETICAL AND REALIZED OUTCOMES
CV =0.0
Number of Theory Realized Theory Realized
Consumers Quantity Quantity Price Price
4 1,440 1,440 14.0 13.8
8 2,880 2,875 14.0 13.8
16 5,760 5,761 14.0 13.9
32 11,520 11,478 14.0 14.01
64 23,040 21,660 14.0 16.06
128 46,080 34,810 14.0 22.77
The agents were allowed to adjust price for a maximum of 5 time steps in each
period. Each round included 4 periods, and the market was conducted for 90
rounds, yielding a total of 360 periods. In all cases, the markets were
homogeneous, and all agents were started with 1,000 units of wealth. At the end
of 360 periods the markets were discontinued, and the results examined. The
markets composed of 64 and 128 agents had not come to equilibrium, and the
price was still falling. The markets composed of fewer agents showed some
consistent variation around an apparent equilibrium price. The values reported
were the average price and quantity traded in the last round, and as a result, the
figures may diverge somewhat from the expected average price of 14.0. The
quantities traded in the market are also very close to the theoretical quantities.
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These results were used as a guide for choosing the market structure for further
experimentation. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent markets included 4
producers and 16 consumers. This structure resulted in a price and quantity
equilibrium within 90 rounds for the Stackelberg agents. However, subsequent
results will show that this was not adequate for all classes of agents, and that
some markets may never come to equilibrium. The 16 consumer agents used in
these markets differ only in the coefficients that are assigned to them, so the
agents are not completely identical. This procedure may result in small
quantities of goods left on the market. Briefly, the agent chooses the largest
quantity available, at the lowest price. As a result, this agent can be viewed as a
close approximation to an optimizing consumer.
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CHAPTER VII
DISTRIBUTED MARKET EXPERIMENTS
INTRODUCTION
These experiments show the strengths of the distributed approach for modelling
economic systems. The effect of individual agents and classes of agents can be
tested in artificial markets composed by the researcher. These experiments show
that variety in agents and their strategies is an important component of markets.
The experiments also show the importance of learning, knowledge, and the
advantage of incorporating more complex agents that are able to optimize by
learning about the other agents in the market.
The three classes of agents used for the distributed market simulations are:
Stackelberg agents, satisficing agents and optimizing neural agents (hereafter
called neural agents). Each class of agents employs distinctly different methods
to make price and quantity decisions, and each produces a distinctly different
outcome.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
The focus of this study is on the attributes of the emergent variables such as
wealth, price, quantity, and their values in distributed economic markets. The
attributes of interest are the amount, variability and stationarity of the emergent
time series. Total market quantity traded per period, as well as the quantities
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accruing to individual agents are of interest. That is, the values at both the unit
and the subunit level are of interest.
Wealth
All agents (both consumers and producers) enter the market with 1,000 units of
wealth. For the markets reported here, this amounts to 20,000 units of total
wealth at the market's inception. The design of both consumers and producers is
to increase wealth by production and consumption, respectively. Producer's
intend to trade their product for more than the cost of producing it, thereby
increasing their wealth. The profits from each trade add to the producer's
wealth, while losses from trade reduce the producer's wealth. Consumers, on
the other hand, attempt to pay less for the product than it is worth to them, and
gain utility by consumption.
For the consumer, wealth is a proxy for utility, and measures how well off the
agents are. A market that generates more wealth is deemed to be superior to a
market that generates less wealth, regardless of how the wealth is distributed.
RESULTS
The results of the market experiments are reported for the markets as a whole,
and for the agents individually. The general results are reported first, followed
by the results emerging for each class of agents. Statistical properties of the
markets, such as stationarity are also discussed. A separate set of experiments
reports on the results of repetitions of the same market, with and without agents
that have the ability to carryover information between markets. In these
experiments, markets containing the same agents are repeated multiple times in
order to monitor the variability of results, and the ability of the agents to adapt
---_...__..- - _._.---- .....- .._..--~ _.'. -.-".- -' ~....
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to slightly different conditions. Another important test of adaptability includes
shifts in the demand curve of the consumer. Together, these experiments
provide evidence about learning and the characteristics of these experimental
markets. The discussion of results ends with remarks about the interaction of
agents in the markets and the accumulation of wealth over time.
Table X summarizes the results of the market simulations, including the
homogeneous and heterogeneous markets. The 11 homogeneous markets are
identified as HI through HII, and indicate that all producers in the market were
identical, except for minor variations in the coefficients. The producing agents
that are included in the markets are listed across each row of Table X under the
heading "Agents". For instance, market HI is a homogeneous market and
includes four identical agents (pcOOO). The 31 mixed markets are indicated by
MI through M31 in the table, and each market includes four different producers.
The mixed markets include mixtures of all three classes of agents, satisficing,
Stackelberg and optimizing. For instance, M22 includes pcOOO, ps3, ps7 and pn2.
This table is organized according to the type of market, with homogeneous
markets appearing first, followed by the mixed markets. The total accumulated
wealth, average price and total quantity in the ending period are shown in the
table. Tables XI, XII and XIII show the same data organized according to
increasing total wealth, average ending price and total quantity traded in the last
period, respectively. Many of these markets were still in transition when they
were interrupted after 90 rounds.
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TABLE X
MARKET SUMMARY
Wealth Average Total
Market (Millions) Price Quantity Agents
Hl 65.40 14.0 5,760 peOOO peOOO peOOO peOOO
H2 67.93 17.2 5,234 pe050 pe050 pe050 pe050
H3 65.20 20.0 4,797 pel00 pe100 pe100 pe100
H4 34.18 4.9 6,291 psl pSl pS1 psl
H5 1.94 26.1 120 ps2 ps2 ps2 ps2
H6 12.14 45.1 498 ps3 ps3 ps3 ps3
H7 2.92 48.5 120 ps7 ps7 ps7 ps7
H8 10.61 45.8 468 ps8 ps8 ps8 ps8
H9 64.97 14.2 5,735 pn2 pn2 pn2 pn2
Hl0 69.49 15.7 5,490 pe025 pe025 pe025 pe025
Hll 2.46 23.7 139 pn1 pn1 pn1 pn1
Ml 65.15 16.3 5,362 peOOO pe025 pe050 pe10a
M2 18.59 42.3 1,112 psl ps2 ps3 ps7
M3 14.74 45.9 707 ps1 ps2 ps3 ps8
M4 19.49 42.5 1,139 psl ps2 ps7 ps8
M5 16.30 43.5 923 psl ps7 ps8 ps3
M6 15.20 42.9 926 ps7 ps8 ps2 ps3
M7 62.48 19.1 4,914 peaOO psl ps2 ps3
M8 59.86 21.8 4,486 peOOO psl ps2 ps7
M9 55.39 25.8 3,841 peOOO pSl ps2 ps8
Ml0 64.20 17.3 5.242 peOOO psl ps7 ps3
Mll 63.22 13.5 5.868 peOOO psl ps7 ps8
M12 63.45 16.7 5.305 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps3
M13 64.02 14.5 5,681 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps8
M14 63.68 17.2 5,223 peOOO ps7 ps3 ps8
M15 53.95 17.4 5.203 psl ps2 ps3 pn2
M16 50.82 14.5 5,660 psl ps2 ps7 pn2
M17 58.38 22.1 4,446 psl ps2 ps8 pn2
M18 60.10 6.6 6,952 pSl ps7 ps3 pn2
M19 49.81 15.2 5.557 psl ps7 ps8 pn2
M20 45.49 19.7 4,844 ps7 ps2 ps3 pn2
M21 59.27 9.5 6,475 ps8 ps7 ps3 pn2
M22 66.80 11.5 6,172 peOOO ps7 ps3 pn2
M23 63.42 5.9 7,037 peOOO ps7 ps2 pn2
M24 63.57 17.7 5,138 peOOO ps7 psl pn2
M25 68.62 5.4 7,139 peOOO ps7 ps8 pn2
M26 61.69 27.7 3,547 peOOO psl ps2 pn2
M27 64.88 5.0 7.193 peOOO psl ps3 pn2
M28 64.28 6.7 6,939 peOOO psl ps8 pn2
M29 63.51 22.9 4,308 peOOO ps2 ps8 pn2
M30 66.10 16.2 5,395 peOOO ps2 ps7 pn2
M31 65.02 18.6 5.024 peOOO ps3 ps8 pn2
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
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TABLE XI
MARKET SUMMARY SORTED BY WEALTH
Wealth Average Total
Market (Millions) Priee Quantity Agents
H5 1.94 26.1 120 ps2 ps2 ps2 ps2
H11 2.46 23.7 139 pn1 pn1 pn1 pn1
H7 2.92 48.5 120 ps7 ps7 ps7 ps7
H8 10.61 45.8 468 ps8 ps8 ps8 ps8
H6 12.14 45.1 498 ps3 ps3 ps3 ps3
M3 14.74 45.9 707 pS1 ps2 ps3 ps8
M6 15.20 42.9 926 ps7 ps8 ps2 ps3
M5 16.30 43.5 923 ps1 ps7 ps8 ps3
M2 18.59 42.3 1,112 ps1 ps2 ps3 ps7
M4 19.49 42.5 1,139 pS1 ps2 ps7 ps8
H4 34.18 4.9 6,291 ps1 pS1 ps1 ps1
M20 45.49 19.7 4,844 ps7 ps2 ps3 pn2
M19 49.81 15.2 5,557 ps1 ps7 ps8 pn2
M16 50.82 14.5 5,660 PS1 ps2 ps7 pn2
M15 53.95 17.4 5,203 ps1 ps2 ps3 pn2
M9 55.39 25.8 3,841 peOOO pS1 ps2 ps8
M17 58.38 22.1 4,446 pS1 ps2 ps8 pn2
M21 59.27 9.5 6,475 ps8 ps7 ps3 pn2
M8 59.86 21.8 4,486 peOOO pS1 ps2 ps7
M18 60.10 6.6 6,952 pS1 ps7 ps3 pn2
M26 61.69 27.7 3,547 peOOO ps1 ps2 pn2
M7 62.48 19.1 4,914 peOOO pS1 ps2 ps3
M11 63.22 13.5 5,868 peOOO ps1 ps7 ps8
M23 63.42 5.9 7.037 peOOO ps7 ps2 pn2
M12 63.45 16.7 5,305 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps3
M29 63.51 22.9 4.308 peOOO ps2 ps8 pn2
M24 63.57 17.7 5,138 peOOO ps7 pS1 pn2
M14 63.68 17.2 5,223 peOOO ps7 ps3 ps8
M13 64.02 14.5 5.681 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps8
M10 64.20 17.3 5,242 peOOO ps1 ps7 ps3
M28 64.28 6.7 6,939 peOOO ps1 ps8 pn2
M27 64.88 5.0 7,193 peOOO ps1 ps3 pn2
H9 64.97 14.2 5,735 pn2 pn2 pn2 pn2
M31 65.02 18.6 5,024 peOOO ps3 ps8 pn2
M1 65.15 16.3 5.362 peOOO pe025 pe050 pe100
H3 65.20 20.0 4,797 pe100 pe100 pe100 pe100
H1 65.40 14.0 5,760 peOOO peOOO peOOO peOOO
M30 66.10 16.2 5.395 peOOO ps2 ps7 pn2
M22 66.80 11.5 6,172 peOOO ps7 ps3 pn2
H2 67.93 17.2 5,234 pe050 pe050 peOSO peOSO
M25 68.62 5.4 7,139 peOOO ps7 ps8 pn2
H10 69.49 15.7 5,490 pe025 pc025 pc025 pe025
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
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TABLE XII
MARKET SUMMARY SORTED BY PRICE
Wealth Average Total
Market (Millions) Priee Quantity Agents
H4 34.18 4.9 6,291 ps1 psl psl ps1
M27 64.88 5.0 7,193 peOOO psl ps3 pn2
M25 68.62 5.4 7,139 peOOO ps7 ps8 pn2
M23 63.42 5.9 7,037 peOOO ps7 ps2 pn2
M18 60.10 6.6 6,952 ps1 ps7 ps3 pn2
M28 64.28 6.7 6,939 peOOO psl ps8 pn2
M21 59.27 9.5 6,475 ps8 ps7 ps3 pn2
M22 66.80 11.5 6,172 peOOO ps7 ps3 pn2
M11 63.22 13.5 5,868 peOOO ps1 ps7 ps8
H1 65.40 14.0 5,760 peOOO peOOO peOOO peOOO
H9 64.97 14.2 5,735 pn2 pn2 pn2 pn2
M16 50.82 14.5 5,660 pSl ps2 ps7 pn2
M13 64.02 14.5 5,681 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps8
M19 49.81 15.2 5,557 pSl ps7 ps8 pn2
H10 69.49 15.7 5,490 pe025 pe025 pe025 pe025
M30 66.10 16.2 5,395 peOOO ps2 ps7 pn2
M1 65.15 16.3 5,362 peOOO pe025 pe050 pel00
M12 63.45 16.7 5,305 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps3
M14 63.68 17.2 5,223 peOOO ps7 ps3 ps8
H2 67.93 17.2 5,234 pe050 pe050 pe050 pe050
M10 64.20 17.3 5,242 peOOO ps1 ps7 ps3
M15 53.95 17.4 5,203 ps1 ps2 ps3 pn2
M24 63.57 17.7 5,138 peOOO ps7 psl pn2
M31 65.02 18.6 5,024 peOOO ps3 ps8 pn2
M7 62.48 19.1 4,914 peOOO psl ps2 ps3
M20 45.49 19.7 4,844 ps7 ps2 ps3 pn2
H3 65.20 20.0 4,797 pe100 pelGO pel00 pel00
M8 59.86 21.8 4,486 peOOO psl ps2 ps7
M17 58.38 22.1 4,446 pS1 ps2 ps8 pn2
M29 63.51 22.9 4,308 peOOO ps2 ps8 pn2
H11 2.46 23.7 139 pn1 pn1 pnl pnl
M9 55.39 25.8 3,841 peOOO psl ps2 ps8
H5 1.94 26.1 120 ps2 ps2 ps2 ps2
M26 61.69 27.7 3,547 peOOO ps1 ps2 pn2
M2 18.59 42.3 1,112 psl ps2 ps3 ps7
M4 19.49 42.5 1,139 pS1 ps2 ps7 ps8
M6 15.20 42.9 926 ps7 ps8 ps2 ps3
M5 16.30 43.5 923 ps1 ps7 ps8 ps3
H6 12.14 45.1 498 ps3 ps3 ps3 ps3
H8 10.61 45.8 468 ps8 ps8 ps8 ps8
M3 14.74 45.9 707 pS1 ps2 ps3 ps8
H7 2.92 48.5 120 ps7 ps7 ps7 ps7
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
112
TABLE XIII
MARKET SUMMARY SORTED BY QUANTITY
Weatth Average Total
Market (Millions) Price Quantity Agents
H5 1.94 26.1 120 ps2 ps2 ps2 ps2
H7 2.92 48.5 120 ps7 ps7 ps7 ps7
H11 2.46 23.7 139 pn1 pn1 pnl pn1
H8 10.61 45.8 468 ps8 ps8 ps8 ps8
H6 12.14 45.1 498 ps3 ps3 ps3 ps3
M3 14.74 45.9 707 ps1 ps2 ps3 ps8
M5 16.30 43.5 923 ps1 ps7 ps8 ps3
M6 15.20 42.9 926 ps7 ps8 ps2 ps3
M2 18.59 42.3 1,112 ps1 ps2 ps3 ps7
M4 19.49 42.5 1,139 ps1 ps2 ps7 ps8
M26 61.69 27.7 3,547 peOOO pS1 ps2 pn2
M9 55.39 25.8 3.841 peOOO ps1 ps2 ps8
M29 63.51 22.9 4,308 peOOO ps2 ps8 pn2
M17 58.38 22.1 4,446 psl ps2 ps8 pn2
M8 59.86 21.8 4,486 peOOO ps1 ps2 ps7
H3 65.20 20.0 4,797 pel00 pel00 pel00 pel00
M20 45.49 19.7 4.844 ps7 ps2 ps3 pn2
M7 62.48 19.1 4,914 peOOO PSl ps2 ps3
M31 65.02 18.6 5,024 peOOO ps3 ps8 pn2
M24 63.57 17.7 5,138 peOOO ps7 pSl pn2
M15 53.95 17.4 5,203 ps1 ps2 ps3 pn2
M14 63.68 17.2 5,223 peOOO ps7 ps3 ps8
H2 67.93 17.2 5,234 pe050 pe050 pe050 pe050
Ml0 64.20 17.3 5.242 peOOO pSl ps7 ps3
M12 63.45 16.7 5,305 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps3
Ml 65.15 16.3 5,362 peOOO pe025 pe050 pel00
M30 66.10 16.2 5,395 peOOO ps2 ps7 pn2
Hl0 69.49 15.7 5,490 pe025 pe025 pe025 pe025
M19 49.81 15.2 5,557 ps1 ps7 ps8 pn2
M16 50.82 14.5 5,660 ps1 ps2 ps7 pn2
M13 64.02 14.5 5.681 peOOO ps7 ps2 ps8
H9 64.97 14.2 5.735 pn2 pn2 pn2 pn2
H1 65.40 14.0 5,760 peOOO peOOO peOOO peOOO
M11 63.22 13.5 5,868 peOOO ps1 ps7 ps8
M22 66.80 11.5 6,172 peOOO ps7 ps3 pn2
H4 34.18 4.9 6,291 ps1 pSl psl pSl
M21 59.27 9.5 6,475 ps8 ps7 ps3 pn2
M28 64.28 6.7 6.939 peOOO psl ps8 pn2
M18 60.10 6.6 6,952 psl ps7 ps3 pn2
M23 63.42 5.9 7,037 peOOO ps7 ps2 pn2
M25 68.62 5.4 7,139 peOOO ps7 ps8 pn2
M27 64.88 5.0 7,193 peOOO ps1 ps3 pn2
Agent key: pc= Stackclberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
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Each class of markets results in a different pattern of results. In general, the
Stackelberg agents produce more wealth and result in higher joint production
than the homogeneous satisficing markets. This is reasonable because these
agents have far more knowledge about the market. The satisficing agents do not
have knowledge about the markets and produce low market wealth in
homogeneous markets. The optimizing agent pn2 also does well using total
market wealth as a criteria, but pn1 does not.
The mixed markets were composed of agents from each of the classes. Several
tests included mixtures of satisficing agents. In addition, one mixed market was
composed of only Stackelberg agents. The other mixed markets included
combinations of all three classes. The Stackelberg agent pcOOO was used in all
tests to represent the Stackelberg agents because agents in this class were very
consistent in operation. The optimizing class was represented by pn2 because
this agent's performance was generally superior to agent pnl. The difference
between these agents was the inclusion of a third network in pn2 for price
estimation.
One feature that appears in the results shown in Tables XI , XII and XIII, is a
large discontinuity that separates the results into distinct groups. These
discontinuities are shown more dearly when the data are shown graphically (See
Figures 18, 19,and 20). These figures show the results sorted by total wealth,
price and ending quantity. In the case of total wealth, the low wealth markets
are, with a single exception, composed of satisficing agents. The exception was
neural agent pn1, which also produced very low market wealth. Total wealth
jumps from 34.18 million units to 45.49 million units between consecutive
markets when the markets are ordered according to increasing wealth. All
---- .~- .. - .-- ._.---.-'. . - ._.- ._--
markets in the high wealth group include at least one representative from either
the Stackelberg or the optimizing class (pn2), while the low wealth group
contains mostly satisficing agents.
The highest wealth was produced by the homogeneous market composed
entirely of Stackelberg agent pc025. However, many combinations of satisficing,
optimizing and Stackelberg agents produce similar values. Markets with at least
one Stackelberg or optimizing agent usually produce more wealth than markets
composed only of satisficing agents (See Figure 18).
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Figure 20. Markets sorted by quantity.
The quantity traded results are consistent with the results reported above for
total wealth. There is a clear separation between the market composed entirely
of satisficing agents and the other markets when the markets are ordered
according to increasing quantity. The quantity traded more than doubles,
jumping from 1,139 to 3,547 between neighboring markets in the sorted list.
Again, the optimizing agent pnl scored with the satisficing agents. The markets
that produce the highest quantity were mixed markets containing Stackelberg,
neural and satisficing agents.
The ordered price results tell a similar story. In this case, the price jumps irom
27.7 to 42.3 between neighboring markets in the sorted list. The high price
markets are exclusively composed of satisficing agents. However, the mid-
range price results also contain a market composed only of satisficing agents,
and the lowest price emerging from the simulations was from a market
composed of satisficing agents (the price slashing agents psI).
Results for Neural Agents
The two homogeneous markets composed of neural agents came to very
different solutions. Agent pnl performed poorly while agent pn2 \vas among
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the strongest agents. The difference between these neural agents was that an
extra neural network was included in agent pn2 for computing the market
opening price. The distinct difference in the results emerging from markets
containing these agents shows the importance of accurate price forecasts in
competitive markets.
The maturity and experience of the agent have a major impact on how the agent
responds to various markets. For instance, Figure 21 shows a homogeneous
market consisting of identical pn2 agents, all starting with identical weight files.
After a transient period at the market's inception, the agents folio\\' different
paths. Figure 22 also illustrates a market composed of ps2 agents, but only one
of the agents has a mature weight file (trace 4). Each of the other pn2 agents has
a set of newly initialized weight files at the start of the market. As the agents
learn by adjusting their weights, the resulting trace shows large triangular
patterns, eventually evolving into smaller adjustments as the agents learn. The
large triangular patterns at the beginning of the new market make the pn2 agent
easy to identify in a mixed market.
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Figure 21. Output from market with identical neural agents.
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Figure 22. Output from market with different neural agents.
Traces 1,2,&3 are newly initialized neural agents. Trace -! is
from a mature neural agent.
The neural agents have an important place in the experimental markets because
markets containing at least one neural agent tend to produce considerably more
wealth than markets composed of only satisficing agents. The neural agents
appear to alter the characteristics of the market because of the large adjustments
that are made as the market unfolds. Because the agents continue to evolve, the
markets in which they participate may wander and not settle down to a fixed
point equilibrium. The markets containing pn2 produce wealth comparable to
the Stackelberg agents who have knowledge of the demand curve, however, the
mature neural agent pn2 dominates most markets where it is the only non-
satisficing agent. At times this agent tends to increase production to catastrophic
levels, followed by an abrupt collapse in production. This behavior does not
appear in all cases, but when it does, it may persist without sign of extinction.
This appears to be similar to the results that sometimes appear in real world
markets, indicating that instability may result from the interaction of particular
combinations of strategies in the market. The interaction of these strategies may
lead to irregular periods (I hesitate to call them cycles because of their non-
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periodic nature) of overproduction and underproduction. The neurnl agent is
generally superior to the satisficing agents in these markets. The performance
(accumulated wealth) of all agents is improved by including the neurnl <tgent. It
is also important to remember that the markets are stochastic in respect to the
internal coefficients, and may not always produce identical results.
Results for Satisficing Agents
Markets composed of only satisficing agents tend to have very high prices and
produce low quantities, so that the resulting wealth is also very low. The poor
performance of the satisficing agents is a clear indication that following rigid
rules may lead to less than optimal performance in markets of this type. The
satisficing agents do retain enough wealth to survive, but reach equilibrium that
is far from optimal. These markets can usually be recognized by abrupt
adjustments in the total quantity traded series. (See Figure 23). The clear
separation between the satisficing agents and others was discussed above.
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Figure 23. Total quantity traded per period in market M2.
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12ll. The distinguishing feature of the psI strategy is the underbidding price
adjustment rule. The homogeneous market containing only psI rapidly fnUs to
marginal cost because the agents continue to underbid each other. The total
quantity series shows an abrupt change where one agent rapidly increases
production, while the other agents drop out of the market. In combination with
other types of agents, psI frequently produces markets that are erratic. These
markets show that the quantity traded in each period makes sharp and abrupt
changes as a result of the price cutting behavior of psI. Additionally, these
results point out the importance of a single agent's strategy to the other ngents,
and to market stability indicated by abrupt changes in the levels of emergent
variables.
ps2. This agent bases price decisions on the average price that emerges in the
previous period. As a result, it does not have the means to adjust price at all in a
homogeneous market. This feature makes this agent poorly suited to competing
against agents that use the same strategy. The failure of such agents in
homogeneous markets is not uncommon in these tests. Some strategies succeed
only when there is sufficient variety in the market. Variety of this type can be
introduced through adding a stochastic noise term to the agents, but this is an
artifact of the experimental market.
Even when matched against other strategies, ps2 appears near the bottom in
terms of production and share of wealth. This agent does not do well in
combination with other agents or independently. Additionally, ps2 does not
have a discernable impact on the total quantity traded series.
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ps3. Agent ps3 produces irregular results in two ways. This agent makes
comparatively large adjustments to price and quantity, which appear in the price
and quantity traces. Additionally, the agent is sometimes very successful, and at
other times fails. The agent may temporarily be successful, only to precipitollsly
drop to the bottom of the market without warning. The success of this agent
appears to depend on the other agents (the milieu) in the market which it exists.
In a homogeneous market composed of ps3 agents, each agent temporarily
dominates production. Large adjustments in production are sometimes apparent
in the trace of total quantity traded per period. The performance of this agent is
better than the similar agents psI and ps2. Recall that the difference between
these agents is in the opening price bid. The high bid strategy of ps3 appears to
improve performance and indicates that errors in forecasting price are more
acceptable if they are biased upward. Agents ps4, ps5 and ps6 were eliminated
in preliminary testing and were not included in the final testing.
~. The strategy used by agent ps7 for quantity adjustment makes it dependent
on the other agents in the market. This agent does not perform well in
homogeneous markets. However, in markets showing a greater variety of
strategies, this agent does well. It attempts to capture a "fair share" of the
market. This strategy keeps this agent from extreme high or low production,
and is a means of reducing risk. However, this also eliminates the opportunity
to earn high profits. This agent rides along with the market, but will not make
the market. In terms of performance within a variety of markets, agent ps7 is
superior to most of the other satisficing strategies.
ps8. ps8 is an agent that makes large adjustments and continually searches for
better results. This agent does well in some markets but poorly in others for no
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apparent reason. In the homogeneous market, one of the four ps8 agents
dominates the market and accounts for nearly all of the production. All-or-none
outcomes are also observed in other situations. In some cases, this agent leads
the market in production, but has a weak price adjustment rule that relies on
average market price for its trading. ps8 frequently leads markets composed of
satisficing agents, and also does well in the more optimal markets com posed of
Stackelberg and neural agents.
Results for Stackelberg Agents
The Stackelberg agents are, not surprisingly, strong contenders in these markets.
The advantage of knowing the demand curve is large, but not insurmountable.
Each of the Stackelberg agents was tested separately in a homogeneous market,
and also in a mixed market composed only of Stackelberg agents. Each of the
Stackelberg agents produces a smooth trace which is characteristic of that
particular agent. For instance, in a mixed market of Stackelberg agents, the
agent with CV= a(pcOOO), always produced the highest quantity. Agent pcOOO
was chosen as the representative of this class of agents and was included in the
mixed markets with satisficing and neural agents.
The Stackelberg class agents come to a clearly different and by all standards
better result than the homogeneous satisficing agents. This is true for the total
wealth produced by the market, as well as the total quantity traded. The total
quantity traded was sometimes nearly 2 orders of magnitude greater for
Stackelberg agents when compared to satisficing agents.
pcOOO added consistency and improved results when it was included in markets
containing only satisficing agents. In most cases the wealth of all agents in the
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market increased when pcOOO was substituted for a satisficing agent. The
interaction typically improved the results for the satisficing agents, while also
producing considerably higher wealth for the consuming agents. pcOOO also
reacted favorably with the neural agent pn2, but was often surpassed by the
neural agent in terms of wealth produced in the market. Combinations of pn2,
pcOOO and satisficing agents sometimes favored agents from each class. That is,
the agents from any given class did not dominate in all markets.
The Stackelberg agents possess knowledge of the demand curve, but are only
able to conjecture the actions of their competitors. The knowledge of the
demand curve gives these agents a decided advantage when compared to the
satisficing agents, but the fixed conjecture about their competi tion means that
these agents do not respond to obvious errors or shortcomings in their weaker
competitors. Additionally, assuming the wrong coefficients for the demand
curve can have disastrous consequences for an agent.
Stability of the Market Over Time
The experimental markets were tested to find evidence of stability (e.g., random
deviations about a fixed point attractor) after a transient period. Initially, the
behavior of the markets is analyzed by comparing changes in the mean and the
variance over time. This analysis concentrates on the last 100 trading periods in
order to eliminate the effects of the transient period that occurs as the market
opens. The 100 periods are divided into 3 groups, consisting of 40,20 and 40
consecutive observations. The central group of 20 observations is discarded, and
the two groups of observations at the beginning and end of the sample are
compared. These groups are designated "Top 40" and "Bottom 40", respectively.
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The variance and mean of the total quantity traded series in the two groups are
compared for each market in Table XIV. In the heterogeneous market, the
variance of the Top 40 and Bottom 40 groups are constant in about a third of the
cases. On the other hand, the means in the two groups differ significantly in
most cases, with only 4 of 31 markets failing to show statistically different
means. This contrasts with the homogeneous markets, which do not show
statistically significant evidence of different variance and means in the two
groups (e.g the mixed markets are less likely to be stable and tend not to have
random deviations about a fixed mean).
The fact that the first difference of these markets is constant while the series
themselves are not, indicates the presence of autocorrelation in the time series
that can be removed by differencing. The term "random walk" is typically
associated with a process Xt = Xt-1 + et, where et is a random error. A "white
noise" process is associated with a stationary process such that Xt= et. The white
noise process is just the first difference of a random walk process. That is,
differencing converts a random walk time series into a stationary, white noise
time series. A random walk with drift is very common in actual economic time
series and can be written Xt = Xt-1 + d + et, where d is a constant drift term. In
this case, the time series drifts in a predictable manner which can also be
reduced to stationarity by differencing. (See [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981], for
more details about white noise, random walks, and stationarity). The
autocorrelation functions and tests for stationarity of the markets is described in
the next section.
The first difference of the quantity series (qt - qt-1) was also tested in the same
manner as described above.
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TABLE XIV
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE QUANTITY SERIES
Z Test F Test
Top 40 Bottom 40 Stable Stable
Market Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
H1 5,759 0 5,760 0 1
H2 5,235 11 5,235 9 1
H3 4,794 12 4,794 16 1
H4 6,738 4,370 6,406 3,999 1
H5 120 0 120 0 NA NA
H6 510 4,759 517 4,871 1 1
H7 120 0 120 0 NA NA
H8 467 62 467 62 1 1
H9 5,695 54 5,726 46 1
H10 5,487 10 5,488 8 1
Hll 163 1,635 166 1,826 1
M1 5,362 15 5,363 14
M2 1,003 2,414 1,105 2,599
M3 702 4,717 765 4,697
M4 1,037 1,391 1,085 1,256
M5 807 2,066 895 1,113
M6 751 978 844 1,721
M7 4,970 3,710 4,971 1,699
Me 4,355 781 4,463 896
M9 3,752 310 3,846 144
Ml0 5,276 1,533 5,136 1,717
Ml1 5,502 7,050 5,747 6,782
M12 5,358 6,971 5,143 9,923
M13 5,539 5,506 5,622 1,505
M14 5,355 12,164 5,333 5,223
M15 4,928 1,731 5,126 1,542
M16 5,138 6,949 5,531 5,149
M17 2,834 137,645 4,114 8,271
M18 6,415 9,142 6,835 4,577
M19 5,015 7,313 5,423 5,591
M20 4,301 7,123 4,708 5,622
M21 5,907 10,745 6,366 6,116
M22 5,436 4,274 5,750 55,283
M23 7,209 1 6,921 43,428
M24 5,245 585,779 5,617 1,069,771
M25 6,459 55,509 7,140 3,804
M26 6,388 331,662 4,982 2,390,313
M27 4,128 393,053 7,140 15,954
M28 6,986 18,575 7,098 5,062
M29 4,334 166,094 4,072 12,407
M30 5,312 907,209 5,282 23,336
M31 6,398 905 5,657 176,878
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TABLE XV
FIRST DIFFERENCE OF THE QUANTITY SERIES
Z Test F Tost
TOP 40 BonOM40 Stable Slable
Market Average Variance Average Variance Mean Variance
Hl 0.03 0 0.00 0 1
H2 -0.07 23 -0.12 16 1 1
H3 0.01 21 -0.25 31 1 1
H4 -5.67 0 -5.42 0 1
H5 0.00 0 0.00 0 NA NA
H6 -1.34 1,086 0.99 765 1 1
H7 0.00 0 0.00 0 NA NA
H8 -0.04 215 -0.04 215 1 1
H9 0.58 9 0.70 11 1 1
Hl0 -0.14 19 0.11 20 1
Hll -2.48 1,681 2.08 2,803 1
Ml 0.08 23 -0.19 19
M2 -0.48 1,029 1.52 1.363
M3 -0.05 616 -4.44 655
M4 -0.54 1,010 4.06 1,026
M5 0.68 856 1.39 668
M6 0.43 644 3.07 793
M7 4.65 304 -3.37 74
Me 1.72 128 1.91 167
M9 1.27 120 0.78 184
Ml0 -0.56 594 -2.21 484
Mll -5.86 190 7.37 220
M12 -8.61 976 8.43 1,313
M13 -6.15 321 1.21 258
M14 12.48 1,179 -1.93 872
M15 3.54 4 3.26 3
M16 7.13 1 6.21 0
M17 -23.92 2,621 11.75 442
M18 8.26 11 5.90 5
M19 7.36 1 6.42 0
M20 7.28 0 6.44 0
M21 8.56 35 7.03 27
M22 3.92 556 16.42 1,556
M23 0.08 0 -10.05 1,783
M24 67.28 732 -18.32 185,831
M25 29.28 1,402 5.44 476
M26 -13.56 122,865 -54.13 388,347
M27 39.81 1,883 19.85 1,207
M28 15.80 206 -5.34 87
M29 -37.21 397 8.58 58
M30 -44.88 169,533 8.20 639
M31 0.05 445 -30.98 504
--~_ _._ _-_ - .
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In this case, the variance and mean of the total quantity traded series were
constant in most cases for the heterogeneous markets (see Table XV). The
exceptions were nearly all markets containing the neural agents. The presence of
pn2 results in markets that have quantitatively different properties. The mean
and variance of the total quantity traded series are not constant, and they are not
changing in a (first order) constant manner (e.g., this is not random walk with
drift). In most cases the neural agents made large changes in the quantity
produced in these periods, resulting in markets that are unstable in the sense
that they do not appear to have a fixed point attractor.
The impact of the neural agent on the market shows that an agent which learns
about the market can have a destabilizing influence on the market. The agent
continues on the same adjustment path as long as profits continue to increase.
But this particular agent abruptly changes productioJ;1 under certain conditions,
precipitating a rapid change in the market composition. Sometimes these
changes lead to sharp increases or decreases in market production.
Stationarity of the Market Process
The autocorrelation function of the total-quantity-traded time series emerging
from each market was examined to determine if the markets were stationary in
the last 100 periods before they were interrupted. The autocorrelation function
was computed for lags up to 15 periods, and up to the fifth difference (see Table
XVI). The results reported here, with a few exceptions, are for the first
difference of the total quantity traded series. The exceptions report the
autocorrelation of the emergent series for some other lag (usually 2 periods).
The sample autocorrelation function was computed for each lag k as described
by Pindyck and Rubinfeld [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981]:
--_.._._._-._--_ ....._.._._- - ...
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Where Yt represents the total quantity traded in the period, cr is the standard
deviation, and k represents the lag. Pk was computed for each time series, and
its derivatives generated by differencing, up to the fifth difference. It W<IS found
that the first difference was usually useful for analysis.
The Q statistic [Box and Pierce], [Pindyck and Rubinfeld], is a joint test that all
the autocorrelation coefficients up to k are zero:
Q is approximately distributed as chi square with k degrees of freedom. Table
XVI shows the results of the Q test statistic for each market and the resulting
conclusion when the critical value of chi square is 22.31. A one in the table
indicates that the null hypothesis rl ,..., f1S =acannot be rejected at the 90
percent confidence level. Except as noted, the first difference of each series is
tested. Several of the homogeneous markets did not vary in the last 100 periods,
and the Q statistic is not interpreted in these cases.
Only 12 of the markets were not stationary in the last 100 periods before the
markets were interrupted. Statistically speaking, a stationary process is random
in the sense that it could have been generated by independently distributed
random variables.
--_.---.. _._._.----_.... - ... -- .•. -._..... ,
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TABLE XVI
STATIONARITY OF THE MARKETS
Market Stationary Lag Agents
Mt pcOOO pc025 pC050 pclOO
M2 pst ps2 ps3 ps7
M3 pst ps2 ps3 ps8
M4 psI ps2 ps7 ps8
M5 pst ps7 ps8 ps3
ME) ps7 ps8 ps2 ps3
M7 pcOOO psI ps2 ps3
Me pcOOO psI ps2 ps7
M9 pcOOO psI ps2 ps8
MtO pCOOO pst ps7 ps3
M11 2 pcOOO ps1 ps7 ps8
M12 pcOOO ps7 ps2 ps3
M13 pcOOO ps7 ps2 ps8
M14 pcOOO ps7 ps3 ps8
M15 ps1 ps2 ps3 pn2
Mt6 2 pst ps2 ps7 pn2
M17 ps1 ps2 ps8 pn2
Mt8 ps1 ps7 ps3 pn2
Mt9 pst ps7 ps8 pn2
M20 ps7 ps2 ps3 pn2
M21 ps8 ps7 ps3 pn2
M22 pcOOO ps7 ps3 pn2
M23 2 pcOOO ps7 ps2 pn2
M24 2 pcOOO ps7 ps1 pn2
M25 2 pcOOO ps7 ps8 pn2
M26 pcOOO psI ps2 pn2
M27 2 pcOOO pst ps3 pn2
M28 2 pcOOO pst ps8 pn2
M29 2 pcOOO ps2 ps8 pn2
M30 pcOOO ps2 ps7 pn2
M3t 2 pcOOO ps3 ps8 pn2
Ht pcOOO pcOOO pcOOO pCOOO
H2 0 pcOSO pc050 pC050 pC050
H3 0 pctoo pctoo pctoo pclOO
H4 2 pst pst pst psI
H5 na ps2 ps2 ps2 ps2
H6 2 ps3 ps3 ps3 ps3
H7 na ps7 ps7 ps7 ps7
H8 0 ps8 ps8 ps8 ps8
H9 pn2 pn2 pn2 pn2
Hto 0 pc025 pc025 pc025 pC025
H1t pnt pnt pnt pnl
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
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The agent pn2 was present in 7 of the 9 mixed markets that were not stationary.
This observation leads to the conclusion that the variability induced by this
agent leads to a trend in the markets that is distinguishable from a random walk
with an underlying white noise process. The other markets appear tu ha \'e an
underlying white noise processes. The neural agent continues to change its
strategy in response to changes by other agents in the market, and as a result, the
markets in which it participates may never really approach stationarity.
Alternatively satisficing agents such as ps2 make significant changes in several
of the markets after periods of relative stability. These markets are punctuated
by abrupt changes in production and price, as agents such as ps2 attempt to
make corrections for poor profits.
In the homogeneous markets, these stationarity results fall into three groups:
1. Markets that stabilize at a fixed point, and do not vary at all in the last 100
periods. These markets are identified as "na" in Table XIV because the Q
statistic cannot be computed when the variance is zero. These markets include
the satisficing agents ps2 and ps7.
2. Markets that are stationary over the last 100 rounds. Most markets
comprising Stackelberg agents were in this group including: pe02S, peOSO and
pelOO. Additionally, the market comprising satisficing agent ps3 was stntionary.
In the case of homogeneous markets of Stackelberg agents, the time series of
quantity traded per period was stationary, rather than the first difference of the
series.
3. Markets that did not show evidence of stationarity over the last 100 periods.
These markets include the satisficing agents psI, and ps8, neural agents pn1, and
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pn2, and Stackelberg agent pcOOO. Each of these markets has a unique trace that
is characteristic of the agent involved.
Mixed Markets With Repetitions
A critical feature of the simulated markets is that they are not exactly repeatable.
In other words, the results are not always apparent until they unfold. The
markets contain several sources of stochasticity such as the randomly assigned
coefficients, and randomization of agents in the queues. Additionally, the neural
agent intentionally changes its internal coefficient in response to the market.
Thus, the total-quantity-traded trace, for example, does not always follow the
same path. In order to determine the consistency and repeatability of the
simulated distributed markets, a market consisting of a selection of the more
interesting agents was repeated 10 times with and without learning between
markets by the neural agent. These markets consisted of the following
producers:
pcOOO
pn2
ps3
ps7
Stackelberg agent with conjectural variation = a
Mature neural agent with 3 internal nets
Satisficing agent with conservative pricing strategy
Satisficing agent with fair game strategy
The neural agent pn2 used the same mature weight files for each trial (e.g the
agent did not learn between markets in the first set of repeated trials).
There are a few factors that vary between markets, for instance, each consumer is
randomly assigned unique coefficients for the demand curve that are used
__" ••~_. __. •• 4 ·' .- • .~_._
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throughout the market. The intercept term is 100 +- 0.3 percent, and the slope
was -2.0 +- 5.0 percent. This allows a certain amount of variety among otherwise
identical agents, but the average demand does not vary between repeated
markets. By the same token, the intercept term for the producer's cost curve was
50 +- 0.6 percent and the slope was 5 +- 2.0 percent. Additionally, the initial
values of price and quantity were set at 25 +- 5 for the price, and 25 +- 10 for the
quantity assigned to each agent. The last variation is the ordering of agents
approaching the blackboard in each trading time. The agents are shuffled so
that the ordering is random rather than repetitive. If all of these sources of
stochasticity are held constant, the markets are completely identical between
repetitions.
Table XVII gives the total and private wealth developed in the same mixed
market with 10 repetitions. Examination of this table leads to the conclusion that
on average, the satisficing agent ps3 performs better than any of the other agents
in terms of total wealth accumulated (3.837 million units). The neural agent and
Stackelberg agents, accumulated 3.767 and 3.360 million units respectively.
These agents did not capture as much wealth as the satisficing agent ps3, even
though the Stackelberg agent has knowledge of the demand curve, and the
neural agent was capable of learning about the market. An interesting feature of
these markets was that the neural agent accumulates more wealth than any other
agent in 5 of 10 trials, yet does not accumulate the highest total wealth. This
indicates that the variability of returns plays an important part in these results.
1"?.)-
TABLE XVII
WEALTIi DEVELOPED IN 10 REPETITIONS OF THE SAME ~\'fARKET
Total Average Total Wealth
Market Wealth Price Quantity peOOO ps3 ps7 pn2
r1 67.378 6.78 6,922 3.190 3.322 3.104 4.052
r2 63.615 18.51 5,036 5.869 4.981 4.257 3.210
r3 62.866 5.16 7,174 3.752 3.201 3.494 4.855
r4 66.410 7.67 6,748 2.197 4.263 2.538 2.354
r5 63.231 13.53 5,813 3.137 3.837 3.226 3.890
r6 63.857 14.79 5,640 3.752 2.813 3.539 5.145
r7 63.867 7.16 6,845 2.003 3.810 2.572 2.659
r8 63.676 7.15 6,845 2.793 3.521 2.843 3.372
r9 65.576 13.33 5,866 3.923 3.812 3.853 4.830
r10 64.446 13.35 5,832 2.988 4.805 3.345 3.303
Average 64.492 10.743 6,272 3.360 3.837 3.277 3.767
Stdev 1.477 4.472 716 1.088 0.687 0.545 0.955
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
Overall, agent ps3 was the strongest competitor in the repeated market. The
satisficing agent ps3 accumulated the most wealth and also had a moderate
variability in the 10 market repetitions. Agent ps3 tends to battle with the
neural agent pn2 for market share. A weakness of agent ps3 is that it tends to
overproduce, which in turn keeps prices down, so that it does not always profit
from its high production. The tendency to overproduce by a single agent affects
the production decisions and profits of all the producers in the market.
The neural agent pn2 also had a strong showing in the market repetitions,
accumulating more wealth than any other producer in 5 of the 10 repetitions.
However, the variability of results was high and the total wealth accumulated
over the 10 markets was second behind ps3.
Agent pcOOO accumulated a moderate amount of wealth but had the highest
variability of any producer over the 10 market repetitions. I believe that
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knowledge of the demand curve increases the efficiency of the market, but does
not give the agent any advantage over the other producers.
Although ps7 accumulates the least wealth in these repetitions, the accumulation
is substantial, and the variability of returns is low. The consistency of returns
is due to the "fair game" strategy that dampens large changes in production by
this agent. The agent does not use an internally based microeconomic strategy,
but rather, a macro-based strategy that is dependent on the market. While such
a strategy is suboptimal in the sense that the agent produced less wealth than thl!
other agents, it is a "safe" strategy because of the lower risk assodLited with its
use.
Evidence of Learning by Neural Agents
The neural agents "learn" by the backpropagation of errors process. In this
context, the neural agent makes an estimate of the quantity produced by others,
the profit, and the price in the next period. When the actual values of these
variables are realized, the error between the estimated and actual value is used
to adjust the weights in the network to more closely approximate the actual
value. As an example, consider Figure 24, which shows the actual and expected
values of profits from the first instance of the repeated market rl, with agents
pcOOO, ps3, ps7 and pn2. As shown in Figure 24, the network used by the neural
agent pn2 has captured the general movements of the profit curve, but does not
capture the specific details.
---"--"- _--_ __._-- _.-
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Figure 24. Actual and expected profits emerging in market rl.
The network used to compute the profits shown in Figure 24 was trained on the
data that emerged from market rl. Figure 25 shows the mean squared error as a
function of training presentations for this curve. Each cycle represents a
complete pass through the training data, which in this case is 360 observations of
profit from the repeated market. The error learning curve is typical of neural
network learning by backpropagation. The mean squared error falls rapidly
initially, and then stabilizes. Note that this network was trained on a wide
variety of data from a range of markets before it was used to compete in market
rl. The training shown in Figure 25 is conducted off line, using data that
emerged from a specific market (rl).
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Figure 25. Mean squared error as a function of training cycles.
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Figure 26 shows the actual profits in market r1 and the expected profits
computed by the network after training for 1000 cycles. The network has
apparently learned to more closely reproduce the profit curve, given the Silme
input data. However, the details from one market may not apply to the next
instance of the same market. It is the general principles that seem to transfer
between markets.
To illustrate the idea that general principles transfer between markets, and to
emphasize the importance of learning, a set of experiments was conducted in
which the demand curve of the consumers was shifted. The average slope of the
demand curve was set at 2.0 for all previous experiments, but the values
assigned to the demand curve were 2.5, 2.3, 2.1, 2.0, 1,9, 1,7 and 1.5 in these
experiments. The markets were interrupted after only 3 periods to provide a
preliminary screening of the results. The wealth accumulated by each agent,
and the total wealth produced by each market are given in Table XVIII.
Figure 26. Actual and expected profits after training for 1000 cycles.
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TABLE XVIII
ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH IN SHORT MARKETS
WITH DIFFERENT CONSUMERS
Demand Slope peOOO ps3 ps7 pn2 Total Wealth
2.5 ·48 12,500 46,629 88,848 309,981
2.3 -48 14,401 51,997 101,325 322,747
2.1 ·14 15.829 52.347 101,729 324,866
2 141.180 23,792 81,168 128,051 643,018
1.9 140,920 21,50282,833131,676 641,319
1.7 139,109 24,471 88,334 131,137 ·657,975
1.5 142,468 26.242 93.541 132,950 662.041
Agent key: pc= Stackclberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
It is interesting to note that the Stackelberg agents were eliminated (weal th fell
below zero) from all markets with slope greater than 2.0 in this short amount of
time. The Stackelberg agents depend on knowledge of the demand curve, and if
this knowledge is not correct it may have disastrous consequences for the agent
in a very short time. In contrast, the neural and satisficing agents continue to
prosper when the slope of demand curve shifts.
The preliminary results given in Table XVIII are extended by continuing two of
the markets (slope 1.5 and 2.5), for a full 360 periods. Figures 27 and 28/ show
the individual quantities produced and wealth accumulated by each agent in the
market when the demand slope was set at 1.5, and the market was continued for
360 periods. When the demand slope shifts to 1.5, the neural agent in particular
continues to prosper and accumulates additional wealth. The satisficing agent
ps7, also prospers because it follows the market, and in this case the market is
prosperous. The Stackelberg agent accumulates approximately the same amount
of wealth as it did in the repeated markets, but its share of wealth is declining as
the market closes. The satisficing agent ps3 does not accumulate nearly as much
wealth as it did in the repeated markets, where it was frequently the strongest
137
performer. It appears that the success of this strategy is strongly associated with
knowledge of the details of the demand curve, rather than to general principles.
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Figure 27. Quantities produced when demand slope is 1.5.
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Figure 28. Wealth accumulated when demand slope is 1.5.
To further illustrate the importance of learning general principles, the consumers
demand slope was set at 2.5, and the market was continued for 360 periods. The
individual quantities and wealth produced are shown in Figures 29 and 30. As
expected, the Stackelberg agent was eliminated early in the trading, leaving the
neural and satisficing agents to satisfy the consumers demand. The neural
agent appears to have taken advantage of the situation by keeping prices high,
but producing more after the competition falls. The shift in the demand curve
appears to create an opportunity, rather than a problem for the neural agent.
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Figure 29. Quantities produced when demand slope is 2.5.
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Figure 30. Wealth accumulated when demand slope is 2.5.
Again, the satisficing agent ps7 prospers by following the market, as shown in
Figures 29 and 30. This fair game strategy is the most consistent strategy for
producing a good, but not outstanding return across a variety of markets. In
contrast, agent ps3 does very well in some situations but does not adapt to
changes in the consumers easily. Table XIX shows the total and individual
wealth produced in the average of the repeated markets, and in the markets with
the shifted demand curves.
139
TABLE XIX
ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH IN EXTENDED MARKETS
WITH DIFFERENT CONSUMERS
Slope 2.5 2 1.5
peOOO -46 3,360,000 3,102,000
ps3 539,000 3,837,000 1,319,000
ps7 6,589,000 3,277,000 4,147,000
pn2 11,545,000 3,767,000 7,313,000
Total Wealth 49,764,000 64,492,000 69,066,000
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
Repeated Market with Learning
When agents are exposed to the same market repeatedly, the agents may learn
both within the market, and between the markets. In this research the neural
agents pnl and pn2 are the only agents that have this capability. The weight
files that represent the agent's knowledge are updated at the end of each period
as the agent participates in the market. Additionally, the neural agents can learn
off-line from the data that was developed and stored in other markets. The
neural agents do not have to participate in a market to learn from the data
emerging from the market.
The neural agents used in the research up to this point have always started each
new market with identical weight files. The agents modify the weight files
during the market according their experience, but always start with the same
weights. In this set of experiments, the weight files for agent pn2 were carried
over to the next market. The weight files represent the accumula tion of
knowledge from the on-line market interactions.
The repeated market with learning included the following agents: pcOOO, pn2,
ps3, ps7. These are the same agents that were used in the repea ted market
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without learning. The market structure was also the same: 4 prod ucers,16
consumers, 5 tim~s per period, 4 periods per round and 90 rounds per market.
The wealth accumulated by each agent in the 10 repetitions of this market are
shown in Table XX. These results do not indicate an improvement in
performance by the neural agent as a result of learning from the market
simulations. The neural agent consistently develops a substantial quantity of
wealth, but its performance does not appear to have improved from learning.
Since the market appears to have an underlying white noise process, it is not
surprising that the network is unable to improve performance. This is typical of
real world economic markets, where forecasting is not possible because the
market exhibits white noise characteristics (Le., unpredictable).
TABLE XX
WEALTH DEVELOPED IN 10 REPETITIONS OF THE SAME MARKET
WITH LEARNING
Total Average Total
Market Weahh Price Quantity peOOO ps3 ps7 pn2
rt1 61.461 5.46 7,125 2.670 3.397 2.617 3.316
rt2 64.459 5.11 7,189 2.682 2.844 2.814 3.425
rt3 67.036 6.43 6,977 3.245 3.843 3.476 4.183
rt4 61.362 16.74 5,295 4.456 5.308 3.349 1.928
rt5 66.201 21.52 4,539 4.758 3.763 3.821 4.165
rt6 63.541 5.51 7,122 2.156 2.203 2.269 2.966
rt7 66.807 7.84 6,736 3.941 3.399 3.266 3.751
rt8 63.141 7.86 6,748 2.936 3.069 3.023 4.361
rt9 60.821 5.21 7,159 3.392 4.072 2.725 2.276
rt10 68.572 7.81 6,747 3.332 4.436 3.270 3.443
Average 64.340 8.949 6,564 3.357 3.633 3.063 3.381
Stdev 2.715 5.593 904 0.822 0.869 0.462 0.808
Agent key: pc= Stackelberg, ps= satisficing, pn= neural.
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Indication of Chaos
A suggestion of chaos in the distributed computer markets can be found by
examining the quantity traded trace of the repeated markets. (See Figure 31). The
figure shows that markets that are identical in nearly every respect produce
traces that diverge after a short time.
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Figure 31. Three instances of the repeated market.
The difference between these markets is in the coefficients that are assigned to
the agents at the markets inception, the ordering of agents as they approach the
blackboard, and the initial values of price and quantity. After numerous trials, it
was determined that the traces from repeated markets including these agents
diverge, even if all sources of stochasticity are removed, but the agents are given
minutely different initial values of price and quantity. Strong dependence on
small changes in initial conditions is a classical indication of a chaotic attractor.
The implication is that long range forecasting of quantity traded (or price) at a
particular time is not possible with any degree of accuracy, even if precise
details about the economic agents are known.
The market shown in Figure 31 is a mixed market consisting of Stackelberg,
neural and satisficing agents. This market shows a variety of interesting
_._--_. '--. - --.-...-._--_._.- .. - ---_._._- -
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beha,·iors. For instance, one trace shows a rapid build up in quantity traded
followed by an abrupt decline. All of the markets shown here exhibit protracted
declines in trading, followed by growth at different rates. One thing this figure
does not suggest is an equilibrium that can be predicted by knowing about the
agents in advance. The markets are continually changing because of the
strategies and motivations of the agents. Figure 32 shows the result when the
market consists only of Stackelberg agents. In this case the market approaches
an equilibrium and remains there.
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Figure 32. A stationary market of Stackelberg ag~nts.
Many or th·· markets exhibit unexpected changes in the quantity traded over
time. For instance, Figures 33 and 34 show abrupt changes in the traded
quantity that are completely determined by the characteristics of the agents. The
last figure in this series, Figure 35, shows the quantity traded in a market
composed entirely of satisficing agents. This figure is of interest because it
comes to apparent equilibrium (as a constant rate-of-change) far from the much
higher equilibrium markets.
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Figure 33. Irregular changes in the quantity traded over time.
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Figure 34. Abrupt change in the quantity traded.
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Figure 35. Gradual shift in the quantity traded in the last 100 periods.
From the viewpoint of dynamic systems, these markets appear to have different
types of attractors. For instance, the market of Stackelberg agents appears to be
attracted to a fixed point with small random variations. However, markets
composed of a variety of strategies appear to be quasi-periodic, or even chaotic.
144
Figure 34 gives the impression of a punctuated equilibrium, where the market is
stable for a time, and then suddenly shifts.
Interaction of Agents in the Market
The agents that produce the smoothest and most regular traces are the
Stackelberg agents. These agents make small and predictable shifts in the
production quantity in each period. An example is shown in Figure 36, where
four different Stackelberg agents compete in the same market. The production
quantity by each agent is determined by the agent's conjecture abollt the
quantity the other agents will produce in the next period.
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Figure 36. Quantities produced by Stackelberg agents in market m1.
In contrast, Figure 37 shows the production quantity of a mixed market
containing neural and satisficing agents. The neural agent is recognizable by the
large triangular path that it produces as it makes adjustments to the production
quantity. The satisficing agents, on the other hand, tend to make sharp
adjustments in production. Agents psI and ps2 clearly follow a much lower
production path than the neural agent pn2 or the other satisficing agent psB, but
this is not always the case. Note that these charts show the actual production by
each agent, which may be more erratic than the total quantity series.
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Figure 38 shows the variability introduced into the market by the strategy
followed by agent ps2. This market includes a neural agent, pn2, a Stackelberg
agent, pcOOO and two satisficing agents, ps2 and ps7. The satisficing agent ps2
follows a low production path in the first part of the market, but suddenly raises
production rapidly, followed by a precipitous collapse in production quantity.
At times, the other satisficing agents also produce sharp changes in production
quantity, but agent ps2 generally introduces more variability into the markets
than the other satisficing agents.
pn2
psi
o ~~~~lo.IL::~:wl!:!!=O:~~9:::::£~===o__Il.::;:.JL::'!i!====B-"":P::':'S=-'......
4500
.4000
~ 3500
! 3000
~ 2500
,: 2000
c1500
! 1000
a 500
o 50 100 150 200
, .,Iod
250 300 350 AOO
Figure 37. Quantities produced by each agent in a mixed market.
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Figure 38. Abrupt change in quantity produced by agent ps2.
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Accumulation of Wealth
The agents in these markets all begin with 1000 units of wealth, and accumulate
more wealth by trading in the market. The total production by the eclch Llgent is
limited by the wealth the agent has accumulated. A portion of the agent's
wealth is risked in each production period, and it is possible for the agent to
produce goods that are never sold at a profit, thus losing wealth. The charts in
this section give some idea of the variability and interaction among the agents as
they compete for wealth in specific markets.
Some agents seem to produce wealth in a very steady and reliable iashion (see
Figure 39), while others produce wealth in a more erratic manner. Figure 39
shows the wealth accumulated in a market of Stackelberg agents, and Figure 40
shows the accumulation of wealth over time in a mixed market containing
agents psI, ps2, ps8 and pn2. Agent psI and ps2 accumulate wealth that is
consistent with their low production quantity. Agents pn2 and ps8 produce far
more wealth over time and also accumulate wealth at a much higher rute. In the
first half of this market, the neural agent pn2 accumulates wealth at a higher rate
than the satisficing agent ps8. The tables are turned temporarily, but by the end
of the market, the neural agent is producing wealth at a higher rate that any of
the other agents. This type of trade off in leadership is frequently observed in
the competition among the agents in these distributed markets. Figure 41 shows
a mixed market with a very successful agent ps3. However, this success is likely
to be of limited duration because the other agents in the market will make
changes over time that will probably reduce the success of ps3.
Figure 41 dearly shows how some of the satisficing strategies can at least
temporarily best the neural and Stackelberg agents. But when the market is
---"-"-- .. _.-- ... '-' _._-
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repeated, different results emerge each time. Figures 42 and 43 for example,
show the wealth developed by each agent in another instance of the same
market.
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Figure 39. Steady accumulation of wealth by Stackelberg agents.
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Figure 40. Irregular division of wealth in a mixed market.
In the case shown by Figure 42, the neural agent pn2 accumulates wealth far
more rapidly than the other agents, and retains a healthy lead as the market
closes. Figure 43 gives a sense of the interaction that sometimes emerges among
the agents. In this case, pn2 produces a large amount of wealth early in the
market, while ps3 lags far behind. A flat portion on the curves indicates that
none of the agents produce much wealth for a time, but this changes as ps3
makes rapid gains, and appears to break the deadlock.
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Figure 41. Satisficing agents sometimes accumulate considerable wealth.
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Figure 42. Neural agents frequently dominate in mixed markets.
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Figure 43. Interaction in the accumulation of wealth in a mixed market.
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CHAPTER VIn
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC DATA WITH NEURAL NETWORKS
INTRODUCTION
A common statement in the neural nets literature is that neural nets have a
natural advantage over traditional models such as ordinary least squares (OLS),
One thing that I will show here is the relationship between OLS and
connectionist models. In addition, I will show that for many problems in
applied economic analysis, network models are not superior to simple
alternatives such as OLS or better known non-linear methods.
A simple linear model can be written as follows:
Where y is the dependent variable, an are coefficients, xn are independent
variables, and e is an error term. The coefficients are chosen to minimize the
sum of the squared errors.
It is known that (in vector notation)
A=(X'X) -1 (X'Y)
and that this computation minimizes the sum of the squared errors. Several
summary statistics such as R-Square and the F statistic are usually reported with
such a regression in order to indicate the goodness of fit between the observed
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and computed values. The statistical reliability of the coefficients a1 ,... , an are
indicated by the associated t-statistics.
Such models have been widely used in economics because of their simplicily as
well as their easy and rich interpretation. Simple changes in represenlalion,
such as the logarithmic transformation, extend these models to a wider variety of
functions, including the well known Cobb-Douglas function (See [Varian, 19841
for details).
Figure 44 shows a feedforward network with 2 layers and a linear transfer
function. This network is equivalent to the linear model mentioned above. The
term "feedforward" indicates that all computations follow a forward path
through the net, and feedback is not permitted. There are n+1 inputs into the
network, including the constant termxQ. In network terminology, the constant
term is known as the "bias". Each connection between the input and output node
is weighted with an adjustable coefficient. Inputs follow the paths forward
through the net to the output node. In this model the transfer function is linear
so that the output from the net is just the weighted sum of the inputs.
It is at this point that connectionist and ordinary least squares models begin to
differ. The DIS model simply computes the coefficients by solving for the
vector A in:
A= (X'X)-l X'V. However, a feedforward network is trained by backpropagation
of errors. The weights are initially assigned at random and then trained by
making multiple presentations of data, comparing the computed output with the
expected output, and making adjustments to the weights. The adjustment
procedure is known as backpropagation [Rumelhart & McCelland, 1986] and is a
--_.__.- .. _.-.-._-_ - -_.__.
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form of hill climbing or gradient descent of the error surface. Like other
gradient descent search procedures, the backpropagation algorithm is not
guaranteed to find the coefficients that produce the global minimum error.
Error adjustment continues until some preset criterion is satisfied.
xO xl
Figure 44. A linear network.
Backpropagation adjusts weights according to the gradient of the error surface,
and minimizes the sum of squared errors, just as in OlS. However, the transfer
function used in network models is usually a non-linear equation such as the
logistic equation shown below.
1
0j= 1+ -ta.x.
ell
where OJ is the output from the jth element, ai are coefficients, and xi are inputs
into the jth element. Backpropagation, like other non-linear methods, is much
more computationally intensive than OlS, and is not guaranteed to find the
global solution. By chance, the random starting values of the coefficients may
be near the global solution, and in this instance the network method would find
the solution very quickly, perhaps even faster than OlS, because OlS requires a
---'-"- _....-..- .. - -- -.--_.- .-.
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matrix inversion. But in the general linear case there is no apparent advantage
for using any non-linear technique because of the computational disadvantage.
Theoretically, the network solution and the least squares solution nre identicnl,
but in practice, there may be good reasons for selecting between the methods.
This becomes dear in the example applications that are presented below.
White has shown that feedforward networks with non-linear elements, nnd at
least one hidden layer are equivalent to stochastic estimators [White, 1989, 1990],
[Hornik et. al., 1990] . (Hidden layers are processing elements that are
sandwiched between the input and output layers.) These networks may consist
of multiple functions and are also closely related to flexible functional forms that
are sometimes used in econometric estimation [Berndt and Khaled, 1979]. The
equation summarizing a network with a single hidden layer, each with n
different transfer function is shown below. In applied work, it is often useful to
use a linear function for 12 and a non-linear function for h.
EXAMPLE APPLICAnONS
Demand Functions
Consider the demand for water in a local economy where the quantity of water
purchased is a function of real price, population and the season of the year.
Using logs of the continuous variables, the regression equation is specified as:
Where q represents the demand for water in hundreds of cubic feet, Xl
represents the real price of water in dollars per 100 cubic feet, and x2 represents
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the population in the given month. S is an indicator variable that takes on the
value 1 in the peak months of June, July, August, September and October, but is
ain all other months. (The data for these tests were provided by Portland Water
Bureau, Portland, Oregon). The same data set was modeled by least squares
regression and by a linear neural network with the results shown in Table XXI.
R-square is similar for the two models, and the price and populiltion elasticities
are of similar magnitude and sign. In addition, the seasonal peaking factors
computed by the alternative models are nearly identical. The models differ
substantially in the weight and significance assigned to the constilnt term, but for
this discrepancy the network model does not pay a substantial price in terms of
R-square. Overall, these models appear to be comparable in the results
produced, but the network model pays a substantial penalty in terms of
computational efficiency. In the case reported here, the OLS solution was
obtained in milliseconds, while the network solution typically took from 5 to 15
minutes to emerge when using a 33 MHZ 386 PC with a 387 math coprocessor.
Additionally, the network computations were repeated several times with
different starting values to verify the results.
A grid search of the error space of these variables showed a long ridge. As a
result of moving along this ridge, different coefficients produce similar goodness
of fit statistics. However, there is a global maximum R-square for this system of
coefficients, and this is very close to the set of coefficients produced by OLS
regression. But many sets of coefficients produce comparable R-square results.
The network model of this linear equation finds some coefficients that produce a
reasonable fit, but are not optimal. In this case, choosing between the optimal
and non-optimal coefficients is not easy.
-------.._._ ...-._-_._..
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Network models become increasingly attractive as the model becomes more
complex, and where data are messy. To demonstrate some of the advantages of
connectionist models, the simple water demand model mentioned above was re-
estimated using additional data indicating the month of the year, rather than just
the season. In addition, data summarizing weather conditions were used in the
estimation where they were available. In total, 26 variables were used to
estimate the water demand relationship. No specific functional form was
specified, but the data was scaled into the a<= x <= 1 range.
TABLE XXI
WATER DEMAND IN THE PORTLAND AREA 1960 - 1988
NETWORK AND LEAST SQUARES MODELS COMPARED
Constant
Population
Price
Season
R-square
NETWORK
Coefficient t-stat.
-0.04 -0.03
1.1 10.5
-0.36 -16.9
0.34 3.9
0.64
LEAST SQUARES
Coefficient t-stat
-3.47 -2.5
1.35 13.1
-0.36 -17.1
0.38 4.5
0.65
The data consisted of monthly observations of the real price of water,
population, real per capita income, and 12 indicator variables (l or 0) that
correspond to the month that the data were observed in. The weather variables
included the monthly rainfall (inches), number of rainy days, number of days
over 75, 80,85 and 90 degrees, cooling degree days, and heating degree days.
However, the weather data was only available for 6 months of each year. No
weather data were available in December through May, and the missing values
were replaced with zeros (or alternatively, 9999).
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This model would present a serious problem for OLS estimation on several
counts. The model is overidentified because all the months are included
explicitly in the data. Multicolinearlty is a problem because several of the
weather variables are very highly correlated. The weather data is only available
for six months of the year. No functional form is known or suggested from the
data, especially with regard to interactions among the variables.
This model was successfully fitted with a variety of connectionist networks
containing from a single hidden element, to as many as 100 hidden elements. R-
square ranged from 0.75 to 0.8 for different architectures, indicating that adding
large numbers of hidden elements was not especially helpful. The network
models quickly learned to ignore missing data, while using all data that was
present. Network models thrive on redundancy, using all data that is available,
and filtering out the irrelevant components. The network models are not limited
by the degrees-of-freedom problems that occur with traditional models. The
model containing 100 hidden elements produced over 2700 coefficients with
only 282 data observations. Furthermore, no ad-hoc functional form was
specified a-priori. Instead, the network found a functional form that fit the data.
This simple application of the connectionist approach to solving economic
problems shows some of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of connectionist
models. The connectionist approach works well with messy data, and where no
functional form is known to fit the data prior to modeling. On the negative side,
connectionist models are computationally intensive, and the coefficients
emerging from connectionist models may not have a satisfying theoretical
interpretation. Additionally, the neural models may be no more accurute (or
----"--"- - .._._.----.- - . __ ._-_ -_..
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even less accurate), than simple alternatives such as OLS, assuming thLlt the
simple models are applicable to the data at hand.
When compared with other non-linear estimation methods, network models are
found to suffer from all the problems associated with gradient descent
optimization procedures. Network models are not guaranteed to reLlch a globi11
optimum. Halting conditions are arbitrary, and results may depend on the
starting values of the coefficients. The coefficients of network models may be
difficult to interpret, and it is not clear how to perform statistical inference on the
hidden layer coefficients. These tests also show that contrary to the theoretici11
equivalence between the models, a network model may not be as accurtlte as a
simple linear model if the relationship is indeed linear. Many of these criticisms
also apply to other non-linear models.
Cost Functions
In general neural networks can be used to construct a model of any relationship
without specifying a functional form. White has shown that feedforward
networks are equivalent to stochastic estimators of the relationship between
inputs and outputs [White, 1989a]. These functions are also closely related to
flexible functional forms that are sometimes used in econometric estimation.
For instance, production and cost functions are common in economics:
y= F(X)
c= G(W,y)
where y is the output, W is a vector of input prices, and c is the cost of
production. The usual approach is to minimize cost given the constraint of the
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production function. The neural network provides a simple way to construct the
model c=G(W,X) given data on costs, inputs quantities and input prices, without
specifying the functional form. However, the assumption that the data results
from a cost minimizing process remains.
Table XXII shows the error analysis for network cost functions that were trained
for 100,000 iterations through the data published by Berndt and Khaled for the
U.S. economy between 1947 and 1971 [Berndt and Khaled, 1979]. The network
has a total of 9 inputs, including the bias, and one output. The inputs into the
network are the prices and quantities of inputs into the U.s. economy: capitill,
labor, energy and materials. The sale output from the network is total cost.
TABLE XXII
ERROR ANALYSIS FOR NETWORK COST FUNCTIONS
Sumo' Direct Nodes in
Squared Linear Hidden Thousand
Trial Errors Connection Layer Iterations
1 0.0085 yes 8 100
2 0.0777 no 8 100
3 0.0068 yes 0 100
Table xxn gives the sum of squared error results for three trials that llsed the
same data and training algorithm, but with different architectures corresponding
to different types of models. Trial 1 included 8 elements in the non-linear
hidden layer, as well as direct linear connections between input and output
layers. This is the most complex model presented here, the other two models are
simplifications of it. Trial 2 included only the 8 non-linear nodes in the hidden
layer, without any direct connections between the input and output layer. Trial
3 included only the direct linear connection between the input and output layer.
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Using the sum of squared error results as the criterion to judge these models
indicates that trial 3, with only linear connections between inputs and outputs, is
superior to the networks with non-linear connections. This is counter to the
results of Berndt and Khaled, which indicate that a non-linear relationship exists,
thus the neural net was not able to find the non-linear relationship in this case.
Forecasting Economic Conditions
Another approach to estimation of economic systems is not based on economic
theory, but on the minimization of estimation errors over time. For instance no
theoretical explanation is found in the economic literature for the relationship
between the values of leading economic indicators and the future state of the
economy [Auerbach, 1982]. However, such a relationship is widely perceived to
exist. These values are typically estimated with a multiple ARIMA process:
where y is a dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, and et is
the error at time t.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis has published a series of leading, current and
lagging economic indicators since the 1930's. These indicators have been revised
several times over this period, most recently in January, 1989. (These indicators
have been published in the Business Conditions Digest until May, 1990 when
they were consolidated into the Survey of Current Business.) The 11 leading
indicators are used to form a composite leading index while 4 indicators are
used to develop an index of current economic conditions. This discussion will
focus on the leading and current indicators, which are listed below in Table
xxm.
_.__ ..._~.- --~_._-_._.-. - - -_ .._-
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TABLE XXIII
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Coincident Indicators
Number Title
41 Employees on nonagricultural payrolls.
47 Index of industrial production.
51 Personal income less transfer payments in 1982 dollars.
57 Manufacturing and trade sales in 1982 dollars.
Leading Economic Indicators
Number
1
5
8
19
20
29
32
83
92
99
106
Title
Average weekly hours of production or non-supervisory workers in
manufacturing.
Average weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance, state programs.
Manufacturers' new orders in 1982 dollars, consumer goods and matcrial
industries.
Index of stock priccs, 500 common stocks.
Contracts and orders for plant and equipment in 1982 dollars.
Index of new private housing units authorized by local building permits.
Vendor performance, percent of companies receiving slower deliveries.
Index of consumer expectations.
Change in manufacturers' unfilled orders in 1982 dollars, smoothed.
Change in sensitive materials prices, smoothed data.
Money supply, M2.
Most of the indicator series date back to 1947, and were collected monthly,
however, series 83, the index of consumer expectations was not collected at all
before 1952, and only quarterly until 1978. For the purpose of this study,
missing values for this series were assumed to equal the last observed value. In
other words the value is constant for each quarter between 1952 and 1972. This
results in a monthly data set spanning the 1952-1990 period and containing 452
observations.
The leading indicators are assumed to precede the current indicators of the
economy but it is unclear by how much. The time lag between a change in the
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leading indicators and a corresponding change in the current indicators varies.
In addition, the relationship between the leading and current series is not
precisely established, but is usually estimated to be 6-9 months. For this study
the time lag between leading and current indicators was arbitrarHy taken as 6
months. For instance, the leading indicators for January were used to predict the
current economic activity in July of the same year. An interesting unanswered
question is how to train networks to learn the appropriate lag for a data set.
Leading indicators can be used to forecast impending changes to the national
economy, such as a recession or a recovery from recession. Such turning points
are comparatively rare in recent economic history. It is my intent in this example
to examine changes in the trend of the indicators and measure agreement
between forecast and actual values of the indicator series with neural network
methods. Since network methods do not posit a functional form they are free of
the restrictions implied by such assumptions, such as constant returns to scale
and homotheticity. Several different network designs were tested with variable
success. The users of neural nets are burdened by large numbers of ad-hoc
decisions regarding methodology. It is difficult to find a good network solution
without a certain amount of groping.
The inputs into the initial network were made up of the 11 leading indicators
mentioned above. In addition, all experiments use a constant input called the
bias term. The selected network includes a single hidden layer, also consisting
of 11 units. The number of nodes in the hidden layer and the number of hidden
layers are both variables that were considered in modeling with neural nets.
Preliminary results indicated that no apparent gain in sensitivity was observed
by adding additional layers or nodes to this network.
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can be expressed in a single equation: OJ 1+e-LWixi
The hidden layer was fully connected to all 11 inputs plus the constant term.
The processing elements in the hidden layer operate in two steps. First, the
inputs into the element are totaled and second, the resulting total is operated on
by a transfer function, which in this case was a logistic function. l30th operations
1
Where xi represents inputs into the processing element, and wi represents the
weights that are applied to the inputs. Many alternative functions are available
for the transfer function, the sine function and hyperbolic tangent functions were
also used in some of the preliminary multiple layer experiments but with poor
results.
A signal is sent to the 4 elements in the output layer from each of the 11
processing elements in the hidden layer, as well as from the constant term. The
nodes in the output layer are similar to the hidden nodes, but the transfer
function is not necessarily the same. The choice of transfer functions is made by
the analyst.
The noise of the forecast was compensated for by running 10 repetitions of each
test with different random starting values of the coefficients. Random values of
the coefficients were generated between +-0.1. Several tests were also done with
starting values at +-0.5 and +-1.0 but with very poor results and a high
tendency for the nets to diverge. Rather than running the net for a fixed number
of presentations, a convergence criteria was set at RMS error of 0.017 over 100
presentations. This figure was chosen because it represented the lower end of
the observed RMS error curve. RMS error rarely fell to 0.015 but reached the
___- ••_.-__• •••. _. ~. •• _" _ ••••...- •• 4_ ' ••• "_",
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0.017 level on 10 of 11 trials. The most successful architecture and nelwork
parameters are listed below:
Inputs: Constant term, 11 leading indicators, 4 current indicators.
Outputs: 4 Current indicators that are 6 months in the future.
Hidden Layer: 11 nodes that are fully connected to each element in the input and
output layer.
Convergence Criteria: RMS error <= 0.017 over 100 presentations.
Learning rate: 0.05
Table XXIV shows the statistics from the network that was trained on 434
observations and tested on 440 observations. The RMS error between observed
and fitted values are listed for each of the 4 series measured over the 440
observations. In both absolute and percentage terms the value of series 47,
Industrial Production, is the poorest fit at 0.030 percent RMS error, while series
41, Manufacturer's Sales was the best fit at 0.013 % RMS error. This general
pattern was true thorough all of the tests reported.
The value of U is known as Theil's inequality coefficient in the simulation and
modeling literature. Theoretically, the value of U can range between 0 and 1.0,
with 0 indicating a perfect fit and 1.0 indicating the worst possible fit between
observed and computed values. The values of U shown in Table XXII indicate a
good correlation between observed values and the figures estimated by the net.
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TABLE XXIV
ERROR ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INDICATOR DATA
Series 41 47 51 57
RMSError 0.856 2.212 0.299 0.560
RMSError % 0.013 0.030 0.0185 0.0214
U 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.009
Urn 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.001
Us 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.002
Uc 0.989 0.995 0.987 0.996
The value of Theil's U is computed as follows:
U= 1 1(-~.y.2)1 /2+(-~'x.2)1 /2
nil nil
where Yi is the estimated value of the series, and xi is the actual value for each
on the n observations. The numerator of U is the rms error, while the
denominator provides the scaling that insures that U remains in the a-1
interval. Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [1981], show that Theil's U coefficient can be
decomposed into 3 inequality proportions: Namely, Urn is the bias proportion,
Us is the variance proportion, and Uc is the covariance proportion. The sum of
these proportions is Urn + Us + Uc = 1.0
The proportions of the inequality coefficients are defined as: The bias
proportion Urn is an indication of systematic error and measures how the
average values of the simulated and actual series differ. The value of Um should
be near 0, and a value of Urn larger than about 0.1 is an indication of a serious
systematic error or bias in the estimation. The values of Urn shown in Table
XXIV do not indicate a problem with systematic bias.
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The variance proportion Us is an indication of the ability of the network to
replicate the variability in the observed data. If Us is large it indicates that one
series varies considerably while the other series is relatively constnnt. The
largest value of Us listed in Table XXIV is 0.009 for Personal Income, series 51.
This value does not indicate a problem with the variance proportion.
The covariance variation Uc, indicates the residual error after the other
variabilities have been accounted for and should be close to 1.0. This is the case
for the estimation reported in Table XXIV. The smallest covariance proportion
shown is 0.9868 for the Personal Income series 51, which is not a cause jor
concern.
Although the network is able to compute reasonable outputs for each of the four
coincident indicators given the historical inputs, the network is not able to
accurately forecast the coincident indicators. The forecasts were binsed and
missed turning points in economic activity. Figure 45 shows the actuJ.l and
estimated values of Industrial Production that resulted from using the network
described above for forecasting the coincident indicators. The forecast is clearly
biased, but captures the general trend of the data. However, this level of
accuracy is not acceptable for forecasting economic activity.
Many other network architectures, data sets, and training methods were used in
an attempt to produce more acceptable forecasts of coincident economic
indicators, but real improvement in results was not forthcoming.
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Figure 45. Actual and fitted values of Industrial Productions
over 18 months.
DISCUSSION
Economic applications of neural networks are more appealing in theory than in
practice. When applied to typical problems in economic analysis, neural nets
trained with backpropagation are often less accurate and more complex than
commonly used alternative methods. Neural networks are orders of
magnitude slower that other methods when using technology that is commonly
available (e.g., serial computers). However, massively parallel computer
technology is evolving rapidly, and neural type computers are starting to
appear in the market. Such computers should be much faster than serial
computers.
Neural networks are conceptually appealing in economics because they do not
posit a particular functional form. Unfortunately, the results emerging from the
network are dependent on numerous ad-hoc assumptions about network
architecture, learning rates, transfer functions, training methods, and so on.
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Training algorithms such as backpropagation are based on gradient descent of
an error function. One of the hazards of such algorithms is that they may iind
local optima, rather than the globally optimal solution. In practice, neural nets
may not even find local optima.
Neural networks are conceptually based on the neural system that makes up the
human brain. The brain is a massively parallel distributed computer that
naturally solves various types of pattern recognition problems, imputes meaning
to patterns, and is generally not proficient at explicit numeral computations. The
brain has attributes such as the ability to learn from experience, organize
information, and fault tolerance. Neurons are modeled as simple computational
devices that support learning from experience.
Extending the neural model to economic systems appears to be misguided. It is
true that economics systems are distributed computers, but neural networks are
based on a computational model that is distinctly different from the organizing
principles of an economic system. The intent in this chapter was to use neural
networks as computational models of economic systems without interpreting the
models as structural models of the distributed computation that exists in
economic systems. Thus no claim was made that economic systems learn in the
sense that the brain learns (i.e. an economic system is not a big brain, with
simple processing units, but has other organizing principles).
The neural models used in the examples presented here were moderately
successful as computational models of economic systems. Particularly strong
features are the ability to learn from experience without choosing a functional
form a-priori, and analysis of messy data, including data with missing or
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redundant observations. However, drawing deep theoretical conclusions from
the internal structure that emerges in the network models, or using network
models without reference to alternative computational models when they are
available is misguided.
There is no reason to discard the simple and well known tools of econometric
analysis for neural methods when the problems is an easy one. But economists
may want to add neural methods to their tool kits for solving more difficult
problems. Neural methods are recommended where simple methods fail to
produce sound results.
---- .- ..- ..- ..._-_ ..
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this research was to model economic markets as distributed
computational systems. As such, the model includes agents based on different
strategies that were independent of any central control. The continued success
of the individual agents was dependent on their own strategies, c1S well <IS the
strategies of others in the distributed computer market. Communication in the
market was facilitated by a mutually accessible area of computer memory called
a blackboard. The blackboard structure is very useful for sharing information
among the agents in distributed systems. This structure imposes little constraint,
while allowing immediate access to information by all agents. Clearly, the
blackboard is only one of many conceivable structures for transferring
information among agents.
It is my claim the blackboard market is a simulation that has the principal
qualities of an economic system. The major difference is in the environment; real
world economic systems exist in the sociosphere, but computer markets are
isolated within the computer environment. Computer trading is commonplace in
real world markets where some or all of the economic agents are computer
programs.
The distributed computer market satisfies all the criteria for an economic system
based on the definition of economic systems provided in Chapter II. An
economy is a system that deals with scarcity through trade. The market is a
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recognizable unit existing within the computer environment and has the
attribute that it has inputs and outputs. The market has subunits comprising
producers and consumers that deal with scarcity by trading among themselves.
Prices, quantities and wealth emerge naturally from the interaction of these
agents in the market. The agents have meta-observer status in that they can
observe the emergent properties of the system and change their behavior
accordingly. The fact that there are no human beings participating in this
market is immaterial to its definition as an economic system. The value of
producing an economic system that can be studied in detail is large because the
researcher has knowledge of the detailed working of the market. The market
also becomes a repeatable event.
In a system including scarcity and trade, the agents prosper according to the
success of their trading strategies, and economic agents compete with each other
for the scarce resources. There is competition among the agents on three levels,
among producers for market share and profits, among consumers for
consumption rights for scarce resources, and among producers and consumers
for the terms of trade. There are no restrictions on the strategies that are
available to the agents, and the same public information is available to all.
The complexity of decision making rises as the number of agents increases
because each agent must take into consideration the possible behaviors of its
competitors. Perfect competition emerges when large numbers of agents
interact in the market, and conversely, monopoly results when only a single
producer dominates the market. The most interesting results were observed in
the mid-range of complexity, where agents must consider their competitors'
---'-'-'-'- ~"'.'-'---~- ... _._.~--.-- --"
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actions in the market. The number of agents participating in the research
markets were held at a moderate level for this reason.
An alternative system structure based on neural networks was considered and
rejected by following the systems approach outlined in Chapter II. A neural
network may perform successfully as a computational model of an economic
system as shown in Chapter VIII, but does not have an inner structure that is
consistent with an economic system. An economic system comprises
independent agents organized by trading for scarce resources. Scarcity and
trade are attributes of economic systems that are not present in the neural
network models considered here. A neural network may take all the inputs
from a market and map them to the appropriate outputs after sufficient training.
But this does not indicate that the internal elements represent buyers and sellers
that trade for scarce resources in a market.
As mentioned above, neural networks were found to perform satisfactorily as
computational models of economic systems in several applications, especially
when assumptions about the functional form were not made. However, in the
event that functional form could be postulated, alternative methods appeared to
provide both more accuracy and more information about the underlying
relationships between the variables. The ability of the neural networks to adapt
to a changing environment, and freedom from assumptions about functional
form were used to advantage at the economic agent level, rather than at the
economic system level.
Neural networks proved to have a valuable role in modelling the learning and
decision making behavior of individual agents in an economic system. In this
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role, the neural networks perform as a computational model of the economic
system that is centered within agents of the system.
This accomplishes two purposes:
1. The agents have meta-observer status. That is, they can observe the system
from a remote vantage point and observe the emergent properties of the system,
just as the researcher does.
2. The agents learn from experience in the market by optimizing without
assigning a particular functional form to the behavior of others.
The distributed form of the blackboard market allows the researcher wide
latitude in designing and testing different types of agents and strategies for use
in the market. Three general types of agents were developed and tested:
1. Satisficing
2. Stackelberg
3. Neural
Unlike many market models, these agents actually make both price and
production decisions. Price, quantity and wealth are emergent variables in these
markets, and the agents must use some decision making strategy to estimate
them.
Evaluating the fitness of agents is a complex problem because performance of
each agent depends on the behavior of the other agents in the system. The focus
of this research was on the consequences of the decision making behavior of the
--_..-"- .. _----_ --_._ --" -"
[-.,/ .:.
producers in the market. The total wealth produced by the system was used as a
guide to estimating the global efficiency of the market. The statistical properties
of the emergent price and quantity series were also examined to determine the
impact of individual agents on the market.
Several conclusions about the role of agents and their strategies are possible.
Perhaps the most critical observation is that knowledge about the market greatly
enhances the wealth of all participants. There was a distinct separation in the
results emerging from markets where at least one agent had some knowledge
about the market. The source of this knowledge was less important than having
the knowledge, even if the knowledge was not perfect. A single agent with
accurate knowledge profoundly changed the stability and wealth of the market,
generally to the benefit of all agents.
Markets consisting only of satisficing agents without knowledge of consumer
demand produced wealth that was grossly inferior to markets where at least one
Stackelberg or neural agent was included. However, the universe of satisficing
strategies is huge and only a few, very simple satisficing strategies were
sampled. It is conceivable that other strategies could be developed that rival the
knowledge based agents.
The Stackelberg agents were endowed with knowledge of the aggregate demand
curve, but have no knowledge of the strategies and intentions of other producers
in the market. These agents were very regular and predictable in all the
markets, but were unable to learn from experience. It is difficul t to imagine how
the knowledge of the market could have emerged naturally from the operation
of this agent in the market because these agents have no knowledge acquisition
173
ability. When compared with other classes of agents, the Stackelberg agents do
not necessarily capture more personal wealth in mixed markets.
The success of the Stackelberg agent is very dependent on the accuracy of the
knowledge of the demand curve. If the Stackelberg agent is provided with
inaccurate information about the average demand curve, the results may be
disastrous for the agent. The agent with inaccurate information may quickly
leave the market because of poor decisions.
The neural agents gather knowledge from participation in markets This
knowledge is stored in the pattern of internal connection weights. The agents
learn by backpropagating errors through the networks. This gives a plausible
route for the emergence of knowledge by agents in economic systems. The
neural agents begin as naive agents with no knowledge of the market, but learn
about the market through participation, and additionally, the agents continue to
evolve and respond to changes in the market.
While the presence of at least one agent with knowledge about the market is
important to the market as a whole, knowledge does not guarantee higher
profits to the agent that possess it. Learning appears to capture key features of
the market, and suggests favorable levels for production and prices, but does not
enable agents to learn the details of what is essentially a white noise process that
underlies a random walk. Rule based satisficing agents often do as well or
better than knowledge based agents in mixed markets. The variety in strategies
and types of agents is important for the flexibility and adaptability of the market
as a whole. The satisficing and neural agents tend to explore prices and
quantities that are away from the mean in an effort to increase profits, but they
--_..._~-- _.-_.- -".--- --~._~ ... '--
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do not always profit from such exploration. They do, however, contribute to the
randomness of the market, and thus unpredictability of the market.
When some of the agents have the ability to learn, or are continually searching
for a higher profit position, the resulting outcome is uncertain. This may lead to
instabilities in markets which appear as irregular shifts in production and price
after a period of stability. Such irregularities emerge naturally from the
interaction of agents in the market even in the absence of natural variations
(caused by weather conditions, for instance). These changes appear to be similar
to variations that sometimes appear in natural markets. Additionally, the
distributed computer markets may be unstable, and reside in a non-optimal state
for extended periods.
The time series emerging from most of the market processes are white and
therefore are apparently random. This is a general validation of the agents and
the distributed market only because a market that is easily predictable is unlike a
natural market. In the blackboard market a single agent can have a dramatic
impact on the market as a whole, but no individual agent or strategy was
superior in all markets.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OUTPUT FILES
FILE
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PAGE
bb.xlt 184
hist.xlt 184
trade.xlt 189
wealthl.xlt. 191
wealth2.xlt. 191
wealth3.xlt. 192
wealth4.xlt. 192
rbb.xlt"'/
maxt 5
maxp 4
maxr 1
time 6
period 5
round 2
producers 4
consumers 4
total agents 8
ID Program Active Type
1 pcOOO.exe 1 p
2 ps3.exe 1 p
3 ps7.exe 1 p
4 pn2.exe 1 p
5 cons09.exe 1 c
6 cons09.exe 1 c
7 cons09.exe 1 c
8 cons09.exe 1 c
total weal th
ending price
ending quantity
ending round price
ending round quantity
ending round value
ending market price
ending market quantity
ending market value
Wealth Coefl
18109. -0.0442
5241. -0.0726
8251. 0.0953
14340. 0.0958
8405. -0.0878
9449. -0.0011
11489. -0.0824
8059. -0.0553
83345.
485.33
0.00
38.70
1269.89
49149.
38.70
1270.
49149.
Coef2
-0.2687
-0.2225
-0.2624
0.1395
-0.0049
-0.2510
-0.0184
-0.2864
Pc
39.89
44.21
44.21
35.93
27.00
21.00
20.00
27.00
P
38.09
39.90
37.90
37.02
27.00
21.00
20.00
27.00
Qe
168.79
39.69
93.02
183.82
19.00
31.00
22.00
34.00
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Q
0.00
0.00
0.90
0.00
19.00
31.00
22.00
34.00
/ ......................................................................................................................................../
hist.xlt
r p t pI p2 p3 p4 ql q2 q3 q4 cons p q prod
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 30.00 30.00 36.82
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 30.00 30.00 0.00 c5 28.00 36.82 p4
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 30.00 30.00 0.00
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 0.00 30.00 0.00 c7 27.29 30.00 p2
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 0.00 30.00 0.00
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 27.29 30.00 p3
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 60.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 1 46.30 27.29 27.29 28.00 51.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8 46.30 9.67 p1
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 51.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 48.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 48.40 3.00 p1
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r p t pI p2 p3 p4 qI q2 q3 q4 cons p q prod
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 48.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 41.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7 ~8.4() 7.17 pJ
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 41.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 33.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 4H.4() 7.44 pI
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 33.59 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 2 48.40 28.66 28.66 28.63 28.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8 ~H.4() 5.59 pI
1 1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 28.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 20.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 48.40 7.4~ pI
1 1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 20.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 17.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 48.40 3.00 pI
1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 17.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 11.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 cK ~H.40 5.59 !) I
1 1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 11.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 3 48.40 28.66 28.66 30.34 4.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7 48.40 i.17 pI
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 4.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 ~8.40 4.80 pI
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 31.54 0.00 p4
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8 28.66 0.00 p3
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 4 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7 48.40 0.00 pI
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 28.66 0.00 p3
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 31.74 0.00 p4
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7 31.i4 !l.on p4
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1 5 48.40 28.66 28.66 31.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8 28.66 0.00 p3
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.4130.00 39.42 85.82
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.4130.00 39.42 47.83 c8 31.74 37.99 p4
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.4130.00 39.42 47.83
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.4130.00 39.42 8.71 c7 31.74 39.12 p4
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r p t pI p2 p3 p4 ql q2 q3 q4 cons p q prod
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.4130.00 39.42 8.71
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.418.26 39.42 8.71 (6 39.02 21.:--t p2
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.418.26 39.42 8.71
1 2 1 45.07 39.02 39.02 31.74 100.418.26 14.05 8.71 c5 39.02 25.37 p3
1 2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 100.418.26 14.05 8.71
1 2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 100.418.26 0.00 8.71 c7 -10.98 14.05 p3
1 2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 100.418.26 0.00 8.71
1 2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 89.94 8.26 0.00 8.71 c8 45.89 lOA7 pI
1 2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 89.94 8.26 0.00 8.71
1 2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 77.70 8.26 0.00 8.71 c5 45.89 12.24 pI
2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 77.70 8.26 0.00 8.71
2 2 45.89 40.98 40.98 35.58 77.70 8.26 0.00 0.00 c6 35.58 S.71 p4
2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 77.70 8.26 0.00 0.00
2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 67.23 8.26 0.00 0.00 c8 45.89 10.47 pI
1 2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 67.23 8.26 0.00 0.00
1 2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 55.25 8.26 0.00 0.00 c7 45.89 11.98 pI
1 2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 55.25 8.26 0.00 0.00
1 2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 43.00 8.26 0.00 0.00 c5 -15.89 12.24 pI
1 2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 43.00 8.26 0.00 0.00
1 2 3 45.89 40.98 40.98 36.64 43.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 40.98 8.26 p2
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 43.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 31.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7 45.89 11.98 pI
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 31.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 23.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 45.89 8.02 pI
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 23.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 10.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 45.8912.24 pi
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 10.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 4 45.89 40.98 40.98 37.48 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8 45.89 10.47 pI
1 2 5 45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 5 45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 45.89 0.29 pI
1 2 5 45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 5 45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 40.98 0.00 p3
1 2 5 45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2 5 45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7 38.11 0.00 p4
r p t
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1 2 5
131
131
131
1 3 1
1 3 1
131
1 3
1 3
3 2
3 2
132
132
132
132
132
132
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
134
134
134
134
134
134
134
134
pI p2 p3 p4 q1 q2 q3 q4
45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
45.89 40.98 40.98 38.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 134.82
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 107.71
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 107.71
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 84.14
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 84.14
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 58.54
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 58.54
42.71 43.53 43.53 38.11 136.5136.85 63.91 31.65
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 136.5136.85 63.91 31.65
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 136.5136.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 136.5136.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 116.3036.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 116.3036.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 97.49 36.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 97.49 36.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 43.53 43.53 36.94 77.04 36.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 36.85 63.91 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 63.91 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 63.91 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 43.00 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 43.00 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 23.72 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 23.72 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.41 77.04 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 77.04 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 56.83 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 56.83 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 38.02 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 38.02 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 21.43 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 21.43 16.18 6.64 5.75
41.60 41.36 41.36 37.75 0.98 16.18 6.64 5.75
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cons p q prod
c8 38.11 D.OO p4
c5 38.11 27.12 p4
c6 38.11 23.57 p4
c8 38.11 25.60 p4
c7 38.11 26.90 p4
c6 36.94 25.90 p4
c7 41.60 20.21 p1
c8 41.60 18.81 pI
c5 41.60 20,45 p1
c7 41.36 20.67 p2
c5 41.36 20.91 p3
c8 41.36 19.29 p3
c6 41.36 17.08 p3
c7 41.60 20.21 p1
c8 41.60 18.81 p1
c6 41.60 16.59 P1
c5 41.60 20.45 pI
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r p t pI p2 p3 p4 ql q2 q3 q4 cons p q prod
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 16.18 6.64 5.75
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 0.00 6.64 5.75 c7 -l1.36 16.18 p2
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 0.00 6.64 5.75
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 0.00 0.00 5.75 c8 -l1,36 6.64 p3
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 0.00 0.00 5.75
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6 37.96 5.75 p4
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 3 5 41.60 41.36 41.36 37.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c5 -lL(,(l O.';i8 pI
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 183.82
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 156.63 c7 37.96 27.19 p4
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 156.63
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 132.76 c6 37.96 23.87 p4
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 132.76
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 106.87 c8 37.96 25.89 p4
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 106.87
1 4 1 39.89 44.21 44.21 37.96 168.7939.69 93.02 79.46 c5 37.96 27.41 p4
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 168.7939.69 93.02 79.46
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 168.7939.69 93.02 53.55 c6 36.94 25.90 p4
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 168.7939.69 93.02 53.55
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 168.7939.69 93.02 25.68 c8 36.94 27.87 p4
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 168.7939.69 93.02 25.68
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 141.6439.69 93.02 25.68 c5 38'{19 27.16 p1
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 141.6439.69 93.02 25.68
1 4 2 38.09 44.21 44.21 36.94 114.7039.69 93.02 25.68 c7 38.09 26.94 pI
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 114.7039.69 93.02 25.68
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 87.76 39.69 93.02 25.68 c7 38.09 26.94 pI
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 87.76 39.69 93.02 25.68
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 87.76 39.69 93.02 0.00 c 36.83 25.68 p4
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 87.76 39.69 93.02 0.00
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 60.60 39.69 93.02 0.00 c5 38.09 27.16 pI
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 60.60 39.69 93.02 0.00
1 4 3 38.09 42.00 42.00 36.83 34.96 39.69 93.02 0.00 c8 38.09 25.64 pI
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 34.96 39.69 93.02 0.00
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 39.69 93.02 0.00 c7 38.09 26.94 pI
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r p t pI p2 p3 p4 ql q2 q3 q4 cons p q prod
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 39.69 93.02 0.00
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 15.98 93.02 0.00 c5 39.90 23.71 p2
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 15.98 93.02 0.00
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 15.98 73.02 0.00 c6 39.90 20.00 p3
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 15.98 73.02 0.00
1 4 4 38.09 39.90 39.90 36.84 8.02 15.98 50.90 0.00 c8 39.90 22.13 p3
1 4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 15.98 50.90 0.00
1 4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 15.98 26.91 0.00 c6 37.90 23.99 p3
1 4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 15.98 26.91 0.00
1 4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 15.98 0.90 0.00 c8 37.90 26.01 p3
4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 15.98 0.90 0.00
4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 0.00 0.90 0.00 c7 39.90 15.98 p2
1 4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 8.02 0.00 0.90 0.00
1 4 5 38.09 39.90 37.90 37.02 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 c5 38.09 8.02 p1
/Ifo.................................................................................................................../
trade.xlt
tr tp tt np nc r p t pd c Q p q
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 1 4 5 157.70 28.00 36.82
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 1 2 7 120.88 27.29 30.00
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 1 3 6 90.88 27.29 30.00
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 1 1 8 60.88 46.30 9.67
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 2 1 6 51.20 48.40 3.00
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 2 1 7 48.20 48.40 7.17
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 2 1 5 41.03 48.40 7.44
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 2 1 8 33.59 48.40 5.59
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 3 1 5 28.00 48.40 7.44
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 3 1 6 20.56 48.40 3.00
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 3 1 8 17.56 48.40 5.59
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 3 1 7 11.97 48.40 7.17
1 4 5 4 4 1 1 4 1 5 4.80 48.40 4.80
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 1 4 8 255.66 31.74 37.99
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 1 4 7 217.67 31.74 39.12
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 1 2 6 178.55 39.02 21.74
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 1 3 5 156.81 39.02 25.37
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 3 7 131.43 40.98 14.05
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 1 8 117.38 45.89 10.47
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 1 5 106.91 45.89 12.24
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 4 6 94.67 35.58 8.71
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 3 1 8 85.96 45.89 10.47
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 3 1 7 75.49 45.89 11.98
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 3 1 5 63.50 45.89 12.24
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 3 2 6 51.26 40.98 8.26
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 4 1 7 43.00 45.89 11.98
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tr tp tt np nc r p t pd c Q p q
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 4 1 6 31.02 45.89 8.02
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 4 1 5 23.00 45.89 12.24
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 4 1 8 10.76 45.89 10.47
1 4 5 4 4 1 2 5 1 6 0.29 45.89 0.29
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 1 4 5 372.10 38.11 27.12
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 1 4 6 344.98 38.11 23.57
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 1 4 8 321.42 38.11 25.60
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 1 4 7 295.82 38.11 26.90
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 2 4 6 268.92 36.94 ~5.90
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 2 1 7 243.02 41.60 20.21
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 2 1 8 222.81 41.60 HUH
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 2 1 5 204.00 41.60 20.45
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 3 2 7 183.55 41.36 20.67
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 3 3 5 162.88 41.36 20.91
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 3 3 8 141.97 41.36 19.29
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 3 3 6 122.68 41.36 17.08
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 4 1 7 105.60 41.60 ~().21
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 4 1 8 85.40 41.60 18.Hl
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 4 1 6 66.58 41.60 16.59
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 4 1 5 49.99 41.60 20.45
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 5 2 7 29.54 41.36 16.18
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 5 3 8 13.36 41.36 6.64
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 5 4 6 6.72 37.96 5.75
1 4 5 4 4 1 3 5 1 5 0.98 41.60 0.98
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 1 4 7 485.33 37.96 27.19
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 1 ·4 6 458.14 37.96 23.87
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 1 4 8 434.27 37.96 25.89
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 1 4 5 408.37 37.96 27.41
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 2 4 6 380.96 36.94 25.90
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 2 4 8 355.06 36.94 27.87
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 2 1 5 327.19 38.09 27.16
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 2 1 7 300.03 38.09 26.94
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 3 1 7 273.09 38.09 26.94
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 3 4 6 246.15 36.83 25.68
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 3 1 5 220.47 38.09 27.16
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 3 1 8 193.31 38.09 25.64
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 4 1 7 167.67 38.09 26.94
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 4 2 5 140.73 39.90 23.71
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 4 3 6 117.03 39.90 20.00
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 4 3 8 97.03 39.90 22.13
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 5 3 6 74.90 37.90 23.99
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 5 3 8 50.91 37.90 26.01
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 5 2 7 24.90 39.90 15.98
1 4 5 4 4 1 4 5 1 5 8.92 38.09 8.02/ .................................................................................................................................................................../
--_ .._.- .._---- .....- .._._-_ ...
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wcalth1.xlt
r p t prod wealth
1 1 1 1 1000.000000
1 1 2 1 1093.470337
1 1 3 1 2216.454590
1 1 4 1 3339.438965
1 1 5 1 3571.662842
1 2 1 1 3571.662842
1 2 2 1 3019.609375
1 2 3 1 4061.912109
1 2 4 1 5654.062012
1 2 5 1 7614.190918
1 3 1 1 7627.455078
1 3 2 1 6894.910156
1 3 3 1 9368.773438
1 3 4 1 9368.773438
1 3 5 1 12532.950195
1 4 1 1 12573.683594
1 4 2 1 11679.714844
1 4 3 1 13740.297852
1 4 4 1 16777.466797
1 4 5 1 17803.585938
2 5 1 1 18109.072266/ ........................................................................................................../
wealth2.xlt
r p t prod wealth
1 1 1 2 1000.000000
1 1 2 2 1621.174316
1 1 3 2 1621.174316
1 1 4 2 1621.174316
1 1 5 2 1621.174316
1 2 1 2 1621.174316
1 2 2 2 2272.054688
1 2 3 2 2272.054688
1 2 4 2 2610.424072
1 2 5 2 2610.424072
1 3 1 2 2610.424072
1 3 2 2 2379.059326
1 3 3 2 2379.059326
1 3 4 2 3234.083740
1 3 5 2 3234.083740
1 4 1 2 3903.177002
1 4 2 2 3657.838867
1 4 3 2 3657.838867
1 4 4 2 3657.838867
1 4 5 2 4603.603027
2 5 1 2 5241.225586/ ........................................................................................................................................................../
---_..-.-- .._--~_._-_ .. -.. - .~."--- .. _~~ .'-. ~.-.
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wealth3.xlt
r p t prod wealth
1 1 1 3 1000.00ססoo
1 1 2 3 1616.177612
1 1 3 3 1616.177612
1 1 4 3 1616.177612
1 1 5 3 1616.177612
1 2 1 3 1616.177612
1 2 2 3 2355.666992
1 2 3 3 2931.504883
1 2 4 3 2931.504883
1 2 5 3 2931.504883
1 3 1 3 2931.504883
1 3 2 3 2556.104980
1 3 3 3 2556.104980
1 3 4 3 4924.860352
1 3 5 3 4924.860352
1 4 1 3 5199.427734
1 4 2 3 4675.703125
1 4 3 3 4675.703125
1 4 4 3 4675.703125
1 4 5 3 6356.470703
2 5 1 3 8251.351562/ ................................................................................................................................/
wealth4.xlt
r p t prod wealth
1 1 1 4 1000.00ססoo
1 1 2 4 1793.260254
1 1 3 4 1793.260254
1 1 4 4 1793.260254
1 1 5 4 1793.260254
1 2 1 4 1793.260254
1 2 2 4 3753.137939
1 2 3 4 4063.124023
1 2 4 4 4063.124023
1 2 5 4 4063.124023
1 3 1 4 4063.124023
1 3 2 4 7258.182617
1 3 3 4 8215.084961
1 3 4 4 8215.084961
1 3 5 4 8215.084961
1 4 1 4 8433.182617
1 4 2 4 11407.961914
1 4 3 4 13394.458008
1 4 4 4 14340.435547
1 4 5 4 14340.435547
2 5 1 4 14340.435547
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/ /t.c top level program 3/6/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <process.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <alloc.h>
#include "shuffle.c"
#include ''bb.h''
#include <time.h>
#include <bios.h>
#define SCREEN
int ReadMarketFileO(
FILE ItlpMarketFile;
char Ittemp[80);
int tmp;
if ((lpMarketFile = fopen("market.","r"» == NULL>{
fprintf(stdcrr,"Cannot open market file\n");
exit(l);
)
fscanf(lpMarketFile,"%d", &b->maxt);
fgets(temp,80,lpMarketFile);
fscanf(lpMarketFile,"%d",&b->maxp);
fgets(temp,80,lpMarketFile);
fscanf(lpMarketFile,"%d",&b->maxr);
fgets(temp,80,lpMarketFile);
fscanf(lpMarketFile, "%d",&InitiaIWealth);
fclose(lpMarketFile);
return 0;
)
int ReadAgentFileO(
int i;
FILE ItlpAgentFile;
char Itline,lttempstring;
if ((lpAgentFile = fopen("agents.","r"» == NULL)(
fprintf(stderr,"Cannot open agents file\n");
exit(l);
)
b->producers=b->consumers=O;
for (i=l;i<MAXAGENTS;i++)
--------- . ------ " ... - ---
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(
if( (fgets(line,80,lpAgentFile» != NULL>
(
TotalAgents++;
tempstring= strtok(line," ");
strcpy(a[i].name,tempstring);
tempstring=strtok(NULL," ");
if« strchr(tempstring,'c'» != NULL)(
a[i).type='c';
b->consumers ++ ;
)
else(
if( (strchr(tempstring,'p')) != NULL>(
a[i].type='p';
b->producers++;
)
else
a[i).type='e';
)
tempstring=strtok(NULL," ");
strcpy(a[i].id,tempstring);
)
fclose(lpAgentFile);
if((TotalAgents)<2)(
printf("Error in Agent File, not enough agents\n");
exit(l);
)
b->agents=TotaIAgents;
return 0;
int ·shuffle(int , int II');1·········..···•....·······1
int main(void)(
int ·pid,·cid,·id"idl,r,x,y;
registeri;
char ·p[l2];
FILE ·tpRandomFile;
time_t start, stop,t;
start = time(NULL);
mpointer = MK]P(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
clrscrO;
d = malloc( sizeof(struct history »;
if(!d)(
printf("error in malloc d\n");
exit(l);
)
c = farmalloc«unsigned long) MAXAGENTS· sizeof(struct trade »;
if(!c)(
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printf(lterror in malloc c\n");
exit(1);
}
b = malloc( sizeof(struct data_b »;
if(!b){
printf("error in malloc b\n");
exit(1);
}
a = farmalloc«unsigned long) MAXAGENTS '" sizcof(struct agent»;
if(!a)(
printf(lterror in malloc a\n");
exit(1);
}
ReadAgentFile();
ReadMarketFile();
a = farrealloc(a,(unsigned long) (1 + b->agents) .. sizcof(struct agent ));
if(!a){
printf("error in realloc a \n");
exit(1);
}
c = farrealloc(c,(unsigned long) (1 + b->agents) '" sizcof(struct trade »;
if(!c)(
printf(lterror in realloc c\n");
exit(1);
}
/ .. set up pointers to shared memory '"/
mpointer[Ol= FP_SEG(a);
mpointer[lJ= FP_OFF(a);
mpointer[2J= FP_SEG(b);
mpointer[3J= FP_OFF(b);
mpointer[4]= FP_SEG(c);
mpointer[5]= FP_OFF(c);
mpointer[6]= FP_SEG(d);
mpointer[7J= FP_OFF(d);
itoa(InitiaIWealth,p,lO);
r= spawn1(P_WAIT,"tl.exe",p,p,NULL);
if(r==-l){
printf(lterror spawning tl (setup program)\n");
getch();
exit(l);
} / / if
pid= (int ..) malloc«l + b->producers) '" sizeof( int»;
if(!pid)(
printf(ltmemory allocation error\n");
exit(l);
) / / if
cid= (int "') malloc«1 + b->consumers) '" sizeof( int»;
if(!cid){
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printf("memory allocation error\n");
exit(t);
}/ / if
id= (int It) malloc«1 + TotaIAgents)" sizeo£( int»;
if(lid){
printf("memory allocation error\n");
exit(1 );
} / / if
idl= (int .) malloc«l + TotalAgents) It sizeof( int));
if(!idl){
printf("memory allocation error\n");
exit(l);
} / / if
for(i=l;i<= b->producers;i++) pid[i]=i;
for(i=l;i<= b->consumers;i++) cidU]=i;
for(i=l;i<= b->agents ;i++) idU]=idl(i)=i;
if ((IpTrades = fopen("trade.xlt","a+t"» == NULL}{
fprintf(stderr,"Cannot open trade file\n");
exit(1);
}
mpointer(8)= FP_SEG(lpTrades);
mpointer(9)= FP_OFF(lpTrades);
if «lpAve = fopen("ave.xlt","a+t")) == NULL){
fprintf(stderr,"Cannot open average file \n");
exit(t);
}
mpointer{10]= FP_SEG(lpAve);
mpointer{l1]= FP_OFF(lpAve);
if «lpHist = fopen("hist.xlt","a+t"» == NULL){
fprintf(stderr,"Cannot open HISTORY file\n");
exit(l);
}
mpointer{12]= FP_SEG(lpHist);
mpointer(13)= FP_OFF(lpHist);
mpointer{14]= FP_SEG(idt);
mpointer{15]= FP_OFF(idt);
#ifdef SCREEN
textmode(C4350);
highvideo();
for (i=50;i>=1;i-)
printf("%d \n",i>;
#endif
gotoxy(3,5Q);
srand(biostime(O,Ol»;
for(i=O;i<lOOO;i++) random(lOO);
for(b->round=l;b->round<=b->maxr;b->round++){
fOr(b->period=l;b->period<=b->maxp;b->period++){
for(b->time=l; b->time <= b->maxt; b->time++ )(
shuffle(TotaIAgents,id);
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for(i=1~<=TotaIAgents;i++){
if( a[id[iJ).type=='p' && a(id(iJ).active==l)(
itoa(id[i),p,lO);
r=spawnl(P_WAIT,a[id(iJ).name,p,p,NULL);
if(r== 1)(
printf(IIerror spawning producer %d \n",i);
exit(3);
} I I if r
} I I ifa[i]
}llfor i
shuffle(TotaIAgents,id);
for(i=l;i<=TotaIAgents;i++)(
if(a[ id(i) ].type=='c'&&a[ id[iJ).active==l){
shuffle(TotaIAgents,id1 );
itoa( id[i] ,p,lO);
r=spawnl(P_WAIT,a[ idli] ).name,p,p,NULL);
if(r==l){
printf("crror spawning agent %d\n",i);
exit(3);
} I I if r
} I I ifali)
} I I for i
#ifdef SCREEN
x=wherex();
y=whcreyO;
#endif
gotoxy(70,2);
cprintf("%d %d %d ",b->round,b->pcriod,b->time);
#ifdcf SCREEN
gotoxy(x,y);
#endif
r= spawnl(P_WAIT,"updatc.exe",NULL);
if(r==-l)(
printf("error spawning update program\n");
exit(]);
} Ilif r
} I I for b->time
} I I for b->pcriod
} I I for b->round
r= spawnl(P_WAIT,"record.exc",NULL);
if(r==-l)(
printf(tlerror spawning record program\n");
exit(l);
}
for(i=l;i<=TotaIAgents;i++)(
if( a(id(i)).type=='p' && a(idlil].active==l)(
itoa(id[i),p,10);
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b->time=lj
r:spawnl(P_WAIT,a[id(i)).name,p,p,NULU;
if(r:= 1){
printf("error spawning producer %d\n",i);
exit(3)j
} I I if r
} I I ifa(i)
}llfor i
farfree(a);
farfree(b);
farfree(c);
farfree(d);
fclose(lpTrades)j
fclose(lpAve);
fclose(lpHist);
free(id);
stop=time(NULU;
texbnode(C80);
gotoxy(1,24)j
printf(IlElapsed time = %d seconds \n", stop-start);
retumO;
} I lend t.c
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Iltl.c blackboard setup program 3/17192
#include <stdio.h>
#include <process.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include 'bb.h"
#include <dos.h>
int MakeBB()(
int i,j;
unSigned far ·mpointer;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,Ox01eO);
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer(l»j
b=MK_FP(mpointer[2), mpointer(3»;
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4), mpointer[5»;
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6), mpointer[7»;
randomize();
b->time=b->period=b->round=1;
for(i=1; i <= b->agents; i++){
c[i).qe=c[i).q=(random(1000) > 500)? 25 + (float) randomOl) : 25 -(float) random(11);
c[i).p=c[i).pe=(random(1000) > SOD)? 25 + (float) random(6) : 25 -(tloat) random(6);
}
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----~ ...-.-
for(j=1;j<= b->agents;j++)(
a[jJ.coeffOJ= / /(float) i;
( «float) random(RAND_MAX)/RAND_MAX) >= O.S) ?
«float) random(RAND_MAX)/RAND_MAX)"W.l):
-«float) random(RAND_MAX)/RAND_MAX)"W.l);
a[jJ.coefl1 J= / /(float) i;
( «float) random(RAND_MAX)/RAND_MAX) >= O.S)?
«float) random(RAND_MAX)/RAND_MAX)"(O.3):
-«float) random(RAND_MAX) /RAND_MAX)"(O.3) ;
for(i=l; i <= b->agents; i++) (
a(i].wealth=(float) InitialWealth ;
ali].active=l;
d->cprice=O;
d->cquantity=O;
d->periodp=O;
d->periodq=O;
d->periodv=O;
d->roundp=O;
d->roundq=O;
d->roundv=O;
d->marketp=O;
d->marketq=O;
d->marketv=O;
for(i=1;i<= b->agents;i++)(
if(ali].type=='p')(
d->periodq += cfi].q;
d->periodv += c[iJ.p"c[i].q;
}
}
d->periodpl = d->periodv/d->periodq;
d->periodql=d->periodq;
d->roundpl= d->periodpl;
d->roundql= d->periodql;
d->periodq=O;
d->periodv=O;
return 0;
}
/ /
int main(int argc, char "argv[»
(
InitialWealth= atoi(argv[l»;
MakeBBO;
return 0;
}
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/ /
Ilupdate.c 7/21/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <process.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include 'bb.h"
1 •..1
int main(int argc, char "argv[])(
int i;
unsigned far ·mpointer;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,Ox01eO);
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer[l»;
b=MK_FP(mpointer[2), mpointcr(3»;
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4), mpointer[S]);
d=MK_FP(mpointcr[6), mpointcr[7]);
IpAve=MK_FP(mpointer[10), mpointcr(11));
if(d->periodq >O){
fprintf(lpAve,"%#8.2f\t %#8.2f\t %#8.2f\n",d->pcriodv, d->pcriodv I d->periodq, d-
>periodq);
)
if(b->time >= b->maxt && b->round <= b->maxr){
d->cprice=O;
for(i=O;i<b->agents;i++)
if(a[i].type=='p')
d->cprice += c[i].qe;
d->periodp1 = d->periodpi
d->periodq1 = d->periodq;
d->cquanti ty=O;
d->periodp=O;
d->periodq=O;
d->periodv=O;
fprintf(lpAve,"\t\t\t\t%#8.2f\t %#8.2f\n",d->pcriodpl, d->pcriodql);
if(b->period >= b->maxp && b->round < b->maxr){
d->roundp1=d->roundp;
d->roundql=d->roundq;
d->cquantity=O;
d->periodp=O;
d->periodq=O;
d->periodv=O;
d->roundp=O;
d->roundq=O;
d->roundv=O;
)
)
return 0;
)
I • • • • • • ••• ••• I
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/ /record.c 7-21-92
#inc1ude <stdio.h>
#inc1ude <process.h>
#inc1ude <stdlib.h>
#inc1ude <string.h>
#inc1ude <dos.h>
#inc1ude "bb.h"
FILE "lpBB;
int main O(
int i,j;
float TotaIWeaIth=O;
unsigned far "mpointer;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,Ox01eO);
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer[1»;
b=MK_FP(mpointer(2), mpointer[3»;
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4), mpointer[S»;
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6), mpointer[7»;
if ((IpBB = fopen("bb.xlt","w+t"» == NULL)(
fprintf(stderr,"Cannot open blackboard file \n");
exit(1);
}
fprintf(lpBB,"maxt \t%d\n", b->maxt);
fprintf(IpBB,"maxp \t%d\n", b->maxp);
fprintfOpBB,"maxr \t%d\n", b->maxr);
fprintfOpBB,"time \t%d\n", b->time);
fprintfOpBB,"period \t%d\n", b->period);
fprintf(IpBB,"round \t%d\n", b->round);
fprintfOpBB,"producers \ t%d\n", b->producers);
fprintfOpBB,"consumers \t%d\n", b->consumers);
fprintfOpBB,"total agents \t%d\n", b->agents);
fprintf(lpBB,"\nID Program Act Type Wealth Coefl Coef2 Pe P Qe Q\n");
fOr(i=l;i<=b->agents;i++) (
fprintf(lpBB,"%d %s %d %c %#6.0f %#8.4f %#8.4f %#6.2f %#6.2f %#6.2f %#6.2f\n",
i, a[i].name, a[i].active, ali].type, a[i).wealth, a[i).coeflO), ali).coef[1I, cI iI.pc, cI iI.p, cI i I.qe,
c(i].q);
TotalWealth += ali].wealth;
}
fprintf(]pBB,"\ntotal wealth \t%#8.0f\n",TotaIWealth);
fprintf(lpBB,"ending price \t%#8.2f\n", d->cprice) ;
fprintf(]pBB,"endingquantity \t%#8.2f\n", d->cquantity);
fprintf(]pBB,"ending period price \t%#8.2f\n", d->periodp) ;
fprintf(]pBB,"ending period quantity\t%#8.2f\n", d->periodq);
fprintfOpBB,"ending period value \t%#8.0f\n", d->periodv) ;
fprintf(]pBB,"ending round price \t%#8.2f\n", d->roundp);
fprintf(]pBB,"ending round quantity \t%#8.2f\n", d->roundq) ;
fprintfOpBB,"ending round value \t%#8.0f\n", d->roundv) ;
fprintfOpBB,"ending market price \t%#8.2f\n", d->marketp) ;
fprintfOpBB,"ending market quantity\t%#8.0f\n", d->marketq) ;
fprintfOpBB,"ending market value \t%#8.0f\n", d->marketv) ;
fclose(lpBB);
return 0;
} IIend record.c
/ /
1Ishuffle.c 7/21/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <bios.h>
int ·shuffle(int n,int .p>f
int k,i, temp,index;
FILE ·lpRandomFile;
long bios_time;
for (i=1;i<=n;i++) (
indcx=random(n)+1;
temp=p(i);
p[i)=p[index);
p[indexl=temp;
}
return p;
}
/ /
l·dim2.c·1
#include <stdio.h>
#include <aIJoc.h>
char "dim2(int row, int col,unsigned size);
void free2(char ··pa);
void free2(char ··pa){
freeC·pa);
free(pa);
}
char ··dim2(int row, int col,unsigned size){
int i;
char ··prow;
char ·pdata;
pdata =(char·) maIJoc«unsigned ) (row)· (col) • size);
if(! pdata ) (
fprintf(stdcrr,"error 1 in allocation of 2 dimensional array \n");
exit(l);
}
prow =(char ••) maIJoc«row) • sizeof(char "'»;
if(prow == (char ••) NULL){
fprintf(stderr,"error 2 in aIJocation of 2 dimensional array\n");
exit(l);
---_...__.- .. _---_.
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for(i=O;i< row;i++){
prow[i )=pdata;
pdata += size • col;
}
return prow;
}
/ /
/ futiI.c
/ / utilities for agent programs
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include <signaI.h>
#include <f1oat.h>
#include <string.h>
int id;
char buffer (4096);
void CatcherCint sig, int type){
int i,j;
gettext(1,1,80,8,buffer);
window(I,1,80,8);
textcolor(BLACK);
textbackground(WHlTE);
for(j=1~<9;j++ )(
for(i=1;i<80;i++)
putch(' ');
putch('\r');
putch('\n');
}
gotoxy(l,1);
cprintf("Caught Floating Point Error in %s \r\n",a->name);
cprintf("id= %d \r\n",id);
cprintf("c[id).p = %f c[id).pe = %f \r\n",c[id).p, c[id).pe);
cprintf("c[id).q = %f c(id).qe = %f \r\n",c[id).q, c[id).qe);
cprintf("FPE = %d \r\n", sig);
cprintf("FPE status before clear = %X \r\n", _status87(»;
_c1ear870;
cprintf("FPE status after clear = %X \r\n", _status87(»;
exit (1);
}
FILE "makeFile(char root(4),char id(3),char extension(3){
FILE "lpFile;
char fid(4),fname[I2];
----_...~.-- --.-------_... - . -._._-_._---
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strcpy(fname,root);
strcpy(fid,id);
strcat(fname,fid);
strcat(fname,extension);
if ((IpFile =fopen(fname,"a+t"» == NULL)(
fprintf(stderr,"Cannot open %5\n",fname);
exit(l);
}
return IpFile;
}
char "'makeFileName(char root(4),char id[3),char extension(3)(
char fid(4),fname[12),·name;
strcpy(fname,root);
strcpy<fid,id);
strcat(fname,fid);
strcat(fname,extension);
name=&fname;
return name;
}
I lend of util.c1························...············1
Ilbb.h
#define MAXAGENTS 1100
#define UNITCOST 10
#define UNITUTIL 50
struct agent(
char name(13);
char type;
char id(20);
float coef[2];
float wealth;
intactive;
} ;
struct data_be
int maxt; I I maximum number of time steps
intmaxr;
intmaxp;
int time;
intperiod;
intround;
int agents;
int producers;
int consumers;
} ;
struct trade(
float qe;
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float q;
float pc;
float p;
};
struct history{
float cprice;
float cquantity;
float pcriodp; I I average price for the period so far
float periodq;
float periodv;
float roundp; I I average price for the round so far
float roundq;
float roundv;
float marketp; I I average price for the market so far
float marketq;
float marketv;
float periodpl; I laverage price in last period
float periodql;
float roundpl;
float roundql;
} ;
struct agent far "a;
struct data_b far "b;
struct trade far "c;
struct history far "d;
FILE "lpTrades;
FILE "lpAve;
FILE "lpBB;
FILE "lpHist;
int InitialWealth;
int TotaIAgents=O;
unsigned far "mpointer;
double (... fund (double);
I lend bb.h1 _ /
1/ cons09.c 7/21/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <math.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <float.h>
#define CUTOFF 0.1
#define SLOPED 2.0
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/ / #define HIST / /write to history file if defined
/ / #define TRADES
#define SCREEN
int id;
float demand(float p, int id)(
float q,slope;
q=lOO+a(id).coef[l) - (SLOPED + a[id).cocf[OJ>'" p;
q=(q>=O)? q : 0;
return q;
}
float demandPricc(float q){
float p;
p=(float) 000+ a[idl.coef[l)- q )/ (SLOPED + a[id).cocfIOD;
p=(p>=O)? p : 0;
return p;
}
int eval(int id_p,int id)(
float xd;
xd= (float) demand( c[id_p].p,id ) - (float) c[id_p].q ;
xd=(fabs(xd»= CUTOFF)? «xd>Q)? 1:-1) : 0 ;
return (int) xd;'
}
void Catcher(int sig, int type)(
char buffer [4096);
int i,j;
gettext(l,l,SO,8,buffer);
windowO,1,80,8);
textcolor(BLACK);
textbackground(RED);
for(j=1~<9;j++)(
for(i=l;i<SO;i++)
putch(' ');
putch('\r');
putch('\n');
)
gotoxy(l,l);
cprintf("Caught Floating point Bounds Problem in %s \r\n",a[i).name);
cprintf("id= %d \r\n",id);
cprintf("c(id).p = %f c[id).pe = %f \r\n",c[id).p, c[id).pc);
cprintf("c[id).q = %f cHd).qe = %f \r\n",c[id).q, c[id).qc);
cprintf("FPE = %d \r\n", sig);
cprintf("FPE status before clear = %X \r\n", _status87(»;
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3 1earB70;
cprintf("FPE status after clear = %X \r\n", _statusB7());
exit(1);
}
int main(int argc,char "'argv[]) (
int i,j,index,x,p,q;
int "'pid;
float pmin=lOOO,qBought=-l, xsmax=-l000,totaIQuantity=O,qmax=-l;
unsigned far "'mpointer;
time_t t;
char fname(15),fid[4];
FILE "'lpTemp;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
a=MK_FP(mpointer(O), mpointer[l]);
b=MK_FP(mpointer[2), mpointer[3]);
c=MK_FP(mpointer(4], mpointer[5]);
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6), mpointer(7»;
IpTrades=MK_FP(mpointer[B), mpointer[9»;
IpHist=MK]P(mpointer[l2), mpointer[l3));
pid=MK_FP(mpointer[14), mpointer[15));
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
if(argc > 0)
id=atoi(argv[l »;
if(a[id).wealth <= 0) return 0;
# ifdefHIST
fprintf(lpHist,"%#d' t%#d\ t%#d \ tIt,b->round,b->period,b->timcl;
fOr(i=l;i<=b->agents;i++) if(a[i].type =='p') fprintfOpHist,"%#6.2f\ t",c1 iI.p);
for(i=l;i<=b->agents;i++) if(a[i].type =='p') fprintf(lpHist,"%#6.2f\t",c1 i).q);
fprintf(lpHist,"'n");
#endif
/"find total quantity in the market'"/
for(i=l;i<=b->agents;i++)(
if(a[pid[iJ).type=='p')(
totalQuantity += c[pid[ill.q;
}
/ .. search for best price - quantity combination
first compare quantity available and quantity demanded at the given price
choose min(q_available, q_demanded) for each producer
second, choose the highest quantity, thus filling the greatest demand at
the lowest price"/
index =5000;
for(i=1;i<=b->agents;i++){
if(a[pid[i)).type=='p')(
qBought = max (qmax, min (c[pid[i)).q, demand (c[pid[ ilJ.p,id ) l );
index=(qmax==qBought)? index: pid[iJ;
qrnax=qBought;
}
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}
if(index != 5000)
c[index].q -= qBought;
if(index != 5000 && qBought>O){
d->cquantity=qBought;
d->periodq += qBought;
d->periodv += qBought· c[indexl.p;
d->periodp = ( d->periodq )? d->periodv I d->periodq : 0 ;
d->roundq += qBought;
d->roundv += qBought • c[index).p;
d->roundp = ( d->roundq )? d->roundv I d->roundq : 0 ;
d->marketq += qBought;
d->marketv += qBought· c[index].p;
d->marketp = ( d->marketq )? d->marketv I d->marketq : 0 ;
}
if(index != 5000 && qBought > O){
a[index).wealth += qBought·c[indexJ,p;
a[id].wealth += qBough~(UNITUTIL - c[idl.p);
}
#ifdef SCREEN
if (index!= 5000 && qBought > O){
highvideo();
p= (int) 50 - c[index].p;
if(wherexO>=79){
c1rscrO;
gotoxy(O,O);
for (i=50;i>=1;i--)
printf("%d\n",D;
x=3;
} /Iif where
else x=wherexO;
textcolor(index); / / make color equal to producer id
gotoxy(x, p);
putch('p');/ /
#ifdef TRADES
if(qBought> 0)(
fprintf(lpTrades,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%#6.2f\t%#6.2f\t%#6.
2f\n",
b->maxr,b->maxp,b->maxt,b->producers,b->consumers,
b->round,b->period,b->time,index,id,totaIQuantity,c[index].p,qBollght);
} / / if qBought
#endif
} / / if index != 5000
#endif
#ifdefHIST
fprintf(lpHist,"%#d \ t%#d\ t%#d\ t",b->round,b->period,b->time);
fOr(i=l;i<=b->agents;i++) if(a[i].type =='p') fprintWpHist,"%#6.2f\t",c[i).p);
fOr(i=l;i<=b->agents;i++) if(a[i).type =='p') fprintWpHist,"%#6.2f\t", c[ i I.q);
fprintf(lpHist,"c \t %#d\t%#6.2f\t%#6.2f\t",id,c(index).p,qBollght);
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fprintf(lpHist,"p\t %#d\n\n",index);
#endif
return 0;
} / / end eons09.e/ I
I IpcOOO.e Staekelberg agent CV == 0.0 7/21/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <eonio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include <signal.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "utiLe"
#define RATE 1.0
#defineCV 0.0 I I COMPILE WITH DIFFERENTCV FOR EACH STACKELGERC ,\CENT
intid;
float w=0,bO=50,bl=5;
ehar buffer [4096);
float dpdq(float qx, float qe, float qa)(
float aO=50, al=O.5;
aI 1= (float) (b->maxt" b->eonsumers);
return (aO-bI - aI"(qx + qe) - aI·CV"qe );
}
r eost curve ../
float eost(float qH
return bO +bI" q;
}
1 • •..·/
float unitCost(void)(
retum(bO+bI"c[id ).qe)/c[id).qe;
}
r ......round....•........ /
float round(float fptest, int decimals)(
asm{
fild word ptr decimals
fld st (0)
fld dword ptr fptest
fmul
fmdint
fdivr
fstp dword ptr fptest
}
return fptest;
}
r base on price It /
float expectcdPrice(float p, float peH
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATE"'p +(1-RATE)'" pe;
return newPrice;
}
float supply(float p, int id){
float q;
q=20+a(id).coef[1) + (O.S+a[id).coef[OJ> '" p;
return q;
}
int main(int argc,char "'argv[J)[
int i,j, adjust, decimals=100;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O,totalQuantity,fptest;
unsigned far "'mpointer;
FILE "'lpA, ltlpProfit, "'lpTemp, ltlpCoef;
float aI, a2, a3, profit=O, periodProfit, round Profit, dq, adjustment=l ,lastprice;
char fname[l2j,fid(4);
longpos;
mpointer = MK]P(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
aI =a2=a3=0;
a=MI<_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer[l»;
b=MI<]P(mpointer[2), mpointer(3»;
c=MI<_FP(mpointer[4), mpointer[S»;
d=MI<_FP(mpointer[6), mpointer(7»;
if(arge > 0)
id=atoi(argv[l »;
if( a[id).wealth <= O){
c[id).pe=c[id).p=c[id).qe=c[id).q=O;
b->producers-;
a[id).aetive=O;
return 0;
}
IpProfit=makeFile("pOO",argv[l),".xlt");
if(b->time==l && b->period==l && b->round==l); / /initialization
else (
fseekClpProfit,ftell(lpProfit)-(l0+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END);/ /
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfi I);
fseek(lpProfi t,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END>;
if(b->time==2) newSales=sold=periodProfit=O;
newSales = (e[id].qe == c[id).q)? 0: c[id].qe-c[id).q-sold;
sold += newSales;
212
213
profit= ( fabs(newSales'" (c[id).p - unitCostO» < 0.01 )? 0: ncwSales ~ (c! id I.p-
unitCost(»;
pcriodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
}
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d \t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\ t%#6.4f\ t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\ t% f# 10.4£\ t'rQ f# 10.2£\ t%# 10.2£
\n",«b->time ==1)? 5: b->time-1), e[idJ.pe, didl.p, didJ.qc, c1idJ.q, sold, profit
,pcriodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit);
IpTemp=makeFile("wealth",argv[1 ),".xlt");
fprintf(1pTemp,"%d\t%d \t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->tirne, id, al id I. wealth);
fclose(lpTemp);
if(b->time == 2 && b->time < b->maxt)(
totaIQuantity=O;
for(i=I;i<=b->agents;i++)(
if(a(i).type=='p') totalQuantity += e[i].q;
}
lastprice=c[id I.p;
c[idl.p = 50 - (totalQuantity ) / ( 2· (b->maxt- b->timc+1 ) ~ b->consurners ) ;
c[id).p=(c[id].p>bll? c[idJ.p: bI; / / use marginal cost r<lther that average ((l~t
c[idl.p = round(e[id I.p,decimals);
}
if(b->time==I) (
dq= (float) dpdq(d->periodql,c[id).qe,c[idl.q)·1.0 ;
IpTemp=makeFile("qOO",argv[1 ),".xlt");
dq= (float> dpdq(d->periodql,c[id).qe,c[id).q)·1.0;
fprintf(1pTemp,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\t%f\t%f\t%f\t\n",
b->round,b->period,b->time,d->periodqI,e[id ).qe,c[id I.q,dq);
fclose(lpTemp);
/ / set q for next period
q = c[id).qe + dq;
c[idl.q = (cost(q) <= a(id).wealth && a[id).wcalth >= O)? q: <lrid l.wc<llth/unitCosl();
a(idl.wealth -= cost(c(id).q);
c[id ).qe=c[id ).q;
c[id).pe = 50 - ( d->periodqI + (dq) ) / ( 2·(b->maxt)"'b->consumcrs ) ;
r set price at marginal cost or above (not average cost) .../
c[id).pe = (c[id).pe>bl)? c[id).pe : bI; / fuse marginal rather than average cost
c[id).p = c(id).pe = round(c(id).pe,decimals);
}
fclose(lpProfi 0;
return 0;
} / / end pcOOO.c/ /
/ / ps1.c 8/12 based on ps3 but tries to capture
/ / market share by cutting opening price
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include "nett.c"
#indude "util.c"
#dcfine RATE 0.5
float w=0,bO=50,bl=5;
r cost curve It/
float cost(float qH
return bO + b1 It q ;
}
float unitCost(void)(
rcturn(bO+blltc[id J.qe)/did).qc;
}
r base on price It/
float expectedPrice(float p, float pe)(
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATEltp +(1-RATE)lt pe;
return newPrice;
)
float supply(f1oat p, int id)(
floatq;
q=20+a[id).coef[1) + (O.5+a[id).coef[O)) It p;
return q;
}
int mainUnt argc,char ltargv[» (
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far ltmpointer;
FILE ltlpA, ltlpProfit, ltlpData, ltlpNetProfit, ltfp, ltlpProfitData, ltlpTemp;
float al, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfit1=O, roundProfit,totalQuantity;
char fname[t2),fid[4),ltweightFile[t6), ch;
longpos;
float now(8),nowl (8);
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
float lastProfit, deltaProfit;
long endPosition;
mpointer = MI<_FP(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
al=a2=a3=0;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer(t));
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b=MK_FP(mpointer(2), mpointer(3»;
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4), mpointer(5»;
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6), mpointer(7»;
IpTrades=MK_FP(mpointcr(8), mpointcr(9J);
if(argc > 0)
id=atoi(argv(l »;
if( a[id).wealth < 0) {
c[id).pe=c[id).p=c[id).qe=c[id).q=O;
b->producers-;
a[id).active=O;
return 0;
}
r n noise values are constant throughout the simulation .... /
bO += a[id).coef(l) ;
b1 += a[id).coef(O) ;
IpProfit=makeFile(lpOO",argv[1 ),".xlt");
if(b->time==1 && b->period==1 && b->round==l); //initialization
else (
fseekOpProfit,ftcll(lpProfitHlO+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END);//
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f %f %f %f",&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfil);
fseekOpProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
if(b->time==l )(
periodProfitl =periodProfi t;
}
if(b->time==2) {
newSales=sold=periodProfit=O;
}
newSales = (c[id).qe == c[id).q )? 0: c[id).qe-c[id).q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= ( fabs(newSales '" (c[id).p - unitCostO» < 0.01 )? 0: newSalcs It (c[id I.p - unitCost());
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
}
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\ t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\ t%#8.4f\ t%# 1OAf\ t'I 111 O.2f\ I';'.; 111 0.2f
\ nil,
«b->time ==1)? 5: b->time-1), c[id].pe, c(id).p, c(id).qe, c[id).q, sold, profit
,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit);
IpTemp=makeFile(lwealth",argv[1],".xlt");
fprintfOpTemp,l%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->timc, id, arid).wealth);
fclose(1pTemp);
if(b->time != 1)(
timeCriteria=(float) (b->maxt-b->time)/b->maxt;
qCriteria= (float) (c[id).qe - c[id).q)/c[id).qe;
/ / qCriteria is 1 if no goods have been purchased since the start of the period
if(timeCriteria >= 0.5 && qCriteria >= 0.5)
c[id).p "'= 1.05; / / increase price if all sold early
if(timeCriteria < 0.5 && qCriteria < 0.5)
c(id).p "'=0.95;
c[id).p = (c[id).p > bl)? c[id).p : b1; / / use marginal cost
return 0;
--_..__.- --._.--_....... - '--'-" ._. -
} / / if price != 1 price adjustment
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==1 && b->round==l);
else (
if(b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round ==1 )(
deltaProfit=O;
IpProfit=makeFileC'datpO",argv[l J,".xlt");
fprintf(lpProfit,"%10.2f\ t%10.2f\n",del taProfit,periodProfitl);
fcloseOpProfit);
lastProfit=periodProfi t1;
}
else{
IpProfit=makeFile( l datpO",argv[l J,".xlt");
endPosition=ftellOpProfit) -12;
fseekOpProfit,endPosition , SEEK_END>;/ /
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f',&lastProfit);
fseekOpProfi t,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END>;
deltaProfit=(periodProfitl - lastProfit);
fprintfOpProfit,"%10.2f\t %10.2f\n", deltaProiit, periodProiitl I;
fcloseOpProfit);
}
if(deltaProfit >=0)
q = didJ.qe + RATE"deltaProfit/((lastProfit+periodProfit1+1)/2)""c/id I.ge -did I.g;
if(deltaProfit < 0 && didJ.q>O)
q = c[idJ.qe -c[idJ.q;
if(deltaProfit < 0 && c[id).q==O)
q = c[id).qe - RATE"RATPdeltaProfit/((lastProfit+periodProfitl +l)/2)"c1 id I.ge ;
q =( q > 0) ? q : 100;
} / / end of else
if(b->time==l) (
c(id).pe=d->periodpl .. 0.99;
c(id).pe=( c[idJ.pe > unitCost(» ? c[id).pe : unitCostO;
c[id).p = c[idJ.pe;
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=30;
if(cost(q) > a[idJ.wealth) printf(""");
c[id).q=(cost(q) <= a(idJ.wealth && a(id).wealth >= O)? q :
(a(id).wealth >O)? a[id).wealth/unitCostO : 0;
a[id).wealth·= cost(c[id).q);
clidJ.qe=c(id).q;
}//time==l
return 0;
}// end ps1.c/ _ /
/ / ps2.c 8/12 based on ps3
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
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#include <signaI.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include "nett.c"
#include "util.c"
#define RATE 0.5
float w=O,bO=SO,bl=S;
lit cost curve It/
float cost(float q)(
return bO + bI It q ;
}
float unitCost(void)(
retum(bO+bl"c[id).qe)/c[id).qe;
}
float expectedPrice(f]oat p, float peH
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATEltp +(l-RATE)" pe;
return newPrice;
}
float supply(f]oat p, int id){
float q;
q=20+a(id).coef[l) + (O.S+a[id).coef[O» It p;
return q;
}
int main(int argc,char Itargv[])(
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far Itmpointer;
FILE ItlpA, 1t1pProfit, "lpData, "lpNetProfit, "fp, "lpProfitData, "lpTcmp;
float aI, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfit1=O, roundProfit,totaIQuantity;
char fname[l2J,fid[4)/weightFile[l6), ch;
longpos;
float now(8),now1[8];
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
float lastProfit, deltaProfit;
long endPosition;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
al=a2=a3=O;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer[l»;
b=MK_FP(mpointer[2], mpointer(3»;
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4], mpointer[S»;
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d=MK]P(mpointer[6), mpointcr(7»;
IpTrades=MK]P(mpointer[S), mpointer(9»;
if(argc > 0)
id=atoi(argv[1 »;
if( a[id).wealth < 0) {
did ).pe=c[id ).p=c[id ).qe=c[id).q=O;
b->producers-;
a[id ).active=O;
return 0;
}
I ..... noise values are constant throughout the simulation .... /
bO += a[id).coef[1];
b1 += a[id).coef[O];
IpProfi t=makeFile("pOO",argv[1],".xlt");
if(b->time==l && b->period==l && b->round==1); / /initialization
else (
fseek(lpProfit,ftell(lpProfit)-(10+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END>;/ /
fscanf{\pProfi t,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&pcriodProfi t,&round Profi t);
fseek(lpProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
if(b->time==l )(
periodProfit1=periodProfit;
}
if(b->time==2) {
newSales=sold=periodProfit=O;
}
newSales = (c[id].qe == c[id).q )? 0 : c[id).qe-c[id).q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= ( fabs(newSales • (c[id).p - unitCost(») < 0.01 )? 0: newSales" (c[ id I.p -
unitCost());
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
}
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\ t%#8.4f\ t%#l 0..1£\ t%#l1 0.2£\ t%#ll 0.2£
\n",
«b->time ==l)? 5: b->time-l), c[id].pe, c[id).p, c[id).qe, c[id).q, sold, profit
,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit);
IpTemp=makeFile("wealth",argv[1 ),".xltil);
fprintf(lpTemp,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->timc, id, nlidj.wcalth);
fc1ose(lpTemp);
if(b->time != 1)(
timeCriteria=(f1oat) (b->maxt-b->time)/b->maxt;
qCriteria= (float) (c[id].qe - c[id].q)/c[id).qe;
/ / qCriteria is 1 if no goods have been purchased since the start of the period
if(timeCriteria >= 0.5 && qCriteria >= 0.5)
did].p .= 1.05; / / increase price if all sold early
if(timeCriteria < 0.5 && qCriteria < 0.5)
c[id).p ·=0.95;
c[id).p = (c[id).p > b1)? c[id].p : b1; / / use marginal cost
return 0;
) II if price != 1 price adjustment
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==1 && b->round==I);
else (
if(b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round ==1 )(
deltaProfit=O;
IpProfit=makeFile("datpO",argv[1J,".xl t");
fprintfOpProfit,"%10.2f\ t%1O.2f\n",deltaProfit,periodProfitl );
fclose(lpProfit);
lastProfit=periodProfit1;
)
else(
IpProfi t=makeFile("datpO",argv[1],".xlt");
endPosition=ftel1(lpProfit) -12;
fseek(lpProfit,endPosition , SEEK_END>;II
fscanfOpProfit,"%f',&lastProfit);
fseek(lpProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
deltaProfit=(periodProfitl - lastProfit);
fprintfOpProfit,"%1O.2f\t %10.2f\n", deltaProfit, period Profi tI );
fclose(lpProfi t);
)
if(deltaProfit >=0)
q = c[idJ.qe + RATE"deltaProfit/((lastProfit+periodProfitl+l)/2)"c[id I.qe -c[id I.q;
if(deltaProfit < 0 && c(id].q>O)
q = c[id].qe -c[id].q;
if(deltaProfit < 0 && c[id].q==O)
q = c[idl.qe - RATE"RATE"deltaProfit/((1astProfit+periodProfit1+1)/2)"'c!id I.qc ;
q =( q > 0) ? q : 100;
) II end of else
if(b->time==1) (
c(id].pe=d->periodpl;
c(id].pe=( c(id].pe > unitCost()) ? c[id].pe : unitCostO;
c(id].p = c[id].pe;
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=30;
if(cost(q) > a[id).wealth) printf(""");
c(id].q=(cost(q) <= alid).wealth && a[id).wealth >= 0 )? q : (a[idJ.wealth >O)?
a[id).wealth/unitCostO : 0;
a[id).wealth -= cost(c[id).q);
c[id].qe=c(id).q;
}lltime==I
return 0;
) II end ps2.cI /
II ps3.c 7/21/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include <signal.h>
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#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include "nett.e"
#include "uti!.e"
#define RATE O.S
float w=O,bO=SO,bl=S;
r cost curve •/
float cost(float q){
return bO + bl • q;
}
float unitCost(void)(
return(bO+bl·c[id I.qe)/did I.qe;
)
float expectedPriee(float p, float pe)(
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATE·p +(1-RATE)· pe;
return newPrice;
}
float supply(float p, int id){
floatq;
q=20+a[id].coef[1] + (O.S+a[id).coef[O»· p ;
return q;
}
int main(int argc,ehar ·argv[)) (
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far ·mpointer;
FILE ·lpA, ·lpProfit, ·lpData, ·lpNetProfit, ·fp, ·lpProfitData, ·lpTemp;
float al, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfitl=O, roundProfit,totaIQuilntity;
char fname[l2],fid[4 ],·weightFile[l6J, eh;
longpos;
float now[8],now1[8];
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
float lastProfit, deltaProfit;
long endPosition;
mpointer = MK]P(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
signaI(SIGFPE,Catcher);
a1=a2=a3=O;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O], mpointer[l));
b=MK_FI'(mpointer[2], mpointer[3]);
c=MK]P(mpointer[4], mpointerfS));
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d=MK]P(mpointer[6), mpointer(7»;
IpTrades=MK_FP(mpointerfSI, mpointer[9»;
if(argc > 0)
id=atoi(argv[t »;
if( afid).wealth < 0) {
c[id).pe=c[idl.p=c[idl.qe=c[idl.q=O;
b->producers-;
a[idl.active=O;
return 0;
}
r·· noise values are constant throughout the simulation .... /
bO += a(idI.coef[t I ;
bl += a(idl.cocf[OI ;
IpProfit=makeFileC"pOO",argv[II,".xlt");
fseek(lpProfit,ftell(lpProfit)-(10+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END>;//
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProiit);
fseek(lpProfi t,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
periodProfit=(b->time==l && b->round==l && b->pcriod ==l)? 0: pcriodProiit;
if(b->time==1 )(
periodProfit1=periodProfi t;
sold = newSales= 0 ;
periodProfit =0;
roundProfit=(b->period==U? 0: roundProfit;
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#S.4f\t%#10.4f\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
b->time,c[id).pe, c(idl.p, c[idl.qe, c[id].q, sold,
newSales· (c(idl.p - unitCost(» ,periodProfit,roundProfit);
} / / end if b->time==1
else {
newSales = (c[idl.qe == c[idl.q )? 0 : c[idl.qe-c[id).q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= (fabs(newSales· (c[id).p - unitCost(») < 0.1 )? 0: newSalcs It <did I.p - lInitCost());
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\t%#10Af\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
b->time,c[id).pe, c[id).p, c[id).qe, c[id).q, sold, profit ,periodProfit,rolindProfit);
} / / end else i.e. (time !=1)
fclose(lpProfit);
IpProfit=makeFile("pOO",argvf1),".xl til);
if(b->time==1 && b->period==1 && b->round==l); / /initialization
else (
fseek(lpProfit,ftell(lpProfit)-(10+10+10+1O+4),SEEK_END>;/ /
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfit);
fseek(lpProfi t,SEEI<_CUR,SEEK_END);
if(b->time==I){
periodProfit1=periodProfi t;
--- _.- --_.,_._ ..
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if(b->time==2) (
newSales=sold=periodProfit=O;
}
newSales = (c[id).qe == c[idl.q )? 0 : c[idl.qe-e[id].q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= ( fabs(newSales· (c[id].p - unitCostO» < 0.01 )? 0: newSales'" (c(id I.p -
unitCost());
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
}
fprintf<lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\t%#10.4f\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
«b->time ==1)? 5: b->time-l), c[id).pe, c[id].p, c[id).qe, c[id).q, sold, profit
,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit);
IpTemp=makeFile("wealth",argv[ll,".xlt");
fprintf(1pTemp,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->lime, id, ,11 id I.wealth);
fclose(1pTemp);
if(b->time!= 1)(
timeCriteria=(float) (b->maxt-b->time)/b->maxt;
qCriteria= (float> (c[id).qe - c[id).q)/c[id].qe;
if(timeCriteria >= 0.5 && qCriteria >= 0.5)
c[id).p·= 1.05; / / increase price if all sold early
if(timeCriteria < 0.5 && qCriteria < 0.5)
c[id).p ·=0.95;
c[id).p = (c[id).p > bl)? c[id).p : bl; / / use marginal cost
retumO;
} / / if price != 1 price adjustment
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==1 && b->round==1);
else (
if(b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round ==1 )(
deltaProfit=O;
IpProfit=makeFiIe("datpO",argv[1],".xlt");
fprintf(lpProfit,"%10.2f\ t%10.2f\n",deltaProfit,periodProfitl);
fdose(lpProfit);
lastProfit=periodProfitl ;
)
else(
IpProfit=makeFile("datpO",argv[1),".xlt");
endPosition=ftell(lpProfit> -12;
fseek(lpProfit,endPosition , SEEK_END);/ /
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f',&lastProfit);
fseek(lpProfit,5EEK_CUR,5EEK_END);
deltaProfit=(periodProfitl -lastProfit);
fprintf(lpProfit,"% 1O.2f\t %10.2f\n", deltaProfit, periodProfitl);
fdose(lpProfit);
)
if(deltaProfit >=0)
q = c[id).qe + RATE·deltaProfit/((1astProfit+periodProfitl+1)/2)"'c[id I.qe -c[id ].q;
if(deltaProfit < 0 && c[id).q>O)
q = c[id).qe -e[id).q;
if(deltaProfit < 0 && did).q==O)
q = c[id).qe - RATE"RATE"deltaProfit/((1astProfit+pcriodProfitl +1)!2).c/ id I.qe ;
q =( q > 0) ? q : 100;
} 11 end of else
if(b->time==1) (
didl.pe=did).p=d->periodpl"1.1;
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=30;
if(cost(q) > a[id).wealth) printf(""");
c[id).q=(cost(q) <= a(id).wealth && a(id).wealth >= O)? q : (alidj.wcalth >ll)?
a[id).wealth/unitCost() : 0;
a(id).wealth -= cost<c[id).q);
c[id ).qe=c[id ).q;
}lltime==l
return 0;
} II end ps3.c
I • ••• ••..•••..·······1
II ps7.c 8/12/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include "nett.e"
#include "util.c"
#define RATE 0.5
float w=0,bO=50,bl=5;
I" cost curve"I
float cost(f]oat q)(
return bO + b1 .. q ;
}
float unitCost(void)(
return(bO+bl"c(id).qe)/c(id).qe;
)
float expectedPrice(float P, float pe)(
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATEotp +(1-RATE)" pe;
return newPrice;
)
float supply(float P, int id)(
floatq;
q=20+a(idl.coef[1) + (O.5+a(id).coef[OJ>" p;
return q;
)
II"
--oJ
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int main(int argc,char "'argv[]) (
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far "'mpointer;
FILE "lpA, "lpProfit, "lpData, "lpNetProfit, "fp, ltlpProfitData, *lpTemp;
float al, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfit1=O, roundProfit,totaIQuantity:
char fname[l21,fid(41,"weightFile[161, ch;
longpos;
float now(81,nowl(81;
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
float lastProfit, deltaProfit;
long endPosition;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
al=a2=a3=O;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[Ol, mpointer[1));
b=MK_FP(mpointer(21, mpointer(3));
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4I, mpointer[5»;
d=MK_FP(mpointer(6), mpointer(7]);
IpTrades=MK_FP(mpointer(8), mpointer[9));
ifCargc > 0)
id=atoi(argv(1 »;
if( a(idJ.wealth < 0) (
c[id).pe=c[id).p=c[id).qe=c[idl.q=O;
b->producers-;
a(id).active=O;
return 0;
)
I ...... noise values are constant throughout the simulation ltltI
bO += a[id).coef(1) ;
bl += a[id).coef[O) ;
IpProfil=makeFile("pOO",argv[l ),".xlt");
fseek(lpProfit,ftell(lpProfit)-(lO+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END);1I
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfit);
fseek(1pProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
periodProfit=(b->time==l && b->round==1 && b->period ==1)? 0 : periodProfit;
if(b->time==l )(
periodProfitl=periodProfi t;
sold = newSales= 0 ;
periodProfit =0;
roundProfit=(b->period==l)? 0 : roundProfit;
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\ t%#6.4f\ t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\ t%#6.4f\ t%#8.4f\ t%#1OAf\ t%#1O.2f\ t%#1O.2f
\n",
b->time,c[id).pe, c[id).p, c[id).qe, c[id).q, sold,
newSales" (c(id).p - unitCost(», periodProfit,roundProfit);
} / / end ifb->time==l
else (
newSales = (c[idl.qe == c[id].q )? 0 : didl.qe-didl.q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= (fabs(newSales '" (c[id).p - unitCost())) < 0.1 )? 0: newSales ~ (did I.p - unitCost());
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\t%#10.4f\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
b->time,e[id).pe, didl.p, c[idl.qe, c[id).q, sold, profit ,periodProfit,rolindProiitl;
} / / end else i.e. (time !=1)
fclose(lpProfit);
IpProfit=makeFile("pOO",argv[l ),".xlt");
if(b->time==l && b->period==l && b->round==l); / /initialization
else (
fseek(lpProfit,ftellOpProfitH10+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END);/ /
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f %f %f %f",&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProtit);
fseek(lpProfi t,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
if(b->time==1)(
periodProfitl=periodProfit;
}
if(b->time==2) (
newSales:sold=periodProfit=O;
)
newSales = (c[id).qe == c[id).q )? 0 : c[id).qe-c[idl.q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= ( fabs(newSales '" (c[id).p - unitCostO» < 0.D1 )? 0: newSalcs" (did I.p-
unitCost(»;
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profit;
}
fprintfOpProfit,"%d\ t%#6.4f\ t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\ t%#l OAf\ t'7v#1 0.2f\ t%#l 0.2f
\n",
«b->time ==1)? 5: b->time-l), did).pe, c[id).p, did).qe, did I.g, sold,
profit ,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit);
IpTemp=makeFile("wealth",argv[l),".xlt");
fprintf(1pTemp,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->time, id,
a[id).wealth);
fclose(lpTemp);
if(b->time!= 1)(
timeCriteria=(float) (b->maxt-b->time)/b->maxt;
qCriteria= (float) (c[id).qe - c[id).q)/c[id).qe;
/ / qCriteria is 1 if no goods have been purchased since the stnrt oi the period
if(timeCriteria >= 0.5 && qCriteria >= 0.5)
c[id).p "'= 1.05; / / increase price if all sold early
if(timeCriteria < 0.5 && qCriteria < 0.5)
c[id).p "'=0.95;
c[idJ.p = (c[id).p > bt>? c(id).p : bl; / / use marginal cost
retumO;
--_..~.- ---'---"- ._, - .- -_.._-- ._. - - .
} // if price != 1 price adjustment
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==1 && b->round==1);
else (
if(b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round ==1 )(
deltaProfit=O;
IpProfi t=makeFile("datpO",argv[l I,".xl t");
fprintf(lpProfit,"%1O.2f\ t%1O.2f\n",deltaProfit,periodProfitl);
fclose(lpProfit);
lastProfit=periodProfit1;
}
else{
IpProfi t=makeFile("datpO",argv[l I,".xlt");
endPosition=ftell(lpProfit) -12;
fseek(lpProfit,endPosition , SEEK_END);//
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f",&lastProfit);
fseek(lpProfi t,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
deltaProfit=(periodProfitl - lastProfit);
fprintf(lpProfit,"%10.2f\t %10.2f\n", deltaProfit, periodProfitl);
fclose(lpProfi t);
}
q= d->periodql / b->producers;
q =( q > 0) ? q : 100;
} // end of else
if(b->time==1) (
e[id).pe=e[id).p=d->periodpl"l.l;
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=30;
if(eost(q) > a[idl.wealth) printf(......);
c[id).q=(eost(q) <= a[id).wealth && a(id).wealth >= O)? q :
(a[id).wealth >O)? a[idl.wealth/unitCostO : 0;
a[id).wealth -= eost(c[id).q);
e[id ).qe=c[id I.q;
}/ltime==l
retumO;
}I lend ps7.e/ /
// psB.e 8/12/92
#include <stdio.h>
#incIude <eonio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#indude <signal.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#incIude "bb.h"
#include "nett.e"
#include "util.e"
#define RATE 0.5
-------- ._--_..- ... - •....__ . -- .
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float w=0,bO=50,bl=5;
r cost curve It/
float cost(float q)(
return bO + bl It q;
}
float unitCost(void)(
return(bO+bIltc[id).qe)/c[id I.qe;
}
float expectcdPrice(float p, float pe)(
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATEltp +(1-RATE)1t pe;
return newPrice;
)
float supply(float p, int id)(
float q;
q=20+a[id).coef[l) + (O.S+a[id).coef[O» It p ;
return q;
}
int main(int argc,char Itargv(])(
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far "'mpointer;
FILE "'JpA, ItlpProfit, "'lpData, ItlpNetProfit, "fp, ")pProfitData, ")pTcmp;
float aI, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfitl =0, round Profit, tota1Quantily;
char fname[l2],fid[4],ltweightFiJe(16), ch;
longpos;
float now[8],now1[8];
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
float JastProfit, deltaProfit;
long endPosition;
mpointer = MK_FPCOxOOOO,OxOleO);
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
al=a2=a3=0;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O), mpointer[l]);
b=MK_FP(mpointer[2], mpointer[3]);
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4], mpointer[5]);
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6], mpointer[7»;
IpTrades=MK_FP(mpointer[8], mpointer[9»;
ifCarge > 0)
id=atoi(argv[l »;
if( a[id].wealth < 0) (
c[id].pe=e[id].p=c[id).qe=c[id].q=O;
b->produeers-;
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a(id).active=O;
return 0;
}
fit ...... noise values are constant throughout the simulation .... /
bO += a(id).coef[1);
bI += a[id).coef(O] ;
IpProfit=makeFile(ltpOO",argv[II,".xltit);
if(b->time==1 && b->period==1 && b->round==l); / /initialization
else (
fseek(lpProfit,ftell(lpProfitHl0+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END);/ /
fscanf(lpProfit,It%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfit);
fseek(lpProfi t,SEEI<_CUR,SEEI<_END);
if(b->time==l){
periodProfitl=periodProfi t;
}
if(b->time==2) (
newSales=sold=periodProfi t=O;
}
newSales = (c[id).qe == c[id).q )? 0: c[idl.qe-c(idl.q-sold;
sold += newSales;
profit= ( fabs(newSales ... (c[id).p - unitCostO» < 0.01 )? 0: newSalcs" (e[ id I.p -
unitCost(});
periodProfit += profit;
roundProfit += profi t;
)
fprintf(lpProfit,It%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\t%#10.4f\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
«b->time ==1)? 5: b->time-l), c[idl.pe, c[id].p, c(idl.qe, didl.q, sold,
profit ,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit);
IpTemp=makeFile(ltwealth",argv[I J,".xlt");
fprintf(lpTemp,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\nlt,b->round,b->period,b->time, id, aridl.wealth);
fdose(lpTemp);/ /
if(b->time!= I){
timeCriteria=(float) (b->maxt-b->time)/b->maxt;
qCriteria= (float) (c[idl.qe - c[idl.q)/c[id).qe;
/ / qCriteria is I if no goods have been purchased since the start of the period
if(timeCriteria >= 0.5 && qCriteria >= 0.5)
c[id).p "'= 1.05; / / increase price if all sold early
if(timeCriteria < 0.5 && qCriteria < 0.5)
c(idJ.p "'=0.95;
c[idJ.p = (c[idJ.p > bl)? c[idJ.p: bI; / / use marginal cost
retumO;
) / / if price != 1 price adjustment
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==1 && b->round==1);
else (
if(b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round ==1 )(
deltaProfit=O;
IpProfit=makeFile(ltdatpO",argv[II,It.xlt");
fprintf(lpProfit,"%I0.2f\ t%10.2f\n",del taProfit,periodProfi t1);
-_._.- -'.- - ~---------~.. - -- ~._---- -
fclose(lpProfi t);
lastProfit=periodProfitl;
}
else(
IpProfit=makeFile("datpO",argv[l),".xlt");
endPosition=ftell(lpProfit) -12;
fseek(lpProfit,endPosition , SEEK_END);II
fscanf(lpProfit,"%f",&lastProfit);
fseek(lpProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
deltaProfit=(periodProfitl -lastProfit);
fprintf(lpProfit,"%10.2f\t %10.2f\n", del taProfit, periodProfi t1);
fclose(lpProfit);
}
q = (c[id).q < c[id).qe· 0.02) ? c[id).qe·1.08 : ( c[id).q > c[id).qe • 0.05 ) ? c[ id I.qe .. 0.95 :
c[id).qe;
q =( q > O)? q : 100;
} I I end of else
if(b->time==l) (
c[id).pe=c[id).p=d->periodpl • 1.1;
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=30;
if(cost(q) > a[id).wealth) printf("·");
c[id).q=(cost(q) <= a[id).wealth && afid).wealth >= O)? q: (alid).wcn!th >O)?
a[id).wealth/unitCostO: 0;
a[id).wealth -= cost(c[id).q);
c[id).qe=c[id).q;
}lltime==l
return 0;
}
I lend psS.cI·························· ··· · ·..·..···· ···· /
Ilnett.c
I I 7/3/92 see line 18 before eompling
#inc\ude <stdio.h>
#inc\ude <float.h>
#inc\ude <stdlib.h>
#inc\ude <time.h>
#inc\ude <math.h>
#inc\ude <stdarg.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include "dim2.e"
#include "sig.e"
#include "scale.e"
#inc\ude "shuffle.e"
#define LEARNING_RATE 0.10
#define RAND_RANGE 0.1
#define MAX_ROWS 500 /1 use 500 to compile nctt3 and 100 for agents
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#define ranO ( (random(20000) > 10000)? (float)
RAND_RANGE"random(RAND_MAX)jRAND_MAX :(float) -
RAND_RANGE"random(RAND_MAX)jRAND_MAX)
double sigmoid(double);
double hTan(double);
double ihTan(double);
float ....dataIn, ....dataOUt, ....w12, ·"w23;
float"sum:sumOUt"dOUt"dh;
FILE "lpWeights,"lpOut;
int"who;
float "dataInMax, ·dataInMin, "dataOUtMax, "dataOutMin, "scaleln, *scaleOut;
void netset(float ....w12, float ....w23,int in,int hidden,int out){
int i, j;
randomizeO;
for(i=l;i<l000;i++) randO; j jexercize random number generator
for(i=O;i<=in;i++)(
for(j=O; j<hidden ; j++) w12[iUj] = (float) ranO;
)
for(i=O;i<=hidden;i++) (
for(j=O; j<out ; j++) w23[i][jI = (float) ran();
)
void printm(float ....x,int rows,int cols){
int i, j;
for(i=O;i<rows;i++)(
for(j=O;j<cols;j++) printf("%f\ t", x[i][j));
printf("\n");
int countRows(FILE "fp){
int rows=0,r1;
char line[256J;
rewind(fp);
whiJe(fgets()ine,256,fp» rows++; Ilcount the lines in the file
rewind(fp);
if(rows>MAX_ROWS)( Iladd 6/3/92 to read only most recent MAX_ROW lines
r1 =rows-MAX_ROWS;
while (r1- >0) fgets(1ine,256,fp);
rows=MAX_ROWS;
)
return rows;
)
int readData(FILE ·fp, int rows,int inputs,int outputs){
int i,j;
/1 Dimension the input and out matrices
dataIn =dim2(rows,inputs,sizcof(f1oa t»;
-"""---_..... - ...-.-'---' .. - ._._._-
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dataOut=dim2(rows,outputs,sizeof(float»;
/ / Read the training and recall data
for(i=O;i<rows;i++)(
for(j=O;j<inputs;j++) fscanf(fp,"%f', &dataln[i][j»;
for(j=O;j<outputs~++) fscanf(fp,"%f', &dataOut[i][jl);
}
fseek(fp,SEEK_CUR,sEEK_END);
retumO;
int readWeights(FILE "lpWeights,float ....w12, float ....w23, int inputs, int outputs, int hidden){
int i ,j;
/ / Read Historical minimum and maximum for all inputs and outputs
for(j=O~<inputs~++) fscanf(lpWeights,"%f ", &datalnMin[jl);
for(j=O;j<inputs;j++) fscanf(lpWeights,"%f ", &dataInMax[j»;
for(j=O~<outputs;j++) fscanf(lpWeights,"%f ", &dataOutMin[jl);
for(j=O;j<outputs;j++) fscanf(lpWeights,"%f ", &dataOutMax[jl);
for(i=O;i<=inputs;i++)(
for(j=O; j<hidden ; j++) fscanf(lpWeights,"%f ",&w12[i][j]);
}
for(i=O;i<=hidden;i++) (
for(j=O; j<outputs ; j++) fscanfOpWeights,"%f ", &w23[i}(jl);
}
int allocateMemory(int hidden,int outputs,int inputs){
fit Set up memory for the net /
sum= (float*) cal1oc(hidden,sizeof(float»;
if(!sum){
fprintf(stderr,"error al10cating memory for hidden layer\n");
exit(1);
}
sumOut= (float*) cal1oc(outputs,sizeof(float»;
if(!sumOut){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating output layer\n");
exit(l);
}
dh= (float*) cal1oc(hidden,sizeof(float»;
if(!dh)(
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating memory for hidden layer dh\n");
exit(l);
}
dOut= (float") calloc(outputs,sizeof(float»;
if(!dOut)(
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating output layer dOut\n tl);
exit(l);
}
datalnMax= (float*) cal1oc(inputs,sizeof(float»;
if(!dataInMax)(
fprintf(stderr,"error al10cating dataInMax\n tl );
exit(l);
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}
dataInMin= (float"') calloc(inputs,sizeof(float»;
if(ldataInMin){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating dataInMin\n");
exit(l);
}
dataOutMax= (floar) calloc(outputs,sizeof(float»;
if<!dataOutMax){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating dataOutMax\n");
exit(l);
}
dataOutMin= (floar) calloc(outputs,sizeof(float»;
if(ldataOutMin){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating dataOutMin\n");
exit(l);
}
scaleIn= (float"") calloc(inputs,sizeof(float»;
if<!scaleln)(
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating scaleIn\n");
exit(l);
}
scaleOut= (float"") calloc(outputs,sizeof(float»;
if<!scaleOut)(
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating scaleOut\n");
exit(l);
}
return 0;
}
int forwardPass(int hidden,int outputs, int inputs, float *in/float **w12, float **w23,dollble (..
fune) (double) )(
int i,j;
for(i=O;i<hidden;i++)(
sum[i)=w12[O][i);
for(j=O;j<inputs;j++) sum[i] += w12[j+1][i]*in[j];
sum[i)=("'func) (sum[i]);
}
for(i=O;i<outputs;i++)(
sumOut[i]=w23[0][i];
for(j=O;j<hidden;j++) sumOut(i] += w231j+1JIi]*sumlj];
sumOut[i]=("'func) (sumOutli»;
}
return 0;
}
int adjustWeights(int hidden,int outputs,int inputs,int k,float "*w12,£lont ....w23, double (.. dillnc)
(double»
(
int i,j;
float rate=LEARNING_RATE,dHid;
for(i=O;i<ou tputs;i++) (
dOut[i]= (dataOutlk)[i]-sumOut[i) ) '" «"'dfunc) (sumOut(i») ; / / general
w23[O)[i] += dOut[i)"'rate;
for(j=l;j<hidden+ I~++)
w23[j)[i] += dOut[i) '" sum[j-I) "'rate;
)
/ / adjust weights from input layer to hidden layer
for(i=O;i<hidden;i++ )(
dHid=O;
for(j=O~<ou tputs;j++)
dHid += dOut[jI"'w23[i+1)[j];
dh[i]= «It dfund (sum[i))) It dHid It rate;
wl2[O)[i] += dh[i);
for(j=l;j<inputs+ I;j++)
w12[j][i] += dh[i] It dataIn[k)[j-l J;
}
return 0;
int restoreScale(FILE "'lpOut,int outputs,int k,double (.. fune) (double) J(
float spread;
int i,j;
for(j=O~<outputs;j++ )(
spread= dataOutMax[j]-dataOutMin[j);
if(spread==O)
fprintf(lpOut,"%#8.4f\t%#8.4f\t", dataOutMax, sumOut[O»;
else
fprintf(lpOut,"%#8.4f\t%#8.4f\n",
(dataOut[k][j)+1)1t spread/2+ dataOutMinlj), (sumOutljJ+1)" sprend /2+
dataOutMin[j] );
)
return 0;
saveWeights(FILE ItlpWeights,int inputs,int outputs,int hidden,tloat .... w12, float .... w23){
int i,j;
rewind(lpWeights);
/ / Save Historical minimum and maximum for all inputs and outputs
for(j=O~<inputs;j++)fprintf(l pWeights,"%f\ t", dataInMin[j»;
fprintf(lpWeights,"\n");
for(j=O~<inputs~++) fprintf(lpWeights,"%f\t", dataInMaxlj]);
fprintf(lpWeights,"\n");
for(j=O~<outputs~++) fprintf(lpWeights,"%f\t", dataOutMinlj]);
fprintf(lpWeights,"\n");
for(j=O~<outputs;j++) fprintf(lpWeights,"%f\t", dataOutMax[jI);
fprintf(lpWeights,"\n");
/ / Save Weights
for(i=O;i<=inputs;i++)(
for(j=O; j<hidden ; j++) fprintf(lpWeights,"%f\t",w12[i][j»;
fprintf(lpWeights,"\n");
}
for(i=O;i<=hidden;i++){
------ -_.-- ----_._---
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for(j=O; j<outputs ; j++) fprintf(lpWeights,"%f\t", w23[i][j));
fprintf(lpWeights,"\n");
)
fclose(lpWeights);
retumO;
}
getWeights(char weightFile[l6),int hidden,int inputs,int outputs,float ltltw12,float **\\'23)(
int initialize,j;
struct ffblk ffblk;
initialize=( findfirst(weightFile,&ffblk,O) )? 0: 1;
if(initialize == 0)(
netset(w12, w23, inputs, hidden, outputs);
if« IpWeights = fopen(weightFile, "w+t"» == NULL){
fprintf(stderr, "Can't open weight file 1 %s \n",weightFile);
exit(l);
}
for(j=O;j<inputs~++)
datalnMax[j)=datalnMin[j)=dataln[O)rj);
for(j=O~<outputs;j++)
dataOutMax[j)=dataOutMin[j)=dataOut[O)[j);
}
I I Open existing weight file.
else (
if« IpWeights = fopen(weightFile, "rH"» == NULL){
fprintf(stderr, "Can't open weight file 2 %s \n",weightFilc);
exit(l);
}
readWeights(lpWeights, w12, w23, inputs, outputs, hidden);
) I I end of else, done setting I getting weights
retumO;
int train(int maxIter,int inputs, int outputs, int rows, int hidden, flont **\\'12, f10a t *"w2J, f10a t
*"in, double (... func) (double), double (... dfunc) (double) )(
int i,k,l,iter;
for(iter=O; iter<maxIter; iter++)(
shuffle(rows,who);
for(k=O;k<rows;k++)( r for each row of data'"I
l=who[k];
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, in[l], w12, w23, (* func) );
adjustWeights(hidden, outputs, inputs, I, w12, w23, (II- dfunc»;) I .........end of k loop ........1
) I'" end oHter loop'"I
retumO;
}
int trainNet<int inputs,int hidden,int outputs,int iterations,int rows,FILE II-lpDa ta,chnr
weightFile[l6)(
int i,j,k;
allocateMemory(hidden,outputs,inputs);
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w12=dim2(inputs+l,hidden,sizeof(float»;
w23=dim2(hidden+l,outputs,sizeof(float»;
readData(lpData,rows,inputs,outputs); / treads data
getWeights(weightFile,hidden, inputs, outputs, w12, w23);
for(j=O;j<inputs~++ )(
datalnMin[j)=(datalnMin[jl <= dataln[rows-l][j»? datalnMin[j] : dataln[rows-l Ujl;
datalnMax[j)=(datalnMax[j] >= dataln[rows-l][j])? datalnMax[jl : dataln[rows-l UiI;
}
for(j=O~<ou tputs;j++){
dataOutMin[j]=(dataOutMin[j] < dataOut[rows-l][j])? dataOutMinljl : dataOutlrows-l][jl;
dataOutMax[j)=(dataOutMax[jl > dataOut[rows-l][jD? dataOutMaxljl : dataOutlrows-
l][j);
}
for(i=O;i<rows;i++)(
for(j=O~<inputs;j++) dataln[i][j]= scaJe(dataln[i][j»;
for(j=O~<outputs;j++) dataOut[i][jl= scale(dataOut[iJ[j»;
}
who= (float"') calloc(rows+1,sizeof(int»;
if<!who){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating memory for hidden Iayer\n");
exit(l);
}
for(i=O;i<rows;i++) who[i]=i;
train(iterations, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden, w12, w23, dataln, sigmoid, dhSig );
saveWeights(lpWeights,inputs,outputs,hidden, w12, w23);
retornO;
} / / end of trainNet
int main(int argc,char "argv[]){
int i,j,k, maxi, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden_elements,iterations,initiaJizc,hidden;
FILE "fp,"lpNetProfit;
char weightFilel16],fid[4],fname(16];
float "inDatPointer, inDat1[6];
if( argc<2 )(
printf("syntax: net2 data.dat initialize ID# iteration hidden_elements\n");
exit(l);
}
if« fp= fopen(argv[l], "r"» == NULL){
fprintf(stderr, "Can't open file %s\n",argv/1]);
exit(l);
}
initialize=atoi(argv[2»;
maxi=atoi(argv[3]);
iterations=atoi(argv[4»;
hidden=hidden_elements=atoi(argv(5]);
strcpy(weightFile,"wOO");
strcpy(fid,argv[3]);
strcat(weightFile,fid);
strcat(weightFile,".txt");
inputs=6;
outputs=l;
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rows=Oj
rows = countRows(fp)i
rcadData(fp,rows,inputs,outputS)i /Ireads data and scales into O<x<=l range
w12=dim2(inputs+I,hidden,sizeof(float»j
w23=dim2(hidden+I,outputs,sizeof(float»i
getWeights(weightFile,hidden, inputs, outputs, wI2, w23, initialize);
allocateMemory(hidden, outputs, inputs)i
who= (float"') calloc(rows+I,sizeof(int»i
if(!who){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating memory for hidden layer\n lt);
exit(1)i
}
for(i=O;i<rowsii++) who[i]=ii
train(iterations, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden, w12, w23, dataln,hTan»;
if« lpOut = fopen("netout.xItIt, Ita+tlt»== NULL){
fprintf(stderr, ItCan't open netout file \n lt);
exit(1)i
}
for(k=Oik<rowsik++){ Irt for each row of data rtI
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, dataln[k], wI2, w23,hTan); / /eomputc net output
restoreScale(lpOut, outputs, k, hTan)i
}Irtrtrt end of k loop rtrtI
saveWeights(lpWeights,inputs,outputs,hidden, w12, w23);
free2(w12)i
free2(w23)i
return OJ
} I I end nett.c
Ilsig.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
double sigmoid(double x){
int oldstatus,newstatusi
asm{
fldl2ei
fmul qword ptr Xi
fchs;
fstcw oldstatusi
fstew newstatusi
and newstatus,Of3ffh;
or newstatus,OOcOOhi
fwaiti
fldcw newstatus;
fld sti
fmdinti
fldcw oldstatusi
fsubr st,st(1);
f2xrn1;
f1d1;
faddp st(1),5t;
fscale;
ffree st(1);
f1d1;
fadd;
f1d1;
fdiv st,st(1);
fstp qword ptr x;
ffree st;
)
return x;
)
double hTanScale(double x)(
int oldstatus,newstatus;
double scale=O.OOOO3;
asrn{
fstew oldstatus;
fstew newstatus;
and newstatus,Of3ffh;
or newsta tus,OOcOOh;
fwait;
f1dew newstatus;
f1dI2e;
frnul qword ptr x;
fmul qword ptr scale;
fld st;
frndint;
fsubr st,st(1);
fld st
f2xrn1;
fldl;
fadd
fxeh st(1)
finestp
fscale;
fxeh
fehs
fdecstp
fchs
f2xrnl;
fldl;
fadd
fseale;
fxeh
ffree st
fincstp
fld st
fxch st(2)
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fadd st(l),st
fsub st,st(2)
fdivr
fstp qword ptr x;
ffree st
fldewoldstatus;
}
retumx;
}
double hTan(double x){
int oldstatus,newstatus;
asm(
fstew oldstatus;
fstew newstatus;
and newstatus,Of3ffh;
or newstatus,DOcOOh;
fwait;
fldew newstatus;
fldl2e;
fmul qword ptr X;
fld st;
fmdint;
fsubr st,st(l);
fld st
f2xml;
fldl;
fadd
fxeh st(l)
finestp
fscale;
fxeh
fehs
fdecstp
fehs
f2xml;
fldl;
fadd
fscale;
fxch
ffree st
finestp
fld st
fxeh st(2)
fadd st(l),st
fsub st,st(2)
fdivr
fstp qword ptr X;
ffree st
fldcwoldstatus;
}
retum x;
-"'"'--- - ----- ----------
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double dhTan(double x)(
asm(
fld1
fld st
fld qword ptr x
fadd st(1 ),st
fsubr st,st(2)
fmul
fstp qword ptr x
ffree st
)
return x;
}
double dhSig(double x)(
asm(
fld1
fld qword ptr x
fsub st(1 ),st
fmul
fstp qword ptr x
ffree st
)
return x;
}
float hTans(float x)(
float ep,em;
float scale=O.OOOO3:
ep=exp(x"scale)i
em=exp(-x"scale);
x=«ep-em)/(ep+em);
return Xi
)
double ihTan(double x)(
double unscale=16666.667; / / unscale=O.5/0.00003
if (x==1) return 100000:
asm(
fld1
fld st
fld qword ptr x
fadd st(l),st
fsubr st,st(2)
fdiv
fldln2
fxch st(1)
fyl2x
fmul qword ptr unscale
------ - -~.~ - . _.- ~._~.
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fstp qword ptr x
ffree st
}
return Xi
} , 'end sig.c, ,
, .. scale.c
.. scales the input into the range -1 < scale(x) < 1
.. unscale reverses the scaling
.. The amount of scaling is controled by the factor SCALE_FACTOR
..,
#inc1ude <stdio.h>
#inc1ude <math.h>
#inc1ude <float.h>
#inc1ude <stdlib.h>
#define SCALE_FACTOR 20.0
#define LINEAR_SCALE_FACTOR 0.0001
#define LINEAR_UNSCALE_FACTOR 10000
#define SHIFCFACTOR 10000
extern float"datalnMax, "datalnMin, "dataOutMax, *dataOutMin, "scalcln, *scalcOut;
double linearScale(double x)[
double scale = LINEAR_SCALE_FACTOR;
asm(
fld scale
fmul x
fstp x
}
return Xi
}
double linearUnscale(double x)(
double scale =LINEAR_UNSCALE]ACTOR;
asm(
fld scale
fmul x
fstp x
}
return Xi
}
double scale(double x)(
double sx,shift;
sx=l'SCALE_FACTOR;
if(x==O) return -1.0;
asm fld sx
asm fld x
asm fyl2x
asm fstpsx
---_. -_._._.----- ....•..- ----
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retumsx;
}
double unScale(double x){
double sx=SCALE_FACfOR,shift=SHIFf_FACTOR;
unsigned int ewl,ew;
if(x==O) return 1;
if(x==-1.0) return ;
asmfstewew
asm fstew ewl
asm and ew,Oxf3ff
asm or ew,Ox0400
asmfldewew
asm fld x
asm fld sx
asmfmul
asm fld st(O)
asm fld st(O)
asmfmdint
asm fldew ewl
asmfsub
asmf2xml
asm fldl
asmfadd
asm fscale
asm fstpsx
asm ffree st(O)
sx=(x >= O)? sx : sx"0.5;
return sx;
}
int scale2(int rows,int inputs,int outputs,float ....dataln,float ....dataOut){
int i,j;
float spread,shift;
for(j=O;j<inputs;j++)(
spread=datalnMax[H-datalnMin[j];
if( spread==o)
for(i=O;i<rows;i++) dataln[i][j]=O;
else{
shift= -3 - (6/spread)"datalnMin[j];
for(i=O;i<rows;i++) dataln[i][j] = shift + 6.0/sprcad" datalnlilljl;
}
}
for(j=O~<ou tputs;j++)(
spread=dataOutMax[j]-da taOutMin[j);
if( spread==O)
for(i=O;i<rows;i++) dataOut[i][j]=O;
else{
shift= -1 - (2/spread)"dataOutMin[j];
for(i=O;i<rows;i++) dataOut[i][j]= shift + 2.0/sprcad" datnOut!illjl;
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}
return 0;
}1lend scale
int scalet(int inputs, float "now){
int j;
f1oa~ spread,shift;
for(j=O;j<inputs~++)(
spread=dataInMax[j)-dataInMin[j);
if( spread==O)
now[j)=O;
else{
shift= -3 - (6/spread)"dataInMin[j);
now[j) = shift + 6.0/spread .. now[j);
}
)
return 0;
) I"end scalet"l
float scaleD(fIoat x,int j){
float spread,shift;
spread=dataInMax[j)-dataInMin[j);
if( spread==O) x=O;
else{
shift= -3 - (6/spread)"dataInMin[j);
x = shift + 6.01spread" x;
}
return x;
) 1lend scale.eI / / / nctl3.c for training
network without participating in market
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include <signaI.h>
#include <£loat.h>
#include <string.h>
#include ''bb.h''
#indude "nett-e"
#indude "utiI.e"
#define RATE 0.5
float w=0,bO=10,bl=5;
float eost(float q){
return bl .. q ;
--"-_..- ..--- --._----_..
float expectedPrice(float p, float pe){
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATE"p +(l-RATE)" pe;
return newPrice;
}
float supply(float p, int id){
floatq;
q = 1.()*(p-bl);
return c[id].qe+q;
}
int main(int argc,ehar "argv[))(
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far "mpointer;
FILE "lpA, "lpProfit, "lpData, "lpNetProfit, Itfp, ItlpProfitData, ItlpTemp;
float aI, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfit1=O, roundProfit,totalQuantity;
char fname[t 2],fid[4],"weightFile[16];
longpos;
float now[B],nowl[B];
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
if(arge > 0)
id=atoi(argv[t»;
iterations=atoi(argv[2»;
iterations=(iterations>l)? iterations: 100;
IpProfit=makeFile("pOO",argv[l],".xltlt);
strepy(weightFile,makeFileName("wOO",argv[1J,1t.txt"»;
fclose(lpProfit);
/ / note that d->cprice is actually total Qe
IpData=makeFile("datOOlt,argv[l ],".xl ttl);
rewind(lpData);
inputs=7;
outputs=l;
hidden=5;
rows = countRows(lpData)-l;
if(rows >0)
trainNet(inputs,hidden,outputs,i terations,rows,1pDa ta, weightFi Ie);
free2(w12);
free2(w23);
free2(dataIn);
free2(dataOut);
free(sum);
free(sumOut);
free(dOut);
free(dh);
-----_ - -_ -_.__.'
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free(who)i
IpProfitData=makeFile("datpO",argv[l],".xlttl)i
rewind(lpProfitData)i
inputs=5.:
outputs=li
hidden=3i
rows = countRows(lpProfitData)i
if( rows >0)(
allocateMemory(hidden,outputs,inputs)i
readData(lpProfitData,rows,inputs,oUtputs)i Ilreads data into dataln and dataOut
w12=dim2(inputs+l,hidden,sizeof(float»i
w23=dim2(hidden+l,outputs,sizeof(float»i
strcpy(weightFile,makeFileName("wpO",argv[l],".txt"»i
getWeights(weightFile,hidden, inputs, outputs, w12, w23)i
for(j=Oij<inputs~++)(
datalnMin[j]=(datalnMin[j} <= dataln[rows-1J[jJ)? datalnMinljl : datalnlrows-l][jl;
datalnMax[j]=(datalnMax[j] >= dataln[rows-1J[jl)? datalnMaxljl : datalnlrows-l Hjl;
}
for(j=Oij<OUtputSij++)(
dataOutMin[j]=(dataOutMin[jl < dataOut[rows-1][j])? dataOutMinljl : dataOut[ rows-l][jl;
dataOutMax[j]=(dataOutMax[j] > dataOut[rows-llfjJ>? dataOutMaxljJ: dataOutlrows-
lUj]i
}
scale2(rows,inputs,outputs,dataln,dataOut)i
who= (float"') calloc(rows+l,sizeof(int»i
if(!who)(
fprintf(stderr,tlerror allocating memory for hidden layer\n");
exit(l)i
}
for(i=Oii<rows;i++) who[i]=i;
train(iterations, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden, w12, w23, dataln,hTan,dhTan);if« lpOut = fopen("netp.xlt", tla+t"» == NULL)(
fprintf(stderr, "Can't open netp file \n")i
exit(l)i
}
for(i=O;i<rows;i++)( I" for each row of data"I
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, dataln(i], w12, w23, hTan); / /compute net output
restoreScale(lpOut, outputs, i, ihTan);
}jot.... end of i loop ....I
fclose(lpOut) i
saveWeights(lpWeights,inputs,outputs,hiddcn, w12, w23);
free2(w12)i
free2(w23)i
free2(dataln)i
free2(dataOut);
free(sum)i
free(sumOut)i
free(dOut)i
free(dh)i
free(who)i
} I I if time ==1
---- ..... - ..._- ..--"
IpData:makeFile("dat$O",argv[l ],".xlttl);
rewind(lpData);
inputs=6;
outputs=l;
hidden=4;
rows = countRows(lpData);
if(rows >0)
strcpy(weightFile,makeFileName("w$O",argv[1 J,".txt"»;
trainNet<inputs,hidden,outputs,iterations,rows,lpData, weightFile);
free2(w12);
free2(w23);
free2(dataln);
free2(dataOuO;
free(sum);
free(sumOut);
free(dOu0;
free(dh);
free(who);
} / / if rows
retornO;
} / / end nett3.c/ /
/ / pnl.c #include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <dir.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <f1oat.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include "nett.c"
#include "util.c"
#define RATE 0.5
float w=0,bO=50,bl=5;
float cost(f1oat q)(
return bO + bl .. q;
}
float unitCost(void)(
return (bO+bl"c[idl.qe)/ c[idl.qe;
}
float expectedPrice(f1oat p, float pe)(
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATE"p +(l-RATE)" pe;
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return newPrice;
)
float supply(float p, int id)(
floatq;
q=20+a(id].coef[l] + (0.5+alid).coef[0J>· p ;
return q;
)
int main(int argc,char ·argv[]){
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far ·mpointer;
FILE ·lpA, ·lpProfit, ·lpData, ·lpNetProfit, ·fp, ·lpProfitData, ·lpTemp;
float aI, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit,periodProfit1=O, roundProfit,totaIQuantity;
char fname[l2),fid[4],·weightFile[l6);
longpos;
float now(6),nowl[6];
int inputs,outpu ts,hidden,rows,itera tions;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tcmpProfit, tcmpQ,spread,shift;
mpointer = MK_FP<oxOOOO,OxOleO>;
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
al=a2=a3=O;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O], mpointer(l»;
b=MK_FP(mpointer[2], mpointer[3]);
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4], mpointer[S»;
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6], mpointer[7»;
IpTrades=MK_FP(mpointer[8], mpointer[9));
if(argc > 0)
id=atoi(argv[l ));
if( a[id].wealth <= 0) {
c[id ].pe=c[id].p=c[id].qe=c[id).q=O;
b->producers-;
a[id].active=O;
return 0;
}
I··.. noise values are constant throughout the simulation·"I
bO += a[id).coef[l] ;
bl += a[id].coef[O] ;
IpProfit=makeFile("pOO",argv[l ),".xlt");
if(b->time==l && b->period==l && b->round==l); /Iinitialization
else (
fseekOpProfit,ftellOpProfit)-(1 0+10+10+10+4),SEEK_END);I I
fscanfOpProfit,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfit);
fseekOpProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
if(b->time==l)(
periodProfit1=periodProfit;
}
if(b->time==2) {
246
.• •
247
newSales=sold=periodProfit=O;
)
newSales = (c[id).qe == c[id).q )? 0 : c[id].qe-c[id].q-sold;
sold += newSalesj
profit: (fabs(newSales It (c[id].p - unitCostO» < 0.01 )? 0: newSales" (c[id].p-
unitCost());
periodProfit += profitj
roundProfit += profitj
)
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\t%#10.4f\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
«b->time ==1)? 5: b->time-1), clid].pe, c[id).p, c[id].qe, c[id).q, sold, profit
,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fclose(lpProfit)j
IpTemp=makeFile("wealth",argv[l],II.xlt");
fprintf(lpTemp,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->time, id, a[id].wcalth);
fclose(lpTemp)j
/ / note that d->cprice is actually total Qe
qxe= d->cprice - c[id).qe;
qxa=d->cprice - d->periodq1 - c[id].q;
qxa=(qxa>=O)? qxa : 0;
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==1 && b->round==l);
else (
if(b->time == 1 )(
IpData=makeFile("datOO",argv[l],".xltil);
if(b->round > b->maxr) (
fprintf(lpData,"%f\n",qxe);
fclose(lpData)j
return 0;
}
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round==l)
fprintf(lpData,"%d \ t%d \ t%d \ t%f\ t%f\ t%f\ t%f\ til,
b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,did ].qe,d id I.q,qxe,qxil);
else
fprintf(lpData,"%f\n%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\t%f\t%f\t%f\t",
qxe,b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,cI id I.ge,d id j.q,qxC,qxil);
rewind(lpData);
inputs=7j
outputs=1;
hidden=5;
iterations=l00;
rows = countRows(lpData)-l;
if(rows >O){
strcpy(weightFile,makeFileName("wOO",argvI1 J,".txt"»;
allocateMemory(hidden,outputs,inputs);
w12=dim2(inputs+1,hidden,sizeof(float»;
w23=dim2(hidden+1,outputs,sizeof(f1oa t»;
readData(lpData,rows,inputs,outputs); / /reads datil
getWeights(weightFile,hidden, inputs, outputs, w12, \\'23);
for(j=O;j<inputs;j++)(
datalnMin[j}=(datalnMin[j) <= datalnlrows-1 lIjl)? datalnMinljl : datalnl rows-1Ujl;
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datalnMax[jJ=(datalnMax[j) >= dataln[rows-l][j])? dataInMax[j] : dataln[rows-l][j];
}
for(j=O~<outputs;j++)(
dataOutMin[j)=(dataOutMin[j] < dataOut[rows-l][jD? dataOutMin[j] :
dataOut[rows-l][j)i
dataOutMax[jJ=(dataOutMax[j) > dataOut[rows-l][jJ)? dataOutMax[j] :
dataOut[rows-l][j)i
}
/ / Scale the data into 0 < x <= 1 range
for(i=O;i<rowsii++)(
for(j=O~<inputsij++) dataIn[i][j]= scale(dataln[i][jJ);
for(j=O~<OUtputsij++) dataOut[i][j]= scale(dataOut[i][jJ);
}
who= (float"') calloc(rows+1,sizeof(int»i
if(!who)(
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating memory for hidden layer\n");
exit(l);
}
for(i=O;i<rowsii++) who[i]=ii
train(iterations, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden, w12, w23, dataln, sigmoid, dhSig );
saveWeights(lpWeights,inputs,outputs,hidden, w12, w23);
} / / end ofrows > 0
if(b->time==l && rows>O){
now[O]=scale(b->producers);
now[l ]=scale(b->consumers)i
now[2]=scale(b->maxt);
now[3]=scale(c[id].qe);
now[4]=scale(c[id].q)i
now[S]=scale(qxe)i
now[6]=scale(qxa)i
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23,sigmoid); / /compute nel output
IpNetProfit=makeFile("qOO",argv[l],".xlt")i
fprintf(lpNetProfit,"%f\t%f\n",unScale(now[S J),unScale(sumOutl 0 j));
fclose(lpNetProfit);
qxe=unScale(sumOut[OJ); / / save the scaled value of projected ott tput by others
free2(w12)i
free2(w23)i
free2(dataln)i
free2(dataOut>;
free(sum);
free(sumOut);
free(dOut)j
free(dh);
free(who);
} / / end of if time==l and rows >0
if(b->time==l&&b->period==l &&b->round==1){
printf("error, this should not happen... \n");
printf("press any key to exit\n")j
getch();
exit (-1);
}
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IpProfitData=makeFile(ldatpOl,argv[l),I.xlt");
fprintf(lpProfitData,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\t%f\t%f\n",
b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,c[id).qe,qxe,periodProfitl);
rewind(lpProfitData);
inputs=5i
outputs=l;
hidden=3;
iterations=lOOi
rows = countRows(lpProfitData);
if( rows >O){
allocateMemory(hidden, outputs,inputs);
readData(lpProfitData,rows,inputs,oUtputs)i / /reads data into dataln and dataOut
w12=dim2(inputs+1,hidden,sizeof(float»;
w23=dim2(hidden+1,outputs,sizeof(float»i
strcpy(weightFile,makeFiIeName(lwpOl,argv[l),tI.txt"»;
getWeights(weightFiIe,hidden, inputs, outputs, w12, w23);
for(j=Oij<inputs~++)(
datalnMin[j)=(datalnMin[j) <= dataln[rows-l][jJ)? datalnMin[j] : datalnlrows-l IIjl;
datalnMax[j]=(datalnMax[j) >= dataln[rows-l][jJ)? datalnMax[j] : datalnlrows-l IIi!;
}
for(j=O~<ou tputs;j++){
dataOutMin[jJ=(dataOutMin[j) < dataOut[rows-l][j))? dataOutMin[jl : dataOutlrows-l HjI;
dataOutMax[j]=(dataOutMax[jJ > dataOut[rows-l][jJ)? dataOutMax[j] : dataOut[rows-
1][j)i
}
scale2(rows,inputs,outputs,dataln,dataOut);
who= (float"') calloc(rows+1,sizeof(int»;
if(!who){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating memory for hidden layer\n");
exit(1)i
}
for(i=O;i<rowsii++) whoU)=i;
train(iterations, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden, w12, w23, dataln,hTan,dhTan);
j't this compares actual and estimated output
if« IpOut = fopen(tlnetp.xlt", "a+t"» == NULL){
fprintf(stderr, "Can't open netp file \ntl);
exit(l)i
}
for(i=O;i<rows;i++){ j't for each row of data"/
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, dataln[i), w12, w23, hTan); / /computc net
output
restoreScale(lpOut, outputs, i, ihTan);
}j't.... end of i loop ..../
fc1ose(lpOut)i
saveWeights(lpWeights,inputs,outputs,hidden, w12, w23);
} / / end of else ie rows> 0
if(b->time==1 && rows>O){
now[O)=b->producers;
now[l )=b->consumers;
now[2)=b->maxt;
now[3)=cUd).qe;
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now[4]=qxe; / / qxe is the projected quantity produced by others in the next period
scale1(inputs,now)j
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23, hTan); Ilcompute net output
IpNetProfit=makeFile("p1O",argv[t],".xlt") j
spread= dataOutMax[O]-dataOutMin[Ol;
maxProfit=(sumOut[O]+1)'" spread/2+ dataOutMin[O];
optimumQ=c[id).qe;
for (i=Oji<100ji++)(
ternpQ=c[id].qe - 50+i;
if(tempQ>O)( / /insist on positive quantities
now[3]=(float) scaleO(tempQ,3);
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23, hTan); I Icompute net output
spread= dataOutMax[O)-dataOutMin[O);
tempProfit=(sumOut[O)+U'" spread/2+ dataOutMin[O];
if(tempProfit >= maxProfit)(
maxProfit=tempProfi t;
optimumQ=tempQ;
}
}/ / if tempQ>O
} / / for i<200
fprintf(lpNetProfit,"%f\t%f\n",maxProfit,optimumQ);
fclose(lpNetProfit);
free2(wI2);
free2(w23)j
free2(dataln);
free2(dataOut);
free(sum)j
free(sumOut)j
free(dOut)j
free(dh);
free(who)j
} / I if time ==1
J / I if time == 1
JI I end else
if(b->time!= I){
c[id).p= (d->periodp+c[id).pe)/2j I Itest 11-23-92
c[id].p = (c[id).p > bU? c[id).p: bI; I Iprice at marginal cost or above
}lltime !=1
if(b->time==l) (
c[id).pe=expectedPrice(c[id).p,c[id).pe);
q=optimumQj / / for feeding in expecd quantity
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=supply(c[id).qe,id);
if(cost(q) > a[id).wealth) printH""''');
c[id].q=(cost(q) <= alid).wealth && a[id).wealth >= 0 )?
q : (a[id].wealth >O)? a[id).wealth/unitCostO : 0;
a[id).wealth -= cost(c[id).q);
c[id).qe=c[id).q;
Jlltime==1
return 0;
} I lend pn1.c/ / I /
/ /pn2.c 7/21/92
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <dos.h>
#incluJe <dir.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "bb.h"
#include "nett.c"
#include "util.c"
#define RATE 0.5
float w=0,bO=50,bl=5;
float cost(float q){
return bO + bl '" q ;
)
float unitCost(void){
return(bO+b1"'c[id ).qe)/ c[id I.qe;
I
float expectedPrice(float p, float pe){
float newPrice;
newPrice= RATE"'p +(1-RATE)'" pe;
return newPrice;
)
float supply(float p, int id){
floatq;
q=20+a[id).coef[l 1+ (O.S+a[id).coef[OJ> '" p;
return q;
)
int main(int argc,char "'argv[])[
int i,j, adjust;
float timeCriteria, qCriteria, q, sold=O, newSales=O;
unsigned far "'mpointer;
FILE "'lpA, "'lpProfit, "'lpData, "'lpNetProfit, "'fp, "'lpProfitData, "'lpTemp;
float aI, a2, a3, profit, periodProfit=O,periodProfit1=O, roundProfit=O,totalQuantity=O;
char fname(12),fid[4],"'weightFile[16I;
longpos;
float now[8],now1[8];
int inputs,outputs,hidden,rows,iterations;
float qxe,qxa,maxProfit, optimumQ, tempProfit, tempQ,spread,shift;
mpointer = MK_FP(OxOOOO,OxOleO);
signal(SIGFPE,Catcher);
al=a2=a3=O;
a=MK_FP(mpointer[O], mpointer[l»;
--_. _..,-- .._--- ..... "-"'-'-'--
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b=MI<_FP(mpointer[2), mpointer[3])i
c=MK_FP(mpointer[4), mpointer[5]);
d=MK_FP(mpointer[6), mpointer[7]);
IpTrades=MI<_FP(mpointer[8), mpointer[9]);
if(argc > 0)
id=atoi(argv[l ])i
if( a[id).wealth <= 0) {
c[id).pe=c[id).p=c[id).qe=c[id).q=O;
b->producers-i
a[id).active=Oi
retomOi
}
j ...... noise values are constant throughout the simulation ..../
bO += a[id).coef[l) i
bl += a[id).coef[O) ;
IpProfit=makeFile("pOO",argv[I),".xlt");
if(b->time==1 && b->period==1 && b->round==l); / /initialization
else (
fseekOpProfit,ftellOpProfit)-(lO+10+10+1O+4),SEEK_END);/ /
fscanfOpProfit,"%f %f %f %f',&sold,&profit,&periodProfit,&roundProfit);
fseekOpProfit,SEEK_CUR,SEEK_END);
if(b->time==l){
periodProfitl=periodProfit;
}
if(b->time==2) {
newSales:sold=periodProfit=O;
}
newSales = (c[id).qe == c[id).q )? 0 : c[id).qe-c[id).q-sold;
sold += newSalesi
profit= ( fabs(newSales II- (c[id).p - unitCostO» < 0.01 )? 0: newSillcs" eel id I.p - unilCost();
periodProfit += profiti
roundProfit += profit;
}
fprintf(lpProfit,"%d\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#6.4f\t%#8.4f\t%#10.4f\t%#10.2f\t%#10.2f
\n",
«b->time ==l)? 5: b->tirne-l), c[id).pe, c[id).p, c[id).qe, c[idl.q, sold, profit
,periodProfit,roundProfit);
fc1oseOpProfi Oi
IpTemp=rnakeFile("wealth",argv[II,".xlt");
fprintfOpTernp,"%d\t%d\ t%d\t%d\t%f\n",b->round,b->period,b->till1c, id, al id I. \\,(.'<llth);
fcloseOpTernp);
/ / note that d->cprice is actually total Qe
qxe= d->cprice - c[id).qe;
qxa=d->cprice - d->periodql - c[id).q;
qxa=(qxa>=O)? qxa : Oi
ifCb->time == I && b->period ==1 && b->round==l); / /skip opening
else (
if(b->time == 1 )(
IpData=rnakeFile("datOO",argvf1 ),".xl t");
if<b->round > b->rnaxr) (
fprintfOpData,"%f\n",qxe);
fclose(lpData);
return 0;
)
if (b->time == 1 && b->period ==2 && b->round==1)
fprintf(lpData,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\t%f\t%f\t%f\t",
b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,c[id).qe,c[id).q,qxe,qxa);
else
fprintf(lpData,"%f\n%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%f\ t%f\ t%f\ t%f\ t",
qxe,b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,c[id).qe,c[id).q,qxe,qxa);
rewind(lpData);
inputs=7;
outputs=l;
hidden=5;
iterations=l00;
rows = countRows(lpData)-1;
if(rows >0)(
strcpy(weightFile,makeFileName("wOO",argv[1),II.txtil»;
trainNet<inputs,hidden,outputs,iterations,rows,lpData, weightFile);
)
if(b->time==l && rows>O)(
now[O)=scale(b->producers);
now[l )=scale(b->consumers);
now[2]=scale(b->maxt);
now[3]=scale(c[id].qe);
now[4]=scale(c[id).q);
now[5]=scale(qxe);
now[6]=scale(qxa);
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23,sigmoid); / /compule net output
qxe=unScale(sumOut[O»; / / save the scaled value of projected output by others
free2(w12);
free2(w23);
free2(dataIn);
free2(dataOut);
free(sum);
free(sumOut);
free(dOut);
free(dh);
free(who);
) / / end of if time==1 and rows >0
if(b->time==1&&b->period==1&&b->round==1)(
printf("error, this should not happen... \n");
printf("press any key to exit\n");
getch();
exit (-1);
)
if(b->time==1)(
IpProfitData=makeFile("datpO",argv[1),".xl t");
fprintf(lpProfitData,"%d\ t%d\ t%d \t%f\t%f\ t%f\n",
b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,c[id ).qe,qxe,periodProfi t1);
rewind(lpProfitData);
inputs=5;
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outputs=1;
hidden=3;
iterations=100;
rows = countRows(lpProfitData);
if( rows >O){
allocateMemory(hidden, outputs,inputs);
readData(lpProfitData,rows,inputs,outputs); / treads data into dataln and dataOut
w12=dirn2(inputs+1,hidden,sizeof(fIoat»;
w23=dirn2(hidden+1,outputs,sizeof(float»;
strcpy(weightFile,makeFileName("wpO",argv[1],".tx til»;
getWeights(weightFile,hidden, inputs, outputs, w12, w23);
for(j=O;j<inputs~++ )(
dataInMin[jl=(dataInMin[jl <= dataIn[rows-1][j])? dataInMin[j) : dataIn[rows-1 Hjl;
dataInMax[j]=(dataInMax[j] >= dataIn[rows-1][jl)? dataInMax[j) : dataln[rows-1][j);
}
for(j=O~<ou tputs;j++)(
dataOutMin[j]=(dataOutMin[j] < dataOu t[rows-1 ][jJ)? dataOutMin[ jl : da taOu t[ rows-
1][j];
1][j];
dataOutMax[jl=(dataOutMax[j] > dataOut[rows-1][jJ>? dataOutMaxljl : dataOutlrows-
}
scale2(rows,inputs,outputs,dataIn,dataOut);
who= (floor") calloc(rows+1,sizeof(int»;
iWwho){
fprintf(stderr,"error allocating memory for hidden layer\n");
exit(t);
}
for(i=O;i<rows;i++) who[i]=i;
train(iterations, inputs, outputs, rows, hidden, w12, w23, dataln,hTan,dhTan);
saveWeights(lpWeights,inputs,outputs,hidden, w12, w23);
} / / end of else ie rows> 0
}
if(b->time==1 && rows>O){
now[O]=b->producers;
now[1 ]=b->consumers;
now[2]=b->maxt;
now[3]=c[id].qe;
now[4]=qxe; / / qxe is the projected quantity produced by others in the next period
scale1 (inputs,now);
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23, hTan); / /compule nel oUlpul
IpNetProfit=makeFile("p10",argv[1],".xlt");
spread= dataOutMax[O]-dataOutMin[O];
maxProfit=(sumOut[O]+1)* spread/2+ dataOutMin[O];
optimumQ=c[id].qe;
for (i=O;i<100;i++){
tempQ=c[id].qe - SO+i;
if(tempQ>O){ / /insist on positive quantities
now[3]=(fIoat) scaleO(tempQ,3);
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23, hTan); / /computc net output
spread= dataOutMax[O]-dataOutMin[O];
tempProfit=(sumOut[OI+1)* spread/2+ dataOutMinlOJ;
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if(tempProfit >= maxProfit)(
maxProfit=tempProfi t;
optimumQ=tempQ;
}
}I I if tempQ>O
} I I for i<200
fprintf(lpNetProfit,"%f\t%f\n",maxProfit,optimumQ);
fc1ose(lpNetProfit);
free2(wI2);
free2(w23);
free2(dataln)i
free2(dataOut);
free(sum);
free(sumOut);
free(dOut);
free(dh)i
free(who);
} I I if time ==1
) I I if time == 1
} I I end else
if(b->time != 1){
clid].p= (d->periodp+c(id].pe)/2; / /test 11/23/92
clid].p = (c[id].p > bt)? c[id].p: bl; /Iusing marginal cost
}lltime !=1
if(b->time==t) (
if( ! (b->period == 1 && b->round == 1) ) (
/ I note that d->cprice is actually total Qe
IpData=makeFile("dat$O",argv[l],".xlt");
fprintf(lpData,"%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%f\t%f\n",
b->producers,b->consumers,b->maxt,b->period,b->round,d->cpricc,d->pcriodpl);
rewind(lpData)i
inputs=6;
outputs=1i
hidden=4;
iterations=I00;
rows = countRows(lpData);
if(rows >0) ""'-
strcpy(weightFile,makeFileName("w$O",argv[1],".txt"»;
trainNet(inputs,hidden,outputs,iterations,rows,lpData, wcightFilc);
if(b->time==1 && rows>O)[
now[O]=scale(b->producers);
now[l ]=scale(b->consumers);
now[2]=scale(b->maxt);
now[3]=scale(b->period);
now[4]=scale(b->round);
now[S]=scale(d->cprice);
forwardPass(hidden,outputs, inputs, now, w12, w23,sigmoid); / /computc nc:t output
IpNetProfi t=makeFiIe("$OO",argv[1],".xlt");
fprintf(lpNetProfit,l%f\t%f\n",d->periodpl, unScalc(sumOut[O)) );
fclose(lpNetProfit);
c[id).pe=unScaleCsumOut[O»;
free2Cw12);
free2Cw23);
free2CdataIn);
free2CdataOut);
free(sum)j
free(sumOut)j
freeCdOut);
free(dh)j
free(who);
) / / if rows
q=optimumQj / / for feeding in expecd quantity
if(b->time== b->period== b->round == 1) q=supply(c[id).pe,id);
ifCcostCq) > a[id).wealth) printf(""");
c[id).q=(cost(q) <= a[id).wealth && alid).wealth >= O)? q: (a[idl.wealth >(»?
a[id).wealth/cost(q): OJ
a[id).wealth -= cost<did).q)j
did ).qe=c[id ).q;
)/ /time==1
retumOj
) / / end pn2.c
"'-------_.._-- - ----_.... --_ ..__ . _.
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